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Abstract 
Dependability Analysis of Web Services 
Nik Looker 
ii 
Web Services form the basis of web based eCommerce and eScience applications so 
it is vital that robust services are developed. Traditional validation and verification 
techniques are centred around the concept of removing all faults to guarantee correct 
operation whereas Dependability gives an assessment of how dependably a system can 
deliver the required functionality by assessing attributes, and by eliminating threats via 
means attempts to improve dependability. 
Fault injection is a well-proven dependability assessment method. Although much 
work has been done in the area of fault injection and distributed systems in general, 
there appears to have been little research carried out on applying this to middleware 
systems and Web Services in particular. There are additional problems associated with 
applying existing fault injection technologies to Web Services running in a virtual 
machine environment since most are either invasive or work at a machine level. 
The Fault Injection Technology (FIT) method has been devised to address these 
problems for middleware systems. The Web Service-Fault Injection Technology (WS-
FIT) implementation applies the FIT method, based on network level fault injection, to 
Web Services to create a non-invasive dependability assessment method. It allows 
targeted perturbation of Web Service RPC parameters as well as more traditional 
network level fault injection operations. The WS-FIT tool includes taxonomies that 
define a system under test, fault models to apply and failure modes to be detected, and 
uses these taxonomies to generate fault injection campaigns. 
WS-FIT has been applied to a number of case studies and has successfully 
demonstrated its effectiveness. It has also been successfully applied to a third-party 
system to evaluate dependability means. It performed this dependability assessment as 
well as allowing debugging of the means to be undertaken uncovering unknown faults. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 1 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Web Services [23] are a heavily used middleware technology in both eCommerce and 
eScience applications. Web Services also make a major contribution to the Globus 
Toolkit [28]that is the current front running Grid technology. Given the prominence of 
this technology it is vital that methods are developed to ensure that dependable software 
services are deployed. 
Dependability [8] is a discipline that provides an assessment of how much trust can 
be placed on a service to deliver its specified function. Conversely validation and 
verification [60] techniques attempt to determine that a system contains no faults, which 
is an important discipline and increases the overall reliability of a system, but is difficult 
to do with current techniques due to such problems as state explosion. Dependability is 
a more realistic approach to assessing a system since it measures the reliance that can be 
placed upon a service rather than validating it against its specification and includes 
methods that increase this reliance. Indeed Dependability embraces validation and 
verification as a fault prevention means [8]. 
Dependability analysis is therefore vital to aid in increasing the dependability of a 
system, not only to uncover existing problems with services but to also provide 
potential users with metrics to compare similar serviced based solutions. 
A Web Service is a software service defined by a number of standards that can be 
used to provide interoperable data exchange and processing between dissimilar 
machines and architectures. A Web Service by definition has to exchange data in a 
machine independent form and the most popular form currently in use is SOAP [15]. 
Currently Web Services provide both synchronous and asynchronous models but this 
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research will concentrate on the synchronous RPC mechanism [13] defined by the 
W3C. There are two reasons for this: 
1. It is a commonly used model 
2. The coupling of request and response messages simplifies the detection of 
incorrect results in this initial work 
The IFIP Working Group on Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance defines 
dependability in [39] as " ... the trustworthiness of a computing system which allows 
reliance to be justifiably placed on the service it delivers ... ". This definition does not 
mention the system being fault free, just that it should be able to deliver the specified 
service when needed. This is because it is virtually impossible to engineer a system that 
can be guaranteed to be fault free. 
1.1 Dependability 
Validation and verification techniques commonly employed to ensure that systems 
are fit for use attempt to remove all faults so that error conditions cannot occur. Since it 
is not feasible to verify all states a system can achieve it is not possible to completely 
test a system using validation and verification techniques. This is commonly called the 
state explosion problem. Further, this technique can fail to take into account the failure 
of third party items such as operating systems, support software such as databases, and 
the hardware itself. 
Dependability takes a different approach. To understand dependability it is important 
to understand the three main concepts that it utilises: 
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Attributes: Measurements of how Dependable a system is 
Threats: Things that may affect the Dependability of a system 
Means: Ways of increasing the Dependability of a system. 
3 
Attributes are measures of how dependable a system ts. Some attributes are 
quantifiable, for instance you can put a number to them, whilst others are not. For 
instance it is very hard to put a simple numeric value to Confidentiality but relatively 
easy to measure reliability. Dependability is therefore quantified using a loose 
classification of: Dependable, Very Dependable or Highly Dependable. There is a 
judgement applied to the classification of the system. 
Threats are affects on a system that lower its dependability. Here we encounter the 
terms fault, error and failure. 
Fault: A fault is a defect in a system. 
Error: An error is an unexpected state within a system boundary. 
Failure: A failure is an instance in time when a system displays behaviour that is 
contrary to its specification. 
Faults, Errors and Failures are created according to a mechanism. This mechanism is 
sometimes known as a Fault-Error-Failure chain [9]. As a general rule a fault, when 
activated, can lead to an error (which is an invalid state) and the error may lead to 
another error or a failure (which is an observable deviation from the specified behaviour 
at the system boundary). 
The purpose of Dependability means is to break fault-error-failure chains and thereby 
increase the Dependability of a system. There are four means of improving the 
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dependability of a system: 
• Fault Prevention 
• Fault Removal 
• Fault Forecasting. 
• Fault Tolerance 
Therefore Dependability is measured using dependability attributes. It assumes that 
threats can exist in a system and employs means to break fault-error-failure chains and 
thus improve the overall dependability of the system. Since these means employ 
techniques that assume that not all faults are removed from the system it is a more 
realistic approach than verification and validation since it is currently not possible to 
guarantee all faults are removed from a system. 
Further it is a more appropriate way to assess a Service based system since loosely 
coupled service based systems may include third party services which have been 
validated by that third party. There may be a lack of trust between the party constructing 
the service-based system and the service provider such that the validation results may 
not be trusted. Dependability therefore allows means other than verification and 
validation to be used, for instance fault tolerance, to increase the dependability of the 
un-trusted service. 
1.2 Service Environment 
There are a number of problems associated with applying existing fault injection 
technologies to Web Services. Currently Web Services are predominantly written in 
Java to run in a Java Virtual Machine. Unfortunately most fault injection tools are 
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engineered to operate on the physical machine rather than on virtual machines and 
would therefore not allow tight correlation between trigger events and elements of a 
Web Service affected, in effect the fault injection would affect the environment the Web 
Service was running in rather than the Web Service itself. This is similar in effect to 
comparing hardware implemented fault injection and software implemented fault 
injection and its application to an operating system [30]. 
In loosely coupled systems the Services that are selected may not have been assessed 
as part of the constructed system or, in systems that employ ultra late binding [11], may 
change from invocation to invocation. This implies that the assessment technique used 
could be run on individual services as part of the system binding. Further a third party 
who may not supply the source code could supply these Services. This precludes the use 
of some compile-time injection techniques or detailed knowledge of the service other 
than that supplied by the service description and accompanying meta-data. Indeed it 
precludes any fault injector that requires physical access to the machine hosting the 
Service that may be another trust issue with the service provider. 
1.3 Objectives 
Fault injection is a well-proven method of assessing the dependability of a system 
through exercising dependability means. Although much work has been done in the area 
of fault injection and distributed systems in general, there appears to have been little 
research with regard to the application of fault injection techniques to middleware 
products [52]. 
Most dependability assessment of middleware appears to have been conducted using 
observational measurement techniques [ 41]. Some research has been conducted using 
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fault injection to test the dependability of CORBA implementations using network level 
fault injection [52, 53], again with promising results. 
Previous research in the field of service assessment vta fault injection has 
concentrated on tightly coupled, binary protocol, RPC based distributed systems. In 
defining an assessment method for Web Services new sets of challenges are faced 
which require different solutions and are non-trivial to address using existing methods 
and tools. Key differences that are encountered when testing Web Services are: 
1. Greater chance for network failure 
2. Higher levels of security and encryption 
3. More generic nature of the platform and possible virtualization of 
environment 
4. Timing constrains of Web Service operations 
5. Lack of access to physical system 
6. Lack of source code 
This thesis intends to utilise network level fault injection, which has been successfully 
applied to assess CORBA based middleware, to construct a method and tools to provide 
dependability assessment of Web Service systems. In particular this method will be 
concerned with points 2 and 3 because these are qualities of particular importance to 
Web Services. Traditional fault injection techniques can be used to cover points 1 and 4 
although the method will also be capable of assessing these. 
This method should be as non-invasive as possible and be capable of dependability 
analysis without access to the Web Service source code to cover points 5 and 6. The 
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method will also allow easy creation of fault injection campaigns though the use of an 
accompanying tool and provide an analysis of the results obtained. The method should 
be applicable to both the development phase, for example fault removal means, as well 
as during the testing phase to access all dependability means. Given this coverage it 
should also be possible to use the method and tool to assess functionally equivalent 
Web Services to give dependability metrics that can be used to compare and select 
competing Web Services. 
Since middleware messages run over the physical network interface as sequences of 
packets, for instance one message may be split across multiple network packets, the 
fault injector will work at a message level rather than a packet level so it can manipulate 
complete middleware messages. 
1.4 Criteria lFor Success 
Given the objectives defined above a number of criteria to measure the success of the 
work have been defined. These are as follows: 
Method: Devise a method based on network level fault injection to perfonn 
dependability testing of Web Services. This method should be comparable to 
other code insertion methods but with the added benefit of minimal alteration to 
code. 
Tool: Construct a tool for use with the method. This tool will be tailored to injecting 
faults into SOAP packets and will handle the decoding of SOAP packets so that 
lightweight scripts can be written by the user to implement test cases without the 
complexity of decoding SOAP packets. 
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Test Case Construction Method: Devise a method to construct test cases for the 
method given above. This method should be devised to allow easy automation 
so that it can be incorporated into the tool. 
Analysis Method: Devise an analysis method to assess dependability of result sets 
generated by the method. This analysis method should be applicable not only to 
the test phase of system development but also to the development stage. 
Applicable to both development and testing phases: The methods and tools should 
be applicable, not only to the testing phase of a project but also to the 
development phase. The method should also be able to test systems without 
access to source code. 
1.5 Major Contributions 
There are three major contributions of this thesis: 
1. Fault injection at a middleware message level rather than at a network 
message level. This allows fault injection operations to be preformed on an 
entire middleware message and affect a specific middleware service rather 
than test error recovery in a network protocol stack. 
2. Runtime decoding of each middleware message combined with information 
on message formats derived from interface definition language definitions of a 
service to allow targeted triggering on specific messages corresponding to 
specific operations. Further, given this information, specific parameters can be 
perturbed in an RPC exchange allowing network level fault injection to be 
used to perform API level injection similar to Code Insertion techniques. 
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3. Non-invasive manipulation of a service via instrumentation of surrounding 
machines which is comparable to Code Insertion but without physical access 
to the service source code or the machine. 
1.6 Thesis structure 
This thesis is structured into three main parts. 
1. A literature survey examines Web Service middleware (Chapter 2) and 
Dependability (Chapter 3) and examines the problems involved with applying 
Dependability Assessment to Web Services 
2. A method (Chapter 4) and implementation (Chapter 5) are described which 
address the problems described in the literature review 
3. A series of case studies are used to demonstrate the implementation (Chapter 
6) and conclusions are made based on this (Chapter 7). 
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Chapter 2 - Service Terminology and Technology 
This chapter will define the concepts and technology of services that is specifically 
relevant to this thesis. It will explore a general definition of a service and then explore 
how services are utilized via the use of Software-Oriented Architectures and 
implemented as Web Services. 
2.1 Services 
A service in economics and marketing terminology is defined by Boone and Kurtz 
[14] as " ... intangible tasks that satisfY both business and consumer needs.". This 
definition originated to describe activities in the service industry such as hotels, garages, 
barbers, etc. In general terms a service is not owned by the customer but is something 
that is utilised to complete a task. The advantage of utilising a service to do this is that 
the customer does not have to design, maintain or run the service. This definition can 
readily be adapted to software services, which is how the term will be used for the 
remained of this thesis. 
A service in computing terms is an entity that communicates with other entities via 
messages [18]. This definition does not specify that the services be networked or the 
method in which messages should be exchanged. Further it does not specify that the 
entities must perform tasks or satisfy a specified requirement but this is usually taken as 
implied. 
Software services can be characterised as follows: 
1) They must communicate over a network, in the case of Web Services 
this is usually an internet utilising HTTP as the transport protocol 
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2) They must provide an API that can be called by external programs to 
invoke service functions 
3) A service should be discoverable m someway so that external 
programs can utilise the service. This is usually done by registering 
the service in a registry which can be searched by programs 
searching for services 
4) Services should be loosely coupled which allows composed systems 
to be adaptable, for instance a system can be recomposed to utilise 
another service if needed without affecting the function of the system 
as a whole. These characteristics are explored in greater depth in the 
following sections. 
Services are often used to implement client/server architectures. A client/service 
Architecture [66] (also called two-tier architectures) are systems that are composed of a 
client, which utilises a service provided by a server. The client accesses the service on 
the server to perform some task. A client may also be a service itself, thus allowing 
services to be composed from other services. 
A client may be a thin client that needs to do little more than utilize services on 
servers to perform its task, with most, if not all business logic located on the server side. 
Conversely a thick client may implement its business logic local and utilize services 
only to perform specific tasks. Therefore the utilized services would not necessarily 
know any of the business logic. 
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Tasks provided by servers can be varied, for instance file storage, database, complex 
calculation, etc. In the context of Web Services a server may offer a number of services 
through a number of defined interfaces. 
For the purposes of this thesis, when considering service composition, it will be 
assumed that a client can also be a service and use the term client rather than service of 
a service. 
Since services must communicate with each other it is useful to have a model that 
defines this communication pattern. One of the first models defined and still one of the 
most used is the Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [12]. This model allows the 
implementation details of executing a routine on a remote machine to be hidden from 
the client program in such a way as the invocation looks like a normal routine call. This 
is done by hiding the implementation detail of the message exchange in a stub routine. 
A normal RPC invocation would consist of a request message being sent to the remote 
server, the requested processing being executed, and a response message being sent 
back by the server containing the result to the client program. Since data formats on 
clients and servers may vary according to machine architecture data must be converted 
into an agreed format for transfer between machines and this is known as marshalling. 
To utilize a service the data required and the format of the message the service 
requires must be known. A commonly used technique for achieving this without having 
to implement this by hand on a service-by-service basis is to use an Interface Definition 
Language (IDL) [75]. This is a type of language used to define an interface to a service. 
An interface is a collection of accessor methods, and possibly required data structures, 
necessary to utilise the service. IDLs tend to be system specific, for instance DCOM 
IDL [1] and CORBA IDL [2]. 
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While working at an abstract level the above is all that is required to implement a set 
of services and exchange messages between them, indeed if a common platform and 
common hardware is used the above is also adequate. Unfortunately most distributed 
systems rarely run on identical hardware and are frequently required to communicate 
with legacy systems and other organizations hardware/software. To overcome this 
problem and allow service-based systems to be constructed rniddleware is used. 
Middleware [73] is connectivity software that consists of a set of enabling services 
that allow multiple processes running on one or more machines to communicate across 
a network. Middleware eliminates differences between machines in a heterogeneous 
environment by marshalling data and includes an agreed set of useful functions. 
2.2 Processing Models 
For a third party to offer a software service to a customer there is usually an implied 
need for the service to operate on a separate processor. 
Once a number of processors are available it is possible to execute code in ways other 
than a simple sequential flow of control. The two main ways to achieve this are Parallel 
Processing and Distributed Processing and this section will give an overview of these 
two processing models. 
Parallel Processing [62] is an approach that allows processing to be shared out 
between a number of CPUs so that parts of a system can be executed at the same time. 
This approach originated on arrays of multiple processors linked by a bus. Such systems 
usually have access to common shared memory. 
It is also possible to implement an approach similar to parallel processing using a 
number of processors linked together by a computer network and this is termed 
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distributed processing. Although these two techniques share aspects in common they are 
two distinct programming models since distributed systems do not share memory, 
network operations are orders of magnitude slower that bus transfers and distributed 
systems tend to be geographically distributed as well. Further distributed systems can be 
independently owned so there can be trust issues involved in distributed processing. 
Services allow distributed processing to be undertaken in two different ways. Firstly, 
a Service can be invoked by asynchronous messaging rather than by a more traditional 
RPC mechanism. This allows a client to continue processing whilst the Service (hosted 
on a different machine) processes the request. When the Service has processed the 
request an asynchronous response message can be sent back if required. 
Secondly, if a synchronous RPC mechanism is being used parallel processing is still 
inherently present in the system if a number of Services are in use by a number of 
clients since RPC requests are sent to different Services at different times by different 
clients. This means that at any one time different servers are servicing requests in 
parallel. This is the model that will be examined in this thesis. 
2.3 Service-Oriented Architectures 
Distributed services must be organised into a system to be useful and a common 
architecture used to accomplish this is a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). SOA is 
an architecture that represents software functionality as discoverable services on a 
network. Channabasavaiah et al [21] define a SOA as 
"an application architecture within which all functions are defined as 
independent services with well-defined invokable interfaces, which can be 
called in defined sequences to form business processes." 
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The main principles are not new, for instance CORBA provides functionality by 
offering functions as components [2], but SOAs provide a number of advantages such 
as loose coupling and late binding. However, these advantages come with potential 
problems not least in the area of dependability. Given the widespread usage of these 
technologies methods for increasing the reliability of SOA is greatly desired. 
Loose coupling [10] is the capability of services to be composed and utilized on 
demand, possibly using different system technologies, to create a working system. This 
can be accomplished using a combination of Dynamic composition [54], which is the 
composing of systems from existing services that are discovered at runtime, and late 
binding. Loose coupling implies that a service is referentially transparent from any data 
or other services that it requires. From a dependability point of view this makes it 
impossible to assess a complete system since each time the system is composed it may 
be composed of different services. It can also have an impact on the integrity of the 
system since the integrity of the services used may be in question, for instance you may 
bind to a malicious service. 
Late Binding [10, 11] is the property of a system which allows a system to bind to a 
service at runtime, rather than at compile time. A new provider of a service can make a 
description of a new service available at runtime and an existing client can then utilize 
the new implementation without modification of it's code. This method implies that the 
client is written in such a way as to accommodate the utilization of new services in 
some way rather than just dynamically composing itself from already known service 
definitions. 
Whilst late binding is a very useful facility and essential for the construction of 
loosely coupled systems it means that new services can potentially be deployed which 
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have not been assessed with the combination of services being used by an SOA, and as 
described above the integrity of the service could be called into question. 
A directory service [32] can be used to supply an SOA with a service discovery 
function. A directory service is a service that keeps track of the location of available 
services. When a service becomes available it registers itself with a directory service. 
The directory service is sent the description of the service and its location. Once 
registered a client, or another service, can query the directory service to obtain this 
information and thus utilize the registered service. This process is known as service 
discovery. 
A directory service also has the potential to provide alternate services that match a 
requested description, for instance if a directory service has two entries for an identical 
service on different servers it could transparently provide either service entry to a 
requesting call. This can be leveraged by such dependability means as n .. voter 
algorithms and multi-version diversity to provide functionally equivalent services. 
A common directory services is Universal Description, Discovery and Integration 
(UDDI) [4]. This provides a way to publish and discover web services. The UDDI 
server is logic~lly centralized but physic~lly replicated to provide fault tolerance. Once 
registered a service is effectively published to the whole network and is automatically 
replicated on all servers 
Dependability is a key factor for SOAs. Many traditional distributed systems 
performing business-to-business (B2B) [32] operations, for instance those in the 
banking domain, perform computations that require very little execution time but the 
impact of incorrect results can have far reaching financial consequences. Conversely, 
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scientific Grid applications often perform tasks that require many days to complete so 
any failures during this time can have a considerable impact in terms of time and hence 
indirectly to costs thorough man hours lost. Dependability is therefore essential for both 
types of SOA to reduce the risk of failures. 
The cost and difficulty of containing and recovering from faults in service-based 
applications may be higher than that for normal applications [ 46] whilst the 
heterogeneous nature of services within an SOA means that many service-based 
applications will be functioning in environments where interaction faults, operational 
faults caused by a system interacting with another system within the environment, are 
more likely to occur. Dependability means are therefore an advantage in these situations 
since they can be used to mitigate faults without the need to remove them. 
Research in providing dependable SO As falls into two main disciplines [29]: 
• Increasing the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). 
• Reducing the Mean Time To Recover (MTTR). 
These concepts will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
2.4 Web Services 
A Web Service is software service defined by a number of standards that can be used 
to provide interoperable data exchange and processing between dissimilar machines and 
architectures. For the purposes of this research it is concerned with Web Services 
defined by the W3C that are described by WSDL [22] and implemented using SOAP 
[15] and the RPC model. 
Web Services are commonly used to provide the 'building blocks' of SOA and, as 
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such, any dependability assessment method that targets them will be of wide use, not 
only to Web Services but also to Globus Grid services, which utilize the same 
technology. 
2.5 Extensible Markup Language 
Both WSDL and SOAP utilize Extensible Markup Language (XML) to define and 
implement Web Service message exchange. XML notation and terminology is used 
frequently in this thesis and the following covers the basic terms used. 
XML is a standard for document markup [16, 36]. It provides a document layout that 
allows a document to be self-describing and portable thus allowing data transfer 
between dissimilar systems. Its portability is largely due to it being an ASCII format 
document, with numeric values encoded as strings. Since it is portable it largely 
eliminates the need for marshalling and unmarshalling of data but this overhead is 
replaced by the need to construct XML documents and parse them at the receiving 
machine so no net gain is obtained by eliminating marshalling. 
An XML document is structured from a number of Elements. An Element is 
composed of a Start Tag, an End Tag and Element Content. The document can have 
only one root element, with all other elements nested within it. An example XML 
document is given in Table 2-1 and this shows the basic structure and format of a 
typical XML document with examples of all the major features. 
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Table 2-1: An example XML Document 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="IS0-88S9-1" standalone="yes"?> 
<root> 
<elementl> 
<element2 attrl="some value" attr2="some other value"> 
Some element content and some &lt;escaped&gt; characters 
<element4 /> 
</element2> 
<elementS> 
<1 [CDATA[ 
19 
A CDATA section can contain unescaped characters like 
<>& etc ••• 
] ]> 
</elementS> 
</elementl> 
<element6 /> 
</root> 
A start tag consists of a tag name and an optional number of attributes, for instance 
<element2 attrl="some value" attr2="some other value"> 
The Start Tag and attribute names can be any user-defined name which may be made 
up from standard English letters and digits, non-English letters and ideograms as well as 
certain punctuation characters. The End Tag for an element must be the Start Tag name 
preceded by a solidus. 
Element Content can be a mixture of free format text and Elements. Free format text 
can take one of two forms: 
1. Normal characters and escaped special characters such as greater than and less 
than symbols 
2. CDA T A that is unescaped free format text enclosed in a CDA T A tag. 
Escaped symbols consist mainly of symbols that appear in the syntax of element tags, 
such as great than or less than symbols. 
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Namespaces are a way of grouping sets of elements and attributes together and an 
example is given in Table 2-2. They have two main uses: 
1. Distinguish between elements and attributes from different vocabularies that 
share the same names 
2. Group together related elements and attributes in an XML document so that 
applications can easily recognize them 
Table 2-2: Example XML using namespaces 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
instance"> 
<soapenv:Body> 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
<nsl:testl 
soapenv:encodingstyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:nsl="http://testl.testsuite.samples.wsfit.org"> 
<pl xsi:type="xsd:int">O</pl> 
</nsl:testl> 
</soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
XML is extremely flexible and can be used to represent a large variety of data but 
most programs that utilize XML are not designed to be this flexible and are only 
concerned with a sub-set of XML elements. XML can be limited by defining a 
Document Type Definition (DTD). A DTD can be used to define which elements are 
permissible and the circumstances that these elements can be used under. XML parsers 
can validate an XML document against a DTD and determine if it is valid according to 
the syntax defined by the DTD. 
DTDs allow the basic structure and syntax of an XML document to be defined and 
validated. A DTD cannot be used to limit such things as data types used within an 
element. For this purpose an XML Schema must be used. Schemas can be used to 
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describe and enforce complex restrictions on an XML document, such as type 
information for contents and complex data types. 
It is possible to check an XML document to see if it follows the XML syntax rules 
and this process is called validation. Validation is performed by parsing the XML 
document through a parser. This is a piece of software designed to read and validate 
XML against a set of restrictions defined in a DTD or schema. 
2.6 WSDL 
Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is an XML-based IDL used to define 
Web Services interfaces and how to access them [22, 23]. Our research is mainly 
concerned with RPC message exchanges and WSDL lends itself well to providing 
explicit information on the structure of message exchanges between Web Services and 
their clients. 
Table 2-3 shows an example WSDL description of a message. A WSDL message 
description is composed of an element that has a unique name attribute that is used to 
identify the message and a number of part elements. Each part defines a parameter or 
return value in the case of a response message. A part has an associated name that must 
be unique within the message element and a type that defines the parameter type. There 
are a number of predefined types and complex types can also be defined using a types 
element. 
Table 2-3: Example WSDL Description of a Message 
<wsdl:message name="unregisterserviceRequest"> 
<wsdl:part name="context" type="xsd:string"/> 
<wsdl:part name="entry" type="impl:ServiceEntry"/> 
</wsdl:message> 
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Once all request and response messages required to implement the RPC style 
interface have been defined they can be used to define the calling interface for a Web 
Service. This is done by use of the portType element (see Table 2-4). A portType 
contains a number of operation elements with each operation element corresponding to 
a method of the Web Service. Each operation is made up of an input element that will 
be the request part of the RPC and an output element that will be the response part of 
the RPC. 
Table 2-4: Example WSDL PortType 
<wsdl:portType name="Register"> 
<wsdl:operation name="registerService" 
parameterOrder="context entry"> 
<wsdl:input name="registerServiceRequest" 
message="impl:registerServiceRequest"/> 
<wsdl:output name="registerServiceResponse" 
message="impl:registerserviceResponse"/> 
</wsdl:operation> 
<wsdl:operation name="unregisterService" 
parameterOrder="context entry"> 
<wsdl:input name="unregisterServiceRequest" 
message="impl:unregisterServiceRequest"/> 
<wsdl:output name="unregisterServiceResponse" 
message="impl:unregisterServiceResponse"/> 
</wsdl:operation> 
</wsdl:portType> 
The above explanation briefly describes the use of WSDL to define a classic RPC 
style Web Service. WSDL can also be used to describe other styles of Web Service 
calling interface such as message-oriented calling but this is outside the scope of this 
research. 
2.7 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [15, 23] is a messaging protocol designed to 
allow the exchange of messages over a network. It is XML based to allow the exchange 
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of messages between dissimilar machines. It is extensively used to implement Web 
Services so it has been chosen as the middleware protocol to examine. 
The research conducted in this thesis is primarily concerned with the RPC mechanism 
over SOAP. This is defined by the W3C in [33] and describes a general purpose RPC 
mechanism. The message types that are involved in an RPC exchange and the relevant 
features used by the WS-FIT method are briefly reviewed here. 
A SOAP message utilizes the http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/ schema 
which defines the namespace soapenv and this namespace is setup in the 
soapenv:Envelope element. Consequently all elements that unitise this namespace must 
be enclosed by the soapenv:Envelope element. The soapenv namespace defines a 
semantic framework for SOAP messages. 
The body, or payload, of the SOAP message is enclosed by the soapenv:Body 
element. This element acts as a grouping for the body elements for different types of 
messages. Its primary function is to keep the body elements distinct from other 
grouping of elements, for instance a header block. 
These two elements form the basis of a SOAP message. The soapenv:Body element is 
then populated with elements that make up the payload of a request, response of fault 
message. 
A typical request message is given in Table 2-5. The request message name is defined 
in the wsdl:operation (see Section 2.6) but by convention the name of the message 
equates to the service method name but it can be defined as any valid name. In the 
example the message and method name are getQuote. The message element is therefore 
nsl:getQuote. The namespace nsl is defined to be the urn of the service that implements 
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the method. If this is combined with the address of the server hosting the service this 
allows a specific method of a specific service on a specific server to be identified. 
Table 2-5: Typical Request Message 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<soapenv:Body> 
<nsl:getQuote 
soapenv:encodingstyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:nsl="http://quote.stock.samples.dasbs.org"> 
<symbol xsi:type="xsd:string">foo</symbol> 
</nsl:getQuote> 
</soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
The ns 1 : getQuote element contains parameter elements that represent the RPC 
parameters, for instance the getQuote method takes one string parameter called symbol 
so nsl:getQuote contains one element with an element tag symbol which contains the 
string data for that parameter. Parameters are defined in WSDL by wsdl:part elements 
in wsdl:message elements (see Section 2.6). 
A typical response message is given in Table 2-6. The response message is similar in 
structure to the request message but by convention the response message name is post-
fixed with the word Response although again it can be any valid name defined in the 
wsdl:operation element. In this example the response element name IS 
ns 1: getQuoteResponse. 
A response element contains elements that represent any method return value and any 
parameters that are marked to be marshalled in-out or out. Method return results follow 
the naming convention of the method name post fixed by the word Return and are 
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represented in the WSDL by wsdl:part elements. In-out and out parameters follow the 
same conventions as parameters in a request message. 
The example response message in Table 2-6 also demonstrates the format that objects 
and arrays are marshalled in a SOAP message. This utilizes the multiRef element. Each 
object or item in an array is created using a multiRef that has an id. The actual 
parameter/return value is then set to this reference id and the complex data can then be 
constructed within the multiRef element in the same way that individual parameters are 
constructed in a message. This technique applies to both request and response messages. 
Table 2-6: Typical Response Message 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.wJ.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance"> 
<soapenv:Body> 
<nsl:getQuoteResponse 
soapenv:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:nsl="http://quote.stock.samples.dasbs.org"> 
<getQuoteReturn href="#idO"/> 
</nsl:getQuoteResponse> 
<multiRef id="idO" 
soapenc:root="O" 
soapenv:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xsi:type="ns2:QuoteValue" 
xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:ns2="http://quote.stock.samples.dasbs.org"> 
<date xsi:type="xsd:dateTime">2004 10 30Tl0:54:18.511Z</date> 
<quote xsi:type="xsd:double">47.5</quote> 
</multiRef> 
</soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
Table 2-7 shows a typical SOAP Fault Message. Fault Messages are used to return 
failure information from a server to a client. The soapenv:Fault element contains three 
elements: faultcode, faultstring and detail. These elements are used to convey failure 
information to the client with the faultstring and detail elements being language 
specific, for instance using Axis 1. 1 for Java if a piece of user code on a server throws a 
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Java exception the faultcode is set to soapenv:Server.userException to indicate that the 
fault originates in server side user code, then the fault string is set to the text description 
of exception and the detail element is not used. 
Table 2-7: Typical Fault Message 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance"> 
<soapenv:Body> 
<soapenv:Fault> 
<faultcode>soapenv:Server.userException</faultcode> 
<faultstring> 
java.rmi.RemoteException: can&apos;t get a stock price for this 
symbol 
</faultstring> 
<detail/> 
</soapenv:Fault> 
</soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the concepts, problems and commonly used technology for 
implementing SOA. This review has concentrated on SOA implemented using Web 
Services since this is currently the predominant technology. It has highlighted that, 
because of the duration and financial consequences of failures of SO As, dependability is 
a key factor. It has also highlighted that dynamically constructed, loosely coupled SOA 
are particularly hard to assess because: 
1. The combination of services used may vary each time the SOA is constructed 
2. New services may become available that have not already been assessed 
within the SOA. 
Since SOAs composed in this manner may not have been assessed using a particular 
combination of services this implies that the level of trust in the SOA will be reduced 
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since interaction faults may be present that have not been detected. Also since services 
may be included in the SOA without being assessed at all this may lead to a decreases in 
the integrity of the SOA. 
SOA constructed from Web services utilise XML based protocols to exchange 
information. An RPC model allows a request to be coupled with a response, which 
allows easier error detection when injecting faults. Combining this with interfaces 
defined in WSDL, another XML based technology, then an easily decodable system 
definition and message exchange that can be easily manipulated is obtained. 
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Chapter 3 - Dependability Terminology and Fault Injection 
This chapter reviews and gives a consistent definition of the field of Dependability 
since, particularly in the area of Quality of Service, there is variation amongst the 
meaning of some of the terms used, for instance contrast A vizienis et al [8] with 
Somerville [60]. This chapter attempts to give a standard definition of all relevant terms 
and they are taken to be definitive throughout this thesis. 
3.1 A Definition of Quality of Service for Web Services 
When assessing the reliability of a system it is useful to have some agreed 
measurement to determine the quality of a system. A commonly used measurement is 
Quality of Service (QoS) [60]. QoS is commonly used in networking where it is defined 
by Steinmetz et al [63] as 
" ... a concept for specifYing how 'good' the offered networking services are. 
QoS can be characterised by a number of specific parameters. " 
When applied to Web Services this definition has to be slightly modified. Haas et al 
[34] define Quality of Service as 
" ... an obligation accepted and advertised by a provider entity to service 
consumers. 
where an obligation is defined as 
" ... a kind of policy that prescribes actions and/or states of an agent and/or 
resource 
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The factors that go to make up the obligation cover a wide range of factors that are 
combined to define the QoS offered by a system but the following factors are 
commonly used [51] and are taken as definitive when used in this work: 
Availability: the quality aspect of whether a Web Service is present and ready for 
use. This is represented as the probability that a Web Service will be available at 
a specific time. This may be affected by such things as time to complete a 
pervious operation, loading on a particular service, etc. 
Accessibility: the quality aspect that represents the degree the Web Service is capable 
of serving a request and a specific point in time. This is different from 
Availability since a service may be available but not accessible. For instance the 
initial request can be accepted but it cannot be processed due to some other 
dependency, for instance it may depend on another unavailable service, so that 
the request would be queued awaiting a response from the unavailable service. 
Accessibility can be improved by improving the scalability of a system. 
Integrity: the quality of the Web Service maintaining the correctness of any 
interaction. If a transaction fails data should remain in a consistent state. This 
can be achieved through mechanisms such as distributed commit [67], rollback 
mechanisms [65], etc. This also encompasses the concept of malicious 
tampering with a service. 
Performance: the quality aspect that is defined in terms of the throughput of a Web 
Service and the latency. Throughput is defined asthe number of requests 
serviced in a given period and the latency is the time taken to service a request. 
The aim is to produce a high throughput but low latency system. Throughput and 
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latency can be affected by such factors as processor speed, code efficiency, 
network transfer time, etc. 
Reliability: the quality aspect that represents the capability of maintaining the service 
and service quality. One measurement of reliability is the number of failures 
during a given period [59]. 
Regulatory: the quality aspect that the service corresponds to rules, laws, standards 
and specifications. This can have an affect on areas such as availability, 
performance, and reliability through Service Level Agreements (SLA). SLA can 
define minimum levels of performance expected by a service that set levels for 
its dependability. 
Security: the quality aspect that defines confidentiality for parties using a service. 
This can be influenced by regulatory factors. It can also affect performance due 
to the extra overhead incurred in implementing security mechanisms. 
Some attributes can be quantitatively measured and others remain harder to quantify, 
for example Reliability can be measured by failures over time but the effectives of 
Regulatory cannot be measured by any simple means (See Table 3-1) 
Table 3-1: Quantifiable QoS Attributes 
Attribute 
Availability 
Accessibility 
Integrity 
Performance 
Reliability 
Regulatory 
Security 
Quantifiable 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
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3.2 Dependability 
Quality of Service attempts to give a measurement of the over all quality of a service 
and utilises some of the same attributes present in Dependability, whilst Dependability 
is concerned not only with measuring the Dependability of a system but also with 
means to improve the Dependability of the System. 
The IFIP Working Group on Dependable Computing and Fault Tolerance [39] defines 
dependability as 
"The notion of dependability, defined as the trustworthiness of a computing 
system which allows reliance to be justifiably placed on the service it 
delivers, enables these various concerns to be subsumed within a single 
conceptual framework. " · 
A number of factors affect the dependability of a system [8] but for the purpose of our 
research we are interested in factors that can be used to assess dependability via fault 
injection [74]. Dependability can be assessed and increased by the use of three things: 
1. A way to assess the Dependability of a system 
2. An understanding of the things that can affect the Dependability of a system 
3. Ways to increase the Dependability of a system. 
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These things are known respectively as: 
1. Attributes 
2. Threats 
3. Means 
3.2.1 Attributes 
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Attributes are measurements that can be applied to a system to determine its overall 
dependability. A generally agreed list of Attributes is: 
1. Availability - the probability that a service is present and ready for use 
2. Reliability- the capability of maintaining the service and service quality 
3. Safety - the absence of catastrophic consequences 
4. Confidentiality- information is accessible only to those authorised to use it 
5. Integrity- the absence of improper system alterations 
6. Maintainability- to undergo modifications and repairs 
As with QoS some attributes are quantifiable by direct measurements whilst others 
are more subjective, for instance Safety cannot be measured directly via metrics but is a 
subjective assessment that requires judgmental information to be applied to give a level 
of confidence, whereas Reliability can be quantified by physical metrics (See Table 
3-2). The method devised in this work will focus on the quantifiable aspects of 
dependability, for instance Availability and Reliability. 
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Table 3-2: Quantifiable Dependability Attributes 
Attribute 
Availability 
Reliability 
Safety 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Maintainability 
uantifiable 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
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Security is sometimes classed as an attribute [60] but the current view is to aggregate 
it together with dependability and treat it as a composite term called Dependability and 
Security [8]. The reasoning behind this is that a dependable system must also be secure 
since otherwise its Integrity and Confidentiality could not be guaranteed. In this thesis 
the term Dependability will be assumed to be the composite definition of Dependability 
and Security even if not explicitly stated. 
3.2.2 Threats 
Threats are things that can affect a system and cause a drop in Dependability. There 
are three main terms that must be clearly understood: 
Fault- A fault (which is usually referred to as a bug for historic reasons) is a defect 
in a system. The presence of a fault in a system may or may not lead to a failure, 
for instance although a system may contain a fault its input and state conditions 
may never cause this fault to be executed so that an error occurs and thus never 
exhibits as a failure. 
Error - An error is a discrepancy between the intended behaviour of a system and its 
actual behaviour inside the system boundary. Errors occur at runtime when, some 
part of the system enters an unexpected state due to the activation of a fault. 
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Since errors are generated from invalid states they are hard to observe without 
special mechanisms, such as debuggers or debug output to logs. 
Failure - A failure is an instance in time when a system displays behaviour that is 
contrary to its specification. An error may not necessarily cause a failure, for 
instance an exception may be thrown by a system but this may be caught and 
handled using fault tolerance techniques so the overall operation of the system 
will conform to the specification. 
It is important to note that Failures are measured at the system boundary. They are 
basically Errors that have propagated to the system boundary and have become 
observable. 
Faults, Errors and Failures operate according to a mechanism. This mechanism is 
sometimes known as a Fault-Error-Failure chain [9]. As a general rule a fault, when 
activated, can lead to an error (which is an invalid state) and the invalid state generated 
by an error may lead to another error or a failure (which is an observable deviation from 
the specified behaviour at the system boundary). 
Once a fault is activated an error is created. An error may act in the same way as a 
fault in that it can create further error conditions, therefore an error may propagate 
multiple times within a system boundary without causing an observable failure. If an 
error propagates outside the system boundary a failure is said to occur. A failure is 
basically the point at which it can be said that a service is failing to meet its 
specification. Since the output data from one service may be feed into another, a failure 
in one service may propagate into arJ.other service as a fault so a chain can be formed of 
. . 
the form: Fault leading to Error leading to Failure leading to Error, etc. 
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3.2.3 Means 
Since the mechanism of a Fault-Error-Chain is understood it is possible to construct 
means to break these chains and thereby increase the dependability of a system. 
There are four means of improving the dependability of a system: 
1. Prevention 
2. Removal 
3. Fore casting 
4. Tolerance 
Fault Prevention deals with preventing faults being incorporated into a system. This 
can be accomplished by use of development methodologies, and good implementation 
techniques. 
Fault Removal can be sub-divided into two sub-categories: 
1. Removal During Development 
2. Removal During Use 
Removal during development requires verification so that faults can be detected and 
removed before a system is put into production. Once systems have been put into 
production a system is needed to record failures and remove them via a maintenance 
cycle. 
Fault Forecasting predicts likely faults so that they can be removed or their effects 
can be circumvented. 
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Fault Tolerance [49] deals with putting mechanisms in place that will allow a system 
to function in the presence of faults but still deliver the required service, although that 
service may be at a degraded level. 
Dependability means are intended to reduce the number of failures presented to the 
user of a system. Failures are traditionally measured over time and it is useful to 
understand how they are measured so that the effectiveness of means can be assessed. 
Failure rate is a frequently used measurement that denotes the frequency with which 
failures occur and is represented by the Greek letter A. When used in relation to 
software it is often expressed as failures per hour but any measurement of time can be 
used in place of hours, indeed the units need not be based on time but based on any 
measurable period, for instance revolutions and miles are commonly used in general 
engmeenng. 
For mechanical systems it is common for the failure rate to increase during the 
lifetime of a component due, for instance due to mechanical wear, so this makes failure 
rate time dependent. Software systems, on the other hand, are often described as having 
no wear over time so failure rate can be considered constant. Whilst this is generally 
true there are factors which can cause failure rates to increase over time, for instance 
hardware failure of the environment running the software, but it is widely accepted as 
an approximation [37]. In this special case the failure rate is defined as the reciprocal of 
the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). 
1 MI'BF=-
;.._ 
or 
1 8=-
A 
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Thus it is the mean number of failures per hour (if the failure rate is measured in 
hours). There are variations on MTBF that break it down into discrete components. 
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is often used to denote the mean time for a failure to 
occur when a system is replaced in some way after the failure, for instance a new 
system is swapped in or the fault is fixed. This term does not include the time it takes to 
rectify the failure or replace the faulty component. This time is usually described as the 
Mean Time To Recovery (MTTR). So MTBF can be described as: 
fJ = MITF + MITR 
The MTTF can be used to improve the dependability of a system, for instance by 
making the MTTF very long, failures become infrequent and thus the reliability of the 
system is increased. Time and financial considerations may make this approach hard to 
achieve in practice so a different approach may be taken. The MTTR is small it may be 
acceptable to have a shorter MTTF since the system will recover quickly from a failure 
so failures can occur more frequently. 
A long MTTF can be an issue when a assessing and debugging a system since it 
means that in normal operation: 
1. Faults will take a long time to manifest themselves as failures, making fault 
removal problematic 
2. Fault tolerance means may not be exercised during development, which 
means that they will remain unproved until the execution of a fault in a 
production system causes their use. 
The second point can easily be assessed using fault injection since faults can be 
injected in such as way as to exercise fault tolerance mechanisms. 
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3.2.4 Fault Tolerance 
Fault tolerance is a specific Dependability Means that can directly improve the 
Dependability of a system and, since it acts to break fault-error-failure chains, it can be 
evaluated using fault injection. It therefore makes a good case study for this thesis. The 
function of fault-tolerance has been described by A vizienis [7] as 
'~ .. to preserve the delivery of expected services despite the presence of fault-
caused errors within the system itself Errors are detected and corrected, 
and permanent faults are located and removed while the system continues to 
deliver acceptable service." 
There are many mechanisms available to implement fault tolerance in software 
systems but a popular approach when seeking to tolerate both development faults and 
physical machine failures is that of design diversity, which can be defined as the 
production of two or more systems aimed at delivering the same service through 
separate designs and realizations. 
Redundancy has long been used as a means of increasing the availability of 
distributed systems, with key components being replicated to protected against 
hardware failure [47]. Redundancy can be achieved either through: 
1. Hardware modules can be replicated to provide backup capacity when a 
failure occurs 
2. Redundancy can be achieved usmg software solutions to replicate key 
elements of a business process. 
Redundancy can be dynamic or static. Both use replication but in static redundancy, 
all replicas are active at the same time. If one replica fails another replica can be used 
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immediately with little impact on response times. Dynamic redundancy has one replica 
active at one time and others are kept in a standby state. If the active replica fails, a 
previously inactive replica must be initialized and take over operations. This type of 
replication is more often used in hardware replication. 
Redundancy has many attractions as a technique for providing fault tolerance in a 
system but it also incurs a number of overheads in its use. These include: 
1. The cost of replicating calls to replicas 
2. An increase in the complexity of system design 
3. The cost of providing and maintaining the replicas 
Once redundancy has been introduced into a system it can also be used to protect 
against Byzantine faults through the use of the N-version model [57]. Most hardware 
failures result from either physical defects sustained during manufacture or develop 
over time as components wear out. This is not the case with software failures since 
software does not wear out. Software failures result from the invocation of paths that 
contain faults. Since software is typically more complex than hardware it can be 
expected to contain many more faults resulting in more failures. 
TheN-version model is a design pattern for implementing software fault tolerance. 
Physical faults, such as machine failure, can be handled by redundancy. Simply 
replicating a single software component n times may not eliminate a particular failure 
since the software fault will exist in each replica. 
The N-Version model uses n independently implemented versions of a software 
component run in parallel. By running the components in parallel with the same input 
data a set of results is obtained. By using a voting mechanism on this set of results 
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individual failures in a component can be eliminated and the integrity of the final result 
is increased. The voter will guarantee, to some agreed level of integrity, to return a 
correct result or flag an error. 
Since each version of the component is independently implemented each should 
contain a different set of faults and the voting process can cancel these out. In practice 
common-mode failures can still occur since developers tend to implement similar 
solutions to problems [44], and also Web Service composition can include common 
Web Services increasing the chance of common-mode failure [68, 70] but there is still a 
significant gain in reliability from using this model [ 4 7]. As stated by Knight et al in 
[44] 
" ... our result does not mean that N-version programming does not work or 
should never be used. It means that the reliability of anN-version system 
may not be as high as theory predicts under the assumption of 
independence. If the implementation issues can be resolved for a particular 
N version system, the required reliability might be achieved by using a 
larger value for N using the coincident errors model to predict reliability." 
The voting mechanism used in an N-version system can become a single point of 
failure within a system. This is traditionally overcome by making the voting mechanism 
simple and conducting extensive testing to determine its reliability. A tiered voting 
mechanism can be used to reduce the chance of failure through machine faults. 
An N-version model has traditionally been more expensive to design and implement 
that a single system since each version must be designed, implemented and maintained. 
With the advent of SOA and Web Services this cost may be reduced since many 
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independent vendors may offer functionally-equivalent Web Services which can be 
used to construct an N-version system, thus eliminating a large part of the 
implementation and maintenance cost. 
Some work has been conducted on constructing frameworks to facilitate N-version 
models using Web Services. Most prominently is the work ofTownend et al [68, 70] on 
the FT -Grid system which allows dynamic construction of N-version systems from 
existing Web Services. A simpler system designed for creating static N-version systems 
from Web Services is WS-FTM by Looker et al [48]. This system is less complex and 
service discovery is left to the application software unlike FT -Grid but it does allow 
construction of complex N-version systems and is therefore an ideal test bed for fault 
injection experiments. 
3.3 Dependability Assessment 
This work will focus on Dependability Analysis [8] rather than more traditional 
validation testing [61] and one of the areas focused on will be that of Dependability 
Means assessment. System dependability can be assessed using either model-based or 
measurement-based techniques [52]. Both techniques have their merits. 
Modelling can be used in the design stage to predict potential errors and faults in 
algorithms. Measurement can be applied to existing systems to provide metrics on 
dependability. 
Modelling can only make predictions of the dependability of a system since it is 
derived from system design, specification and code documents. Once a system has been 
implemented actual measurement techniques can be applied to obtain specific metrics 
and allow data on dependability to be derived from them. 
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Measurement techniques are useful because they can be applied to existing systems, 
and may not require access to source code or design documentation. There are two main 
measurement techniques: 
1. Observation 
2. Fault Injection 
Observation [ 41] measurements can be performed by the observation of errors and 
failures in a large set of deployed systems. This technique uses existing logs, either logs 
maintained by the system administrator or logs generated automatically by the system. 
Analysis of the data can obtain information on the frequency of faults and the activity 
that was in progress when they occurred. Since failures and errors may occur 
infrequently data must be collected over a long period of time and from a large number 
of systems. Even with this it is unlikely that this technique will catch rarely seen errors 
[37] since the MTTF may be very large (in the order of years). 
3.4 Fault Injection 
Fault injection [74] is a group of techniques that attempt to induce faults into a 
running system to assess, not only its tolerance to faults but it can also be used to 
exercise seldom used control pathways within the system which would otherwise go 
unused for long periods of time [19]. Since the MTTF may be very large, Fault 
Injection attempts to speed up this process by deliberately injecting faults into a running 
system in an attempt to speed up the production of errors and hence either exercise 
dependability means or produce failures. Fault injection can be used to simulate unusual 
input conditions and exercise the boundaries between software components that would 
otherwise rely on being exercised by calls generated by other components in response to 
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user input. Since this input will go through a number of intermediate steps it is 
extremely unlikely that this testing would be able to exercise all conditions of the 
component using traditional testing techniques [76]. 
Fault injection should be used as a supplement to traditional testing techniques. 
Traditional testing is intended to check that a system meets the requirements of the 
specification using expected input and conditions, whilst fault injection techniques are 
intended to assess the operation of a system under exceptional conditions and invalid 
input. Because fault injection assesses exceptional conditions and accelerates the 
occurrence of errors it is not suitable for the measurement of reliability or MTBF since 
these statistics are related to failures and time. These must be measured by 
observational techniques [38]. 
The technique of fault injection dates back to the 1970s [20] when it was first used to 
induce faults at a hardware level. This type of fault injection is called Hardware 
Implemented Fault Injection (HWIFI) and attempts to simulate hardware failures within 
a system. The first experiments in hardware fault injection involved nothing more that 
shorting connections on circuit boards and observing the effect on the system (bridging 
faults). It was used primarily as a test of the dependability of the hardware system. Later 
specialized hardware was developed to extend this technique, such as devices to 
bombard specific areas of a circuit board with heavy radiation. 
HWIFI is divided into two types: 
HWIFI With Contact: this involves the use of specialized hardware, which makes 
el~ctrical contact with a target chip. These connections can cause current and 
voltage changes externally to the chip. These voltage changes can be used to 
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simulate a number of different physical faults. By analyzing the electrical signals 
input into the chip and using timers it is possible to control fault injection timing 
with a good degree of accuracy. 
BWIFI Without Contact: this involves bombarding a specific part of a target device 
with heavy ion radiation or placing the target device in a strong magnetic field. 
This has the advantage of simulating natural physical phenomena but it has the 
disadvantage that it is very hard to control fault injection timing since there are 
latencies involved in physically firing these fault devices. 
It was soon found that faults could be induced by software techniques and that aspects 
of this technique could be useful for assessing software systems. Collectively these 
techniques are known as Software Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI). 
The earliest application of SWIFI was Mill's fault seeding approach [55] which was 
later refined by stratified fault-seeding [56]. These techniques worked by adding a 
number of known faults to a software system for the purpose of monitoring the rate of 
detection and removal. This assumed it is is possible to estimate the number of 
remaining faults in a software system still to be detected by a particular test 
methodology. True SWIFI methods of injecting faults that simulated HWIFI faults soon 
followed [74]. 
In recent years there has been more interest in developing SWIFI based tools. This is 
partly because a SWIFI tool does not require any expensive specialized hardware. 
SWIFT also allow specific systems running on target hardware to be effectively targeted 
without injecting faults into other parts of the system. This is difficult to do with HWIFI 
techniques. 
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SWIFI also has a number of drawbacks: 
• Faults can not be injected into memory that is in protected, for instance a user 
process will not be able to corrupt the memory of a kernel process in a system 
running under the UNIX operating system 
• Instrumentation of the code to be assessed may perturb the operation of the 
system, for instance it may introduce latencies into an operation that could 
cause a time-out. 
• Timing of events may be inaccurate because the timers available to a software 
system on some hardware platforms may not have a high enough resolution to 
capture short latency faults. This problem could be overcome by using a 
combination of SWIFI and hardware monitoring to record fault events but this 
would increase the cost of the system and also decrease the portability of the 
system, since such hardware may be platform specific. 
SWIFI techniques can be categorized into two types. Compile-Time Injection and 
Runtime Injection. 
3.4.1 Compile-Time Injection 
Compile-Time Injection (also know as code mutation) is an injection technique where 
source code (or assembler code) is modified to inject simulated faults into a system. A 
simple example of this technique could be changing 
a = a + 1 
to 
a = a - 1 
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Although these types of faults can be injected by hand the possibility of introducing 
an unintended fault is high, so tools exist to parse a program automatically and insert 
faults. 
This technique has the advantage that it can be used to simulate both hardware and 
software faults. It has been shown to induce faults into a system that are very close in 
nature to those produced by programming faults [24]. It requires no expensive hardware 
and no additional software during runtime. Further, the faults are coded into the system 
and require no communication with a fault injector so it has a considerably smaller 
impact on the execution timing of the system under test than other techniques. Since the 
faults are hard coded into the system image it is possible to emulate permanent faults as 
well as transient faults. Finally this system is very simple to implement. 
The main drawbacks of this technique are that it requires the modification of the 
actual source code. This is a drawback for the following reasons: 
1. It requires that the source code must be available to the test team, which will 
most likely not be the case for COTS systems. 
2. There is the chance that unintended faults will be introduced during the code 
modification, especially if the faults are being injected by hand. 
3. Since the source code is being altered this technique cannot be used as part of 
a certification processes since the system under test will be a different system 
to that which is shipped. 
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3.4.2 Runtime Injection 
Runtime bijection techniques use a software trigger to inject a fault into a running 
software system. Faults can be injected via a number of physical methods and triggers 
can be implemented in a number of ways: 
Time based triggers: These triggers can be based on either hardware or software 
timers. When the timer reaches a specified time an interrupt is generated and the 
interrupt handler associated with the timer can inject the fault. Since this trigger 
method cannot be tied with any accuracy to specific operations it produces 
unpredictable effects in a system. Its main use is to simulate transient and 
intermittent faults within a system. 
Interrupt based triggers: Hardware exceptions and software trap mechanisms are 
used to generate an interrupt at a specific place in the system code or on a 
particular event within the system, for instance access to a specific memory 
location. These are the same mechanisms used by most debugging tools so it is a 
well understood technology. This method of trigger implementation is capable 
of injecting a fault on a specific event. Exception based triggers are usually 
limited to detecting access to a specific memory location as part of the fetch-
execute cycle [62], for instance memory access to a particular location which 
holds a variable. When the exception is raised execution is passed to an interrupt 
handler. 
The trap mechanism (often referred to as a breakpoint) is used to transfer 
execution to an interrupt handler at a certain point in the software [ 17]. It works 
by inserting a special trap instruction into the code (either at compile time or 
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runtime). When this instruction is executed it causes control to pass to an 
interrupt handler. 
In either case when control passes to the interrupt handler, the interrupt 
handler can insert the correct fault into the system dependent on the event that 
triggered the fault injection. This trigger technique has the advantages that it 
requires no modification to the system code and is possible to trigger on specific 
events. Its main disadvantage is that on systems that support a process protection 
model the fault injector may be required to run as a system level process. 
Code Insertion: This technique involves inserting code into the target system source 
just before an event is to occur. This code performs the fault injection and then 
the original statement can execute with the fault present in the system. In this 
way it is similar to using a trap mechanism but it is implemented as a normal 
function call so does not incur the problems associated with using processor 
dependent facilities. 
This method differs from compile-time injection in that it injects its faults at 
runtime rather than at compile time and rather than corrupt existing code it adds 
code to perform the fault injection. Its main disadvantage is that it requires the 
system source code to be modified but it has the advantage that the fault injector 
can be compiled into the system as a library and run as part of the system in user 
mode on systems that support this process protection model. 
This technique can be considered a hybrid of compile-time and runtime 
fault injection since it can use a trigger to determine when and if a fault is to be 
injected, either as an explicit trigger or by virtue of the placement of the code 
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insertion, but it requires code to be modified prior to compilation to inject faults 
similar to compile-time techniques. 
To determine which SWIFI techniques are most appropriate to use when assessing 
Web Services it is useful to consider a number of criteria as well as general criteria that 
would contradict our stated goals. 
One of the main defining characteristics of Web Services is that they run m a 
heterogeneous environment, in terms of machine architecture and implementation 
language. Further it is common for Web Services to run in a virtual machine that 
precludes injecting faults directly onto the hardware of the hosting machine. Therefore 
any SWIFI technique cannot depend on processor dependent features and this is our 
main criteria to determine if a SWIFI technique is appropriate to a Web Service 
environment. 
One of the stated aims of this research is that the developed method should be as non-
invasive as possible. Consequently any SWIFI technique should make as few 
modifications to source code and the environment as possible. 
Finally, two further criteria, which are important generally to developing a fault 
injection method, are that there is a close linkage between the trigger mechanism and 
the injected fault and the possibility of unexpected faults being injected. A close linkage 
between a trigger event and the specific area a fault is injected into is important in terms 
of the repeatability of an assessment and also allows specific pieces of code to be 
assessed. A method which does not generate any unexpected or unrepeatable faults is 
also an advantage for similar reasons. 
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Table 3-3: Comparison of SWIFI techniques 
Compile-time 
Runtime 
Time-based 
Triggers 
Interrupt-
based 
Triggers 
Code 
Insertion 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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X X 
X 
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Table 3-3 compares these various criteria and identifies both Compile-time injection 
and Code-insertion as appropriate techniques since they do not rely on any processor 
specific parameters. Of these techniques Code-insertion provides the potential for far 
more targeted fault injection that Compile-time injection because it corrupts existing 
algorithms whereas Code-insertion can be used to manipulate inputs and outputs with a 
fine degree of control since it inserts extra code, for instance method parameters can be 
corrupted prior to making a method call. 
1 Whilst it is possible to implement time-based triggers using software timers rather 
than hardware timers, it would be hard to implement them in a language/environment 
agnostic way. 
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Runtime injection techniques can use a number of different techniques to insert faults 
into a system via a trigger. Some of the more pertinent ones with regard to middleware 
assessment are given here but the list if not exhaustive: 
Corruption of memory space: This technique consists of corrupting RAM, 
processor registers, and I/0 map. Both permanent and transient faults can be 
injected. Memory and processor registers can be simply corrupted by writing 
new values from the trigger handler routine. There are a number of different 
strategies for calculating new values to inject but one of the most effective 
methods is to bit flip values [64]. 
Syscall interposition techniques: This is concerned with the fault propagation from 
operating system kernel interfaces to executing systems software. This is done 
by intercepting operating system calls made by user-level software and injecting 
faults into them. Traditionally this has required kernel level code to archive but 
recent research indicated that it can also be achieved as user level processes [ 40] 
although this research was concerned with intrusion detection. Since most 
software relies on the operating system for a number of services, errors injected 
at this level can be propagated up to the system being assessed. There are a 
number of ways to propagate errors from the operating system, two of the most 
important being returning an invalid error code from a system call and signalling 
an exception. 
Network Level fault injection [77]: This technique is concerned with the corruption, 
loss or reordering of network packets at the network interface. It is possible to 
use SWIFI tools to inject faults by instrumenting the operating system protocol 
stack as in Dawson et al. [26] but this runs the risk of being detected and 
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rejected by the receiving systems protocol stack. It is therefore preferable to 
inject the fault at the application level before this stage [52]. Faults are then 
processed normally by the protocol stacks at both ends and can be relayed to the 
application layer. The faults injected are based on corrupting packet header 
information and injecting random byte errors. 
Given these fault insertion techniques it is useful to compare them in terms of their 
applicability to a Web Service environment. Given the heterogeneous nature of Web 
Service environments the key criteria of whether it is appropriate to use a technique is 
closely related to its dependence on a specific hardware environment. Further, security 
issues must be taken into account but since techniques exist to work around these 
problems it is possible to apply a technique that has implications to security. Finally, as 
a general criteria, the technique must be able to target faults reliably in specific pieces 
of code. 
Table 3-4 gives a comparison of fault insertion techniques. It has identified network 
level fault injection as an appropriate fault insertion technique to use. Although it has 
issues with security it is possible to circumvent them, whereas the other two techniques 
are tightly coupled with specific hardware platforms. 
Fault insertion techniques allow faults to be inserted into a system, either as a general 
corruption of the environment the system is running in, for instance memory corruption, 
or tied to a specific event, for instance a message transfer with network level fault 
injection. These techniques can be used to stress a system and can therefore be used to 
undertake Robustness testing. 
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Table 3-4: Comparison of Fault Insertion Techniques 
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Robustness testing is the deliberate stressing of a system to determine if it can 
function correctly in the presence of this stress. Marsden et al states in [53] 
"The robustness of a system is a measure of its ability to operate correctly 
in the presence of invalided inputs and stressful environmental 
conditions". 
This is achieved by corrupting data at the interface level of a component and 
observing its behaviour. Robustness testing can also be achieved by running the system 
under a heavy processor load and observing its effects. 
Robustness testing is particularly useful in assessing a system since it not only covers 
fault tolerance means to prevent invalid input, such as input that may be received by a 
system when it is under malicious attack, but it also assessing its operation under load 
and hence can give an indication of how a scalable a system will be when in use. 
2 May not be possible without running at kernel level. 
3 Corrupted messages may be rejected by protocol stack as security failures. 
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3.4.3 Fault Injection Tools 
A number of SWIFI Tools have been developed and a brief review of a selection of 
these tools is given here. Five commonly used fault injection tools are Ferrari [42, 43], 
FT APE [72], Doctor [35], Orchestra [25] and Xception [20]. 
Ferrari [42] (Fault and Error Automatic Real-Time Injection) is based around 
software traps that are used to inject errors into a system. The traps are activated 
by either a call to a specific memory location or a timeout. When a trap is called 
the handler injects a fault into the system. The faults can either be transient or 
permanent. Research conducted with Ferrari shows that error detection Is 
dependent on the fault type and where the fault is inserted [42]. 
FTAPE [71] (Fault Tolerance and Performance Evaluator) can inject faults, not only 
into memory and registers, but into disk accesses as well. This is achieved by 
inserting a special disk driver into the system that can inject faults into data sent 
and received from the disk unit. FT APE also has a synthetic load unit that can 
simulate specific amounts of load for robustness testing purposes. 
DOCTOR [35] (IntegrateD sOftware Fault InjeCTiOn EnviRonment) allows 
injection of memory and register faults, as well as network communication 
faults. It uses a combination of time-out, trap and code modification. Time-out 
triggers are used to inject transient memory faults and traps are used to inject 
transient emulated hardware failures, such as register corruption. Code 
modification is used to inject permanent faults. 
Orchestra [25] is a script driven fault injector which is based around Network Level 
Fault Injection. Its primary use is the evaluation and validation of the fault-
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tolerance and timing characteristics of distributed protocols. Orchestra was 
initially developed for the Mach Operating System and uses certain features of 
this platform to compensate for latencies introduced by the fault injector. It has 
also been successfully ported to other operating systems. 
Xception [20] is designed to take advantage of the advanced debugging features 
available on many modem processors. It is written to require no modification of 
system source and no insertion of software traps, since the processor's exception 
handling capabilities are used to trigger fault injection. These triggers are based 
around accesses to specific memory locations. Such accesses could be either for 
data or fetching instructions. It is therefore possible to accurately reproduce test 
runs because triggers can be tied to specific events, instead of timeouts. 
Each fault has a fault mask and this mask defines the type of fault that will 
be injected from a predefined set of fault classes, for instance stuck-at-zero, 
stuck-at-one, bit-flip, bridging, etc. Although this method of predefining faults 
speeds up fault generation, over a script based tool, research comparing it to 
static analysis methods has shown that it fails to detect some classes of faults 
(namely those contained in infrequently executed pieces of code) [50] but it did 
prove to be effective at detecting faults in frequently executed code. 
Table 3-5 compares the features and properties of these common fault injection tools. 
The heterogeneous environment that hosts Web Services means that any fault injection 
tool must not be tied to a particular hardware platform. Any tool used must therefore be 
able to run equally well under any environment hosting Web Services. Network Level 
Fault Injection offers a way of using a relatively machine independent way of injecting 
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faults whilst allowing tools to be run on a specific hardware platform since only 
messages are intercepted and relayed to the fault injector. 
Table 3-5: Features of Common Fault Injection Tools 
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From Table 3-5 both DOCTOR and Orchestra support network level fault injection 
and could potentially be used to implement fault injection into Web Services but these 
two tools have been designed to perform network protocol testing and therefore don't 
decode complete middleware message sequences. 
3.4.4 Fault Models 
A fault model [6] is a model of the types of fault that can occur in a system whilst it is 
running. A fault model can be categorized into the following types of faults: 
4 Trap instructions are inserted into system code. 
5 A replacement disk driver is required. 
6 Code modification is used to provide permanent faults. 
7 Ported to a number of operating systems but each variant is still tied to a particular 
system. 
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Physical Faults: These are faults that are caused by physical hardware failures, such 
as memory failures, processor failures, power spikes, etc. It has been found that 
this class of faults can be replicated effectively by using bit flipping techniques. 
Software Faults: This class of faults includes both programming faults and design 
faults. 
Resource-management faults: This class of faults includes such faults such as 
memory leakage and exhaustion of resource, for instance file descriptor 
exhaustion. 
Communication faults: This class of faults is specific to systems that use some form 
of communication so they may not be present in all systems. These faults are 
concerned with simulating faulty network connections by the corruption, 
duplication, reordering and deletion of network messages. 
Life-cycle faults: This class of fault is concerned with the mechanisms that maintain 
objects. This class of faults includes such faults as premature object destruction, 
delayed asynchronous operations (outside specified timing constraints). 
This list is not exhaustive but covers commonly found classes of faults found within 
most systems. A specific fault model must be defined for a system before its failure 
modes can be defined. 
3.4.5 Failure Modes 
Once a fault model has been defined the ways in which a system can fail must be 
defined. These are know as the Failure Modes [6] and these will vary from system to 
system but some common failure modes are given in Table 3-6. 
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Table 3-6: Example Failure Modes 
• Crash of an object, process or thread 
• Hang of an object, process or thread 
• Corruption of data into the system 
• Corruption of data out of the system 
• Omission or duplication of messages 
• Incorrect generation of exceptions 
Again this list is not exhaustive but covers the likely failures encountered by a Web 
Service based system. 
More detailed failure modes are defined on a per-application basis. For instance The 
Apache Software Foundation defines a set of failure modes for Axis [5] that are shown 
in Table 3-7. By comparison with the example failure modes given in Table 3-6 we can 
see that the failure modes given can be grouped into groupings mainly concerned with 
communication, with only one group "500: internal Error" being concerned with 
programming failures and exceptions. 
This is a reasonable set of failure modes from an end user perspective of Web Service 
middleware such as Apache Axis since its failure model is concerned with the correct 
function of the middleware rather than Web Services. The failure modes given in Table 
3-7 assume that the middleware is fault free and these are the failure modes that will be 
encountered by a normal user. To test the actual middleware a far more extensive set of 
failure modes is required since other failures may be encountered during testing. These 
failure modes will be more akin to the failure modes found in any large application. 
Web Services are a rapidly evolving technology and as such specialized testing has 
concentrated on protocol issues and general middleware validation. It is a sad fact that 
most general texts on the subject neglect testing all together [27, 58] the assumption 
being that normal test methodologies can be used to test systems. Whilst this may be the 
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case during development of an in-house SOA, larger SOA using external third party 
components would not have access to source code so validation techniques could not be 
applied. 
As far as we are aware dependability analysis of Web Services and middleware has 
not be extensively applied [52] although some work is now underway to apply Interface 
Propagation Analysis (IPA) to Web Services [78] although this work is only concerned 
with applying IPA to Web Services and not with providing a non-invasive framework to 
undertake dependability analysis. 
A more detailed set of failure modes is given by Gorbenko et al [31]. This work 
concentrates on providing information on constructing fault tolerant Web Services from 
unreliable sets of Web Services. Consequently the failure modes given are aimed at 
providing a basis for constructing fault tolerant solutions rather than testing for correct 
implementation of Web Services, for instance the taxonomy given in this report groups 
all suspected corrupted results under one failure mode to allow these to be dealt with by 
Multi-Version Diversity mechanisms. Conversely for testing requirements we may 
require a higher level of granularity to help assess at which point a Web Service is 
failing. 
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'fable 3-7: Axis Failure Modes 
Failure Mode Cause 
Connection refused The host exists: nothing is listening for 
connections on that port. Alternatively, a 
firewall is blocking that port. 
Site Finder: the URL is using a port other than 
80, and the .com or .net address is invalid 
Unknown host The hostname component of the URL is invalid, or 
the client is off-line. 
404: Not Found There is a web server there, but nothing at the 
exact URL. Proxy servers can also generate 404 
paqes for unknown hosts. 
302: Moved The content at the end of the URL has moved, and 
the client application does not follow the links. 
Site Finder: the .com or .net address is invalid, 
the port is explicitly -or defaulting to- port 80 
Other 3xx response The content at the end of the URL has moved, and 
the client application does not follow the links. 
wrong content The URL may be incorrect, or the server 
type/MIME type application is not returning XML. 
Site Finder: a 302 response is being returned as 
the host is unknown 
XML parser error This can be caused when the content is not XML, 
but the client application assumes it is. 
Site Finder: this may be the body of a 302 
response due to an unknown host, the client 
application should check return codes and the 
Content-Type header 
500: Internal Error SOAP uses this as a cue that a SOAPFault has been 
returned, but it can also mean 'the server is not 
working through some internal fault' 
Connection Timed The hostname can be resolved, but not reached. 
out/ NoRouteToHost Either the host is missing (potentially a 
transient fault), or network/firewall issues are 
preventing access. The client may need to be 
configured for its proxy server. This can also 
crop u~ if the caller is completely off-line. 
GUI hangs/ long Client application may be timing out on 
pauses lookups/connects 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has defined some commonly used terms and concepts used in QoS and 
some of these are subjective and therefore not suitable for measurement whilst others 
are quantifiable and will form part ofthe basis of this thesis. 
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This chapter has also reviewed dependability and fault tolerance methods that can be 
used to increase dependability. It has reviewed the process of how a fault may produce a 
failure. 
Execution of an error may or may not lead to a failure being observed at the system 
boundary and this may be due to the presence of a fault tolerance mechanism. The main 
purpose of fault tolerance mechanisms is to allow a system to continue functioning 
reliably in the presence of errors. One simple fault tolerance model for eliminating 
errors is the N-version model which compares multiple outputs from functionally 
equivalent services and provides a consensus to either prevent failures of indicate when 
an answer cannot be reliably obtained. 
MTBF may be very large since control pathways containing errors may be executed 
infrequently so fault injection techniques can be used to speed up the process of 
assessing fault tolerance mechanisms since specific faults can be injected into a 
replicated service to check the consensus processes. 
There seems to have been little research carried out using network level fault injection 
to assess middleware products, the notable exception to this being it's application to 
CORBA systems where it provided promising results. Therefore this chapter has 
reviewed Dependability Assessment and Fault Injection as a means of assessing the 
dependability of systems. It has described the different techniques available for 
performing fault injection and has reviewed the available tools. Of these tools most are 
designed for general-purpose dependability assessment of protocol stacks and not 
middleware products. 
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It has demonstrated that network level fault injection can be applied to RPC 
exchanges since network messages are sent to implement each call. Traditionally simple 
fault models are applied using network level fault injection, such as bit-flip fault 
models, to test network protocols. Network level fault injection also runs the risk of 
being detected by the protocol stack and messages rejected so it is preferable to inject 
faults at a higher level in the protocol stack if specific middleware functionality is to be 
assessed. 
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Chapter 4 -FIT Method for Dependability Assessment 
Although much work has been done in the area of fault injection and distributed 
systems in general, most dependability assessment of middleware appears to have been 
conducted using observational measurement techniques. There also appears to have 
been little research carried out on applying this technique to Web Services. Some 
research has been conducted using fault injection to test the dependability of CORBA 
implementations using network level fault injection with successful results and we have 
used this as a starting point for defining our new novel method. 
4.1 Problem Definition 
There are many problems associated with using traditional testing techniques and 
formal proofs on distributed systems. Dependability assessment provides a useful 
technique for allowing a level of confidence in a system to be obtained, even though 
this does not assure correct operation under all circumstances. 
To address this need within the middleware domain a new dependability assessment 
method has been developed which has been called Fault Injection Technology (FIT) 
method has been developed. The FIT method provides a dependability assessment 
method that can be applied to SOA to allow an indication of the level of reliability of a 
system. There are many variations possible for an SOA. For the purpose of the FIT 
method we will define an SOA as being a simple system, composed of a number of 
services and clients interconnected via a middleware layer. Clients can make use of 
services via the middleware layer and services may make use of other services via a 
middleware layer (see Figure 4-1). We further assume a homogenous middleware layer 
is used by each service, although the services may run on heterogeneous platforms. 
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Figure 4-1: Outline Middleware System 
The FIT method addresses three areas of dependability assessment: 
• Fault Injection mechanism (Section 4.2) 
• Automatic test generation (Section 4.3) 
• Automatic failure detection (Section 4.4) 
We intend the FIT method to be extendable and act as a framework, so the models 
given here are generic and it is intended that they should be enhanced and adapted to a 
specific system. 
This thesis details the FIT dependability assessment method and shows how it can be 
applied to service based systems. Whilst the method supports ontology based automatic 
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test generation and failure detection the intension is to demonstrate the framework that 
the FIT method provides and any ontologies given are provided to illustrate this and are 
not intended to be definitive or complete. 
The major contribution of this work is the novel fault injection mechanism that allows 
network level fault injection to be used to simulate Code Insertion fault injection whilst 
circumventing the need for modifications to the service source code. This comparison is 
limited to Code Insertion where it is used to perturb method input parameters or output 
results when an RPC is made since this generates a network request/response exchange 
which network level fault injection can operate on. It does not compare Code Insertion 
that operates on internal method calls, which do not involve an RPC. 
This novel injection mechanism is achieved by intercepting middleware messages 
within the protocol stack, decoding the middleware message in real-time and injecting 
appropriate faults. By decoding the middleware message and allowing this level of 
targeted fault injection it is possible to perform parameter perturbation. This is detailed 
in Section 4.2. 
The method incorporates three data structures intended to assist a user in describing a 
service-based system and construct triggers on specific parameters (Section 4.2), a data 
structure to aid a user in classifying and utilizing fault models (Section 4.3), and a data 
structure to classify and detect failures in a system (Section 4.4). This part of the FIT 
method could be implemented via any fault injection mechanism that supports 
parameter perturbation. 
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4.2 Fault Injection Mechanism 
Of the techniques available we have decided to base the FIT method on network level 
fault injection for the following reasons: 
1. Since the test domain involves transfer across a network interface it is a 
common factor in the design of both client and server software. 
2. It is simple to implement under heterogeneous middleware because it can be 
implemented using small modifications to the middleware protocol stack. 
3. Middleware messages can be modified to simulate a large number of fault 
classes, for instance transport layer failure, API parameter faults, etc. 
Physical Medium 
Figure 4-2: Detailed Middleware System 
The FIT method uses a modified network level fault injection technique to inject 
faults into a service. Standard network level fault injection works by performing the 
Chapter 4 - FIT Method for Dependability Assessment 67 
following operations on network packets at the physical network interface (see Figure 
4-2): 
• Corrupting 
• Reordering 
• Dropping 
Figure 4-3: FIT Fault Injection Hook Code Placement within Middleware 
Since this fault injection is done at the network interface modifications to these 
packets tend to only be reflected at the middleware level as random corruption of data, 
even reordering and dropping of packets may only result in corruption of a data stream 
since a middleware level message may span more than one physical network packet. 
Further, reordered or dropped packets may be subject to error correction such as 
retransmission so faults injected may not reach the middleware layer. Also packets 
corrupted at this level may be rejected by the network protocol stack lower layers, for 
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instance via mechanisms such as checksums. It is thus hard to target a particular 
element of a middleware message with any great certainty. Thus network level fault 
injection has traditionally been used only for assessing network protocol stacks, not 
service based systems. 
The FIT method of network level fault injection takes the basic concept given above 
but moves the fault injection point away from the network interface and positions it in 
the actual middleware transport layer (see Figure 4-3). Since middleware messages are 
then intercepted as complete entities it is possible to corrupt, reorder and drop complete 
messages, rather than just part of a network packet that may be discarded before it 
reaches the middleware layer. Messages can thus be modified and then passed on to the 
lower layers of the middleware and network protocol stacks. In this way faults can be 
injected but not filtered out by the network protocol stack. 
Further, if the messages are intercepted before they are signed or encrypted (or after 
they are decrypted and the signature checked in the case of incoming messages), it is 
possible to corrupt individual elements within a message without that message being 
rejected by the middleware as having been tampered with. Since we can assume we are 
familiar with the rules and metadata used to construct messages for the specific 
middleware we are using, by combining the corruption of data in a message with these 
rules and metadata it is possible to produce meaningful perturbations of such things as 
RPC input parameters and thus we can use our network level fault injection method to 
simulate API level fault injection. 
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Figure 4-4: Procedure for Intercepting and Processing a Middleware Message 
The procedure used to implement this process is shown in Figure 4-4. A message is 
processed in the following way on an instrumented machine: 
1. A middleware message (a) is received by the Network Protocol Stack and is 
passed into the middleware stack (1). 
2. This part of the middleware stack (1) receives the message from the Network 
Protocol Stack, decrypts it if necessary and validates any signatures. 
3. The message (b) that is passed out of ( 1) is therefore in an unprotected and 
modifiable form. The message (b) is passed into the FIT hook code (2). 
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4. This part of the Hook Code (2) intercepts the message (b) and transmits it (c) 
via a socket to the FIT Fault Injection Engine (3). 
5. The Fault Injection Engine (3) can then process the message and inject any 
faults required. 
6. This processed message (d) is then transmitted back to the hook code ( 4 ). 
7. The hook code (4) then retransmits the message (e) on to the remainder of the 
original middleware stack (5) that will complete the processing of the 
middleware message. At this point the message (e) may contain a fault and 
should be rejected by the protocol stack if the fault violates the protocol 
syntax. 
8. If the middleware message (e) is valid and has not been rejected it will be 
processed as normal (5) and passed on (f) to the Service (5). 
The rules and metadata used to define the interface of a service in a middleware are 
typically encapsulated in an IDL. Some IDLs, for instance DCE IDL, just define the 
interface of the web service and have a set of implicit rules built into the IDL compiler 
to generate the required message structures. Other IDLs, for instance WSDL, explicitly 
define the messages to be exchanged in the IDL definitions themselves. Which ever 
system is used it is possible to interpret the IDL files to decompose the service interface 
into method calls with their associated messages and within the messages identify 
specific parameters. 
The FIT method decomposes this information into a taxonomy (see Figure 4-5) that 
we will refer to as the System Model. This taxonomy provides all the information 
required to construct a fault injection trigger. Although triggers can be constructed to 
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trigger on any node in the taxonomy the FIT method allows triggers to be constructed 
for either the parameter nodes or the message nodes. FIT is primarily concerned with 
perturbing parameters in RPC messages and this matches closely with the lowest level 
of node within the taxonomy. FIT also allows custom operations to be preformed at the 
message level so that the method can be more versatile. 
Figure 4-5: Taxonomy created from IDL 
By using this taxonomy and creating triggers on specific parameters the FIT method 
can target individual elements of a message rather than inject random faults into 
middleware messages as in standard network level fault injection techniques. The 
method will decode the middleware message and inject meaningful faults, such as 
modifying RPC parameters and results, so that they are syntactically correct but may be 
out of specified ranges. The method builds on this framework to allow test cases to be 
written. These test cases can either be written manually or automatically generated 
using our Extended Fault Model. 
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4.3 Automatic Test Generation 
The FIT method uses the concept of an Extended Fault Model (EFM). This is, again, 
structured as a taxonomy (see Figure 4-6). It is intended to act as an aid to the user 
evaluating a system by organising well known fault models into a structure that can be 
applied to the system described in Section 4.2. This takes the standard concept of a fault 
model and groups fault models into the taxonomy so that they can be classified and 
applied to an element of the System Model. 
Figure 4-6: Fault Model Taxonomy 
This is done by apply the technique of functional decomposition to the top-level fault 
model, for instance we can define a high level fault model, as show in Table 4-1, which 
shows a fairly standard fault model for an SOA. Then each item in the fault model 
would be decomposed into a more detailed sub-category (see Table 4-2) after which 
further decompose of each item in the model can continue until a level is reached where 
we have a detailed enough description to implement a specific test case (see Table 4-3). 
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Table 4-1: High Level Fault Model 
o Physical Faults 
• Software Faults 
• Resource Management Faults 
o Communication Faults 
o Life-cycle Faults 
The detailed test case should be generic enough so that it can be applied to any 
message/parameter of an appropriate type in the System Model, for instance a test case 
could be written to perturb any numeric input parameter so that it contains a random 
value within a specified range. The range would be obtained from the specification of 
that RPC and associated with the parameter's node in the System Model. The two 
taxonomies could then be linked together and the EFM could obtain the required range 
information from the System Model taxonomy. 
Table 4-2: Partially Decomposed Fault Model 
o Software Faults 
o Perturbation of Data into a Service 
• Values in Specified Range 
o Values out of Specified Range 
• Values in Specified Range but Logically Incorrect 
o Perturbation of Data out of a Service 
• Values in Specified Range 
• Values out of Specified Range 
• Value in Specified Range but Logically Incorrect 
o Coding Errors 
o Data Returned is the wrong type 
The EFM is intended to be extendable so that a user of the system can customize it to 
cater to their system. The EFM described both here and implemented in the tools is 
therefore not extensive but is intended to provide a basic level of functionality that can 
be enhanced to fit users needs. 
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Table 4-3: Fully Decomposed Fault Model 
• Software Faults 
o Perturbation of Data into a Service 
• Values in Specified Range 
• Upper Bound 
o Replace specified parameter with the 
upper bound value specified for this 
parameter. 
• Lower Bound 
o Replace specified parameter with the 
lower bound value specified for this 
parameter. 
• Lower Bound + 1 
o Replace specified parameter with the 
lower bound value specified for this 
parameter with one added to it. 
• Upper Bound - 1 
• 
o Replace the specified parameter with the 
upper bound specified for this parameter 
with one subtracted from it. 
Random Values between Upper and Lower Bounds 
o On test generation, generate a static 
sequence of randomly distributed values 
that lie between the upper and lower 
bounds inclusively. Cyclically 
substitute the next value from the 
statically generated sequence for the 
specified parameter. A static sequence 
should be used to provide a level of 
test repeatability although this 
repeatability may be effected by 
concurrency effects and timing. 
It is possible, by careful perturbation of input parameters, to perturb the internal state 
of a service but this requires detailed knowledge of the design of the service and so is 
considered outside the scope of this method's automatic test case generation, but it can 
be accomplished via manual test case construction and manual inspection of the service 
code. 
4.4 Automatic Failure Detection 
To detect potential failures in a system, the method includes an Extended Failure 
Model (EF AM). This is similar in concept to the EFM described in Section 4.3 and is 
structured as a taxonomy (see Figure 4-7) 
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The EF AM defines a high level set of failure modes as described in Table 4-4. The 
FIT method applies decomposition to the failure modes in a similar way to the EFM. 
Figure 4-7: Taxonomy of Failures 
Decomposition is applied iteratively to the Failure Modes to compose a number of 
partial models (see Table 4-5). These partial models sub-divide each failure mode into a 
number of sub sections until a simple enough level is reached at which point a script can 
be written to detect the detailed failure mode as in Table 4-6. 
Table 4-4: High Level Failure Modes 
• Crash of a service instance 
• Crash of a hosting server 
• Hang of a service 
• Corruption of data into service 
• Corruption of data out of service 
• Duplication of messages 
• Omission of messages 
• Delay of messages 
Table 4-5: Partially Decomposed Failure Model 
• Corruption of data out of service 
o Data out of specified range 
o Data logically incorrect 
Once a EF AM is available it can be applied to the whole or part of the SOA, so unlike 
the fault model it is active for all message exchanges so it can detect normal failures as 
well as failures caused by fault injection. 
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Table 4-6: Detailed Failure Model 
• Corruption of data out of service 
o Data out of range 
• Data above upper bound 
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• Check specified parameter against upper bound 
in specification and if it is greater than 
this value flag an error condition. 
• Data below upper bound 
• Check specified parameter against lower bound 
in specification and if it is less that this 
value flag an error condition. 
To aid in failure detection the FIT method allows three predefined outcomes from a 
fault injection operation: 
1. Exception 
2. Response out of specified range 
3. No visible effect. 
These outcomes are specified when a fault model is applied to a parameter and apply 
to the next message exchange in that sequence after the fault model has been applied. 
The expected outcome is specified terms of a specific EF AM as part of the EFM. This 
effectively links the two taxonomies together using a many to many relationship (see 
Figure 4-8). 
The exception outcome is the normal outcome to be expected from a fault injection 
since well-written code should detect parameter perturbation and reject the transaction. 
If we expect this outcome and do not detect the expected outcome this would be flagged 
to the user as a discrepancy, where as receiving the exception would be classed as being 
the correct outcome. 
-_,--- ~-- ------------~------~---------- --,----,---~------__ ---:o-·-------=-:--~-;--·--·-.--:-;------ ----- --------;-:--- --.::----
The response out of specified range outcome is typically to be expected from a 
system in the development or testing phase of a project when not all guard mechanisms 
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are present. This would typically result from a perturbed input parameter creating a 
perturbed result and should therefore be flagged to the user. We may expect this 
outcome if the result is being intentionally perturbed to allow it to be fed into another 
component to perturb it. 
EFAM 
EFM 
' 
' 
' 
Figure 4-8: Fault Model Taxonomy Linked to Failure Model Taxonomy 
The no visible effect outcome would typically be expected mainly from the message 
manipulation fault model class. This outcome would arise if normal message flows 
continued with no corruption of output data or exceptions. This is most likely to occur 
under two sub-classes: 
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1. Omission of messages from client to server, since the server would have no 
mechanism for knowing the original message had been sent so it could not 
generate an exception 
2. Message manipulation involving time, since if a timeout is not reached this 
would result in a performance degradation rather than timeout exceptions. 
In both cases a specialized test script in the failure model would need to be 
constructed to test for these on a per system basis. 
This outcome could also be seen when parameters are perturbed within their specified 
range. In this case a manually constructed script would be written to detect the expected 
outcome on a per test basis. 
·· .... 
··············· 
··--.... 
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Figure 4-9: Linking Taxonomies 
By applying one of the fault models contained in the EFM to the System Model 
taxonomy by linking the System Model to the EFM (see Figure 4-9) we not only 
generate a fault injection a specific place but because the EFM is linked to the EF AM it 
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is possible to determine any error condition that should be generated by the fault 
injection. This allows automated failure detection to be preformed. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has detailed the FIT method. The FIT method is composed of a novel 
network level fault injection technique, combined with a three of taxonomies to allow 
automated test generation and failure detection. 
The novel fault injection technique used allows faults to be precisely injected into 
messages allowing perturbations of specific RPC parameters at the middleware message 
level. The injection mechanism also allows faults to be injected and passed to a service 
without being intercepted and rejected by either the network or middleware protocol 
stacks. 
Test generation is achieved by use of the Extended Fault Model taxonomy. This is a 
collection of standard fault models that are categorised according to high-level criteria 
and each individual fault model can be applied generically to any RPC parameter. 
Failure detection is accomplished through the Extended Failure Model taxonomy. 
This is a collection of standard failure modes that are categorised according to high-
level criteria. The individual failure modes can be globally applied to the System Model 
to detect unexpected failures. Individual failure modes from the model can be associated 
with individual fault models from the Extended Fault Model that allows expected 
outcomes from fault injections to be detected. 
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Chapter 5 - WS-FIT Applied to Web Services 
The FIT method detailed in Chapter 4 describes a generic method that can be applied 
to a range of RPC based middleware, such as DCE, DCOM, CORBA, Web Services, 
etc. This chapter applies the FIT method to Web Service middleware to demonstrate the 
method. This implementation is termed Web Service- Fault Injection Technology or 
WS-FIT whilst the generic method is referred to as FIT. 
WS-FIT was conceived in two distinct phases with the intention of evolving the 
secoQ.d phase from the first. The first phase is an implementation of a fairly 
conventional fault injector but with the enhancement that it processes middleware 
messages as opposed to network packets. The second phase builds on the first allowing 
meaningful faults to be injected into specific parts of a middleware message and 
implements the various taxonomies described in Chapter 4. 
The first phase of the WS-FIT implementation implements the functionality of 
existing fault injection techniques and applies them to Web Services. The reasons for 
this were three fold: 
1. We can draw on existing fault injection methods to select the best techniques 
that can be applied to Web Services. 
2. Once we have a solid working method we can use it as a basis to design and 
implement our second phase method. 
3. It should be possible to compare the FIT method to existing methods to gauge its 
effectiveness, . 
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5.1 Middleware Environment 
This implementation of FIT for Web Services realises the method described in 
Chapter 4 and provides a dependability assessment method that can be applied to SOA 
based on Web Service middleware (see Figure 5-1). This implementation has been 
applied to both Apache Axis 1.1 and Apache SOAP 2.3 for the SOAP implementation 
and Apache Jakarta Tomcat 4.x & 5.x reference implementation for a service container. 
This Web Service implementation can be deployed to form a heterogeneous distributed 
system comprising many different machine architectures with the rniddleware layer 
allowing interoperability between them (See Figure 5-l). WS-FIT must take this 
heterogeneity into account. 
Mac OS XPI!Itform UhuxPI~orm 
ebSefvlce Web SerVIce 
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Figure 5-1: Web Service Middleware System 
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The WS-FIT implementation addresses the following areas which were defined in 
Section 4. 1 : 
• Fault Injection mechanism (Section 5.2) 
• Automatic test generation (Section 5.3) 
• Automatic failure detection (Section 5.4) 
This chapter shows the details of how the FIT method has been implemented and 
applied to Web Services and demonstrates the concepts behind the Automatic Test 
Generation and Automatic Failure Detection mechanisms on a real middleware product. 
5.2 Fault Injection Mechanism 
WS-FIT is physically divided into two parts: 
I) Hook Code inserted into the SOAP stack to capture messages (see Figure 5-2 
items H). 
2) The Fault Injection Engine (FIE) that processes the messages and injects faults 
when required (see Figure 5-2 item E). 
As shown in Figure 5-2 the hook code (Figure 5-2 items H) can be installed onto 
more that one machine, for instance on the SOAP stack of the machine running client 
software (Figure 5-2 machine 1) and the SOAP stack of the machine running the Web 
Service the client is utilising (Figure 5-2 machine 2). In this way the WS-FIT fault 
injection engine (Figure 5-2 item E) can intercept outgoing messages on machine 1 
destined for machine 2 or incoming messages on machine 2 from machine 1. It is also 
'"~- --- ~ -possible-to-intercept-either-outgoing"results~before··they-leave-machine-2-orasthey are 
received by machine 1. 
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Figure 5-2: WS-FIT Fault Injection Hook Code Placement within Axis 1.1 Stack 
Therefore the hook code is further sub-divided into two parts, one part that intercepts 
incoming messages and a second part that intercepts outgoing messages. This is partly 
dictated by the design of the SOAP stack (there are two distinct pathways through the 
code to allow processing of incoming and outgoing messages) and also to allow 
differentiation between the two message types. Although it would be possible to 
instrument only one pathway, for instance outgoing messages, and thus make the 
modifications to the SOAP stack less invasive capturing both incoming and outgoing 
message on one machine has certain advantages in terms of the flexibility of the 
method. 
A basic requirement of certification release testing in a production environment is that 
the code installed and tested should be the code that is distributed to a customer since 
modifications to it could alter the control pathway used in production. Also compilation 
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of a source file can produce different binaries between compilations even when an 
unaltered source file is used because the compiler may have faults in it, etc. 
The extra flexibility offered by WS-FIT could be used as part of a certification 
process. This can be demonstrated by use of Figure 5-3. This shows a distributed system 
made up of a number of Web Services and a client running on a heterogeneous network 
of platforms. In this example machine 1 and machine 2 have been instrumented with 
WS-FIT hook code, whilst machines 3, 4 and 5 have been left unmodified. 
This configuration allows WS-FIT to inject faults into messages send and received by 
machines 1 and 2 without modifying the production environment of machines 3, 4 and 
5. Thus faults can be propagated through the system into unaltered production machines 
without the need for specific test harness. This can be used to simulate transient and 
permanent faults in workflows. 
For instance the client (on machine 5) can send a request to the Web Service on 
machine 1. The Web Service on machine 1 utilizes the service on machine 3, which in 
turn utilises the Web Service on machine 2, which makes a call on the Web Service on 
machine 4. Since machine 2 is instrumented with WS-FIT hook code it is possible to 
inject a fault into the request message going to machine 4 without altering the Web 
Service or environment on machine 4. If an error state is produced by the invalid 
request sent to machine 4 it may be propagated back to the client with no further 
modification to the system with the hook code on machine 1 being used to monitor the 
failure. 
Sirrtilarly_a_fault_could_be injected_into __ the system by _modifying_the return result of 
machine 4 as it is received from machine 4 by machine 2. This could then propagate any 
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error back through the workflow and be monitored by machine 1 at the system 
boundary. A similar effect to this could be achieved by injecting a fault into the 
response message sent by machine 2 to machine 3 but this would mean that the logic of 
the Web Service on machine 2 would have to be incorporated into the construction of 
the fault injected. 
e.tac OS X Platform Unua Platform Solarj• Pljttform 
Apache Axla 1.1 
WlndoWa Platfotln 
Figure 5-3: Instrumentation showing potential for certification 
5.2.1 Hook Code 
SOAP 
Mesaages 
over HTTP 
The hook code used to intercept message and pass them to the fault injection engine is 
relatively simple and the main components and data passed are shown in Figure 5-4. A 
message is processed in the following way on an instrumented machine: 
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1. A SOAP message (a) is received by the Network Protocol Stack and is passed 
into the SOAP stack (1). 
2. This part of the SOAP stack (1) receives the message from the Network 
Protocol Stack, decrypts it if necessary and validates any signatures. 
3. The message (b) that is passed out of ( 1) is therefore in an unprotected and 
modifiable form. The message (b) is passed into theWS-FIT hook code (2). 
4. This part of the Hook Code (2) intercepts the message (b) and transmits it (c) 
via a socket to theWS-FIT Fault Injection Engine (3). 
5. The Fault Injection Engine (3) can then process the message and inject any 
faults required. 
6. This processed message (d) is then transmitted back to the hook code (4). 
7. The hook code (4) then retransmits the message (e) on to the remainder of the 
original SOAP stack (5) that will complete the processing of the SOAP 
message. At this point the message (e) may contain a fault. If it is a SOAP 
schema fault the message (e) should be rejected by (5) as a protocol error. 
8. If the SOAP message (e) is valid against the SOAP schema it will be 
processed as normal (5) and passed on (t) to the Web Service (5). 
Whilst a number of existing fault injectors could be used to do this, notably DOCTOR 
and Orchestra, these tools are designed for general purpose protocol testing. WS-FIT 
has been designed around an engine to decode SOAP messages and presents an 
~ _ ~ interfa~-~ at the scrj_p! AP_I_!e_ve! with. t~e information included il!__~_sp~ _RPC .(!~sBy 
accessible. 
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Figure 5-4: Instrumented SOAP Stack showing processing of incoming message 
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Outgoing messages from Web Services/clients are processed in a similar way (See 
Figure 5-5). 
1. The service or client (5) sends information into the SOAP stack API (g). This 
may either be a direct call to the API from the program code or via the stub 
generated to handle return responses, etc. 
2. The information (g) is then processed by the SOAP stack (6) into and 
unsigned and unencrypted message (h). 
3. This SOAP message (h) is then intercepted by theWS-FIT hook code (7). 
4. The hook code (7) then passes the message (c) to theWS-FIT Fault Injection 
engine (3). 
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5. The Fault Injection Engine (3) then processes the message in the same way as 
informing messages are processed (see above). 
6. The modified message (d) is then passed back to the hook code (8). 
7. The hook code (8) then send the message (j) on through the SOAP stack with 
can then perform any signing and encryption (9) that may be required before it 
is transmitted by the Network Protocol Stack to its destination. 
I 
0 
Figure 5-5: Instrumented SOAP Stack showing processing of outgoing message 
FIT method is an enhancement from standard Network Level Fault injection in that it 
allows the targeted manipulation of specific parts of the message. This allows the FIT 
method to trigger on very specific RPC sequences and specific parameters contained 
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within them. This allows FIT to use Network Level Fault Injection to emulate Code 
Insertion fault injection. 
The Hook Code is the only component ofWS-FIT that must be implemented for each 
SOAP implementation that it is to be used with. The Hook Code is a simple piece of 
code that connects itself to the FIE via a network socket. Each SOAP message passing 
down the SOAP stack is intercepted by the Hook Code and transmitted to the FIE that 
may be running on a separate machine. The Hook Code then waits for a string reply 
from the FIE and substituted this message in place of the original message as described 
above. 
Since WS-FIT is intended to be interoperable between different platforms and 
machine architectures it uses an XML format for transferring data between the fault 
injector Hook Code and the fault injector. This document is the message data passed 
into the FIE (c) and also the message passed out of the FIE back to the hook code (d). 
The SOAP message is encapsulated within an XML document as a CDAT A section to 
circumvent the need to escape reserved characters. This makes the original message 
easy to receive and process since the start and end of the XML document is easily 
detectable. Also the encapsulating XML document can be used to carry such 
information as the originating machine's identity and timestamps. 
The CDAT A section within the document carries protocol specific information and 
this would change between implementations for different middleware products so the 
encapsulating XML document can also be used to identify the message data contained 
within. In this way it would be possible, although it may not be desirable for reasons of 
efficiency, to have on implementation of FIT handle several middleware products by 
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detecting the middleware type sent and switching to the appropriate parser for that 
product. 
The Hook Code must be inserted into the SOAP stack at a convenient point, just 
before signing and encryption take place for outgoing messages and just after signature 
checking and decryption have taken place for incoming messages. In this way the 
injected faults in the messages can be propagated up the protocol stack to their intended 
destination and consequently test the domain they were intended for, rather than be 
rejected as network errors or a malicious attack on the system. 
We have used this design, rather than something more complex because we believe 
that it provides the most portable solution between different SOAP implementations. 
For instance with our main test environment it would be possible to implement the 
Hook Code as a plug-in module in the processing chain. Whilst this would provide a 
neater solution for this particular implementation of SOAP, it would not be possible to 
implement the Hook Code in this way under all implementations since this facility is 
not available on some SOAP implementations. Further if our system used WS-
Addressing or WS-MessageDelivery it would be possible to redirect the SOAP 
messages to the fault injector via the protocol stack, effectively removing the 
requirement for Hook Code on systems under test and thus removing the need to modify 
protocol stack code, but this would restrict the tools to working on SOAP based SOA 
that supported these standards and would make it harder to implement FIT on other 
middleware products that are not SOAP based. Also this approach would mean that 
each SOAP message would have to be processed by multiple SOAP stacks before being 
received by WS-FIT, and hence would make it harder to identify where errors have 
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occurred since the message must pass through intermediate nodes before reaching the 
fault injector. 
The Hook Code is implemented so that once it had been inserted into the SOAP 
protocol stack it can safely be turned off and left in a normally running system via a 
configuration file. Whilst this should be relatively non-invasive it would not be 
advisable to ship a system with the Hook Code left in because of the risk of malicious 
attack because the Hook Code gives unsecured access to all messages sent and received 
by a server running it. 
5.2.2 Fault Injection Engine 
Once a SOAP message has been received from the Hook Code by the FIE it must be 
processed. The FIE is split up into a number of functional steps to aid processing of 
these message. These steps are: 
Receive: Physically receive the XML document containing the SOAP message from 
the Hook Code. 
Process: Extract the SOAP message from the encapsulating XML document and 
process and log the associated information in the encapsulating document. 
First Stage Trigger: This step determines if the message supplied requires a fault 
injected into it. It is intended to be relatively fast so that detailed processing, and 
thus the inherent time overhead, can be minimised for message that do not 
require fault injection. 
Second Stage Trigger: This is a more detailed triggering process that locates the 
- ·- - - --
actual position in the message where a fault needs to be injected. It relies on the 
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First Stage Trigger to identify messages where fault injection is required so it 
can be optimised with this assumption. 
Fault Injection: Injects the actual fault into the message. It assumes that the Second 
Stage Trigger has located the correct position. 
Transmit: This packages the message into an encapsulating XML document and 
physically transmits it back to the Hook Code. 
Whilst these are the functional steps followed by the FIE design in the actual 
implementation some of them must be combined for efficiencies sake, for instance the 
Second Stage Trigger and the Fault Injection are combined. This is partly for efficiency 
and partly because they must be preformed iteratively if multiple faults are to be 
injected into the same message since the location of the faults will be different for each 
second stage trigger. 
There are two paths through the FIE. One deals with the case where no faults are to 
be injected into a message, and the other deals with the case where faults must be 
injected. We assume that not injecting a fault is the default and have optimised WS-FIT 
accordingly because faults will be injected infrequently. This is shown in Figure 5-6. 
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Figure 5-6: Processing of SOAP Message (No Fault Injected) 
In this case the following steps are undertaken: 
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1. The encapsulated SOAP message (c) is received by the receive process (10). 
2. The XML document (i) is then processed (11) to extract the SOAP message 
and the originating machine address. 
3. This data (ii) is then used by the First Stage Trigger (12) to determine if the 
SOAP message should be triggered on and a fault injected. This is done by 
pattern matching specific XML tags to determine the specific message, for 
instance request/response message and message name, and if it contains 
specific RPC parameters. A match can also be done on originating machine 
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address so that specific Web Services on specific machine scan can be 
triggered upon. This stage also lends itself to a SAX parser implementation 
but the decision was made to implement it using pattern matching to reduce 
latency overheads. 
4. If the SOAP message does not match the trigger criteria the data is passed (ii) 
to the transmit process ( 15) where it is packaged into an XML document for 
return and transmitted back to the Hook Code (d). 
The other case specifies the path through the code when a message is received that 
does require a fault or faults injecting into it. This is shown in Figure 5-7. 
Figure 5-7: Processing of SOAP Message (Fault Injected) 
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In this case the following steps are undertaken: 
1. The encapsulated SOAP message (c) is received by the receive process (10). 
2. The XML document (i) is then processed (11) to extract the SOAP message 
and the originating machine address. 
3. This data (ii) is then used by the First Stage Trigger (12) to determine if the 
SOAP message should be triggered on and a fault injected. This is done by 
pattern matching specific XML tags to determine the specific message, for 
instance request/response message and message name, and if it contains 
specific RPC parameters. A match can also be done on originating machine 
address so that specific Web Services on specific machine scan can be 
triggered upon. This stage also lends itself to a SAX parser implementation 
but the decision was made to implement it using pattern matching to reduce 
latency overheads. 
4. If the SOAP message matches the trigger criteria the data is passed (iv) to 
the Second Stage Trigger ( 13 ). The Second Stage Trigger locates the precise 
location in the message data where the fault associated with a trigger should 
be inserted. In the WS-FIT implementation this lends itself to a SAX parser 
implementation since: a) the message is XML based; b) if multiple triggers 
are used on one message the SAX parser structure lends itself to iterative 
processing of a message. 
5. Once the location in the message has been found in (13) the data (v) is 
· -passed-to-the-F ault-Injection~process -(14) -tlmr -injectstlie -faUlts into the 
message. Since a SAX parser was used this process was combined with the 
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Second Stage Trigger to allow iterative processmg of a message with 
multiple triggers. 
6. After the Fault Injection (15) process has injected all the required faults it 
passes the new SOAP message (vi) to the transmit process (15). 
7. The transmit process (15) packages into an XML document for return and 
transmitted back to the Hook Code (d). 
These two cases write data to a log at two main points shown in Figure 5-8. The log is 
structured as an XML document, with each transaction being enclosed in an XML 
element to aid in the analysis of the data. 
Figure 5-8: Logging Activities within WS-FIT 
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The first point is in the Processing of the initial XML document (11). This extracts 
the associated data from the encapsulating XML document, for example timestamps, 
and writes it to the log along with a copy of the original unaltered SOAP message. This 
provides a record of all data received from the Hook Code for later analysis. This also 
allows baseline audit data to be obtained from any system by running a 'null' script, for 
instance a script that does not inject any errors. This allows comparisons to be made 
with later fault injection campaigns. 
The second point data is written to the log is at the end of the Fault Injection process 
(14). This logs the modified SOAP message thus allowing the exact fault injected into 
the message at a later data by comparison to the original message. 
At various points in the Fault Injection Engine timestamp and diagnostic information 
is recorded so that assessments of the latency introduced by the FIE can be made but 
this is omitted for clarity. 
5.2.3 First Phase Fault ][njector 
The first phase of the WS-FIT implementation implements a relatively standard fault 
injection mechanisms based on existing models with one major exception, WS-FIT is 
designed to decode each SOAP message as it is received and inject faults at a message 
level rather than on a network packet level. All middleware messages are supplied as 
complete entities regardless of the number of network packets involved in their 
transport. Faults can then easily be injected at this message level and supplied back to 
the protocol stack. 
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The first phase allows: 
1. Triggers on particular messages to be created and executed. 
2. Any part of a message to be manipulated, and thus inject a fault, including the 
structure of a message. 
The first phase fault injector allows traditional fault injection operations to be 
implemented, for instance corruption of bytes within a message, reordering messages, 
dropping messages. This can be used for SOAP protocol stack assessment. 
5.2.4 Second Phase Fault Injector 
The second phase fault injector is based on the first stage and enhances it. Since 
SOAP messages are presented as complete entities it is possible to modify the triggers 
to trigger on specific parts of the message, for instance a specific RPC parameter in the 
message. This allows syntactically correct perturbations of input and output data to be 
preformed by substituting one value for another. Since these perturbations are 
syntactically correct as far as the SOAP scheme is concerned the SOAP stack will pass 
them through to their destination thus injecting a fault into a Web Service. 
WS-FIT uses a simple script based trigger mechanism and is intended to be used with 
SOAP based RPC mechanisms so there will be a request message and a response. A 
uniquely named message is used by each RPC to implement both the request and 
response messages. This name is defined as a tag within the SOAP envelope to uniquely 
define each message transfer. 
One of the advantages of the XML based SOAP is that it is self-describing. This 
means that our trigger mechanism can parse each SOAP message as an XML document 
and determine which RPC is being used by detecting the RPC's unique tag within the 
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message. In this way WS-FIT can determine a specific request or response message to a 
specific method of a service. 
It is also possible to determine which client or server is transmitting the message 
because it will be known which particular SOAP API on which machine is instrumented 
and this information is passed as part of the enclosing XML document from the hook 
code to the FIE. 
The first stage ofWS-FIT implements a two-stage trigger mechanism. The first stage 
determines which message has been sent. This allowed fault injection to be targeted at a 
specific message and a specific method of a service. Once the first stage has detected 
the trigger message, the second stage runs and this injects the fault into the message. 
The fault injected is generated by a second script. The script is only executed if the 
trigger determined that the message is of the specified type. Since our first stage model 
is designed to employ conventional fault injection techniques WS-FIT allows the 
corruption of any byte within the message but since SOAP messages are implemented 
as XML documents WS-FIT reflects this in its injection technique. An XML document 
is made up of elements; each element is composed of a start tag, a body and an end tag. 
WS-FIT treats each of these as a separate entity and presents each of these in turn 
through the model and allows each to be corrupted separately. Elements can also be 
nested within an element body so these are presented recursively through the method. 
Within each of these parts, any byte can be modified or the entire string making up this 
part of the message can be modified or discarded. 
ln _thjs_way faults_can_b_e_injected _so_thaLeitheLvalidly_formatted SOAR messages, 
conforming to the SOAP schema, can be constructed or SOAP messages can be 
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corrupted in such a way as to present invalid SOAPIXML to the system. Invalid 
SOAP/XML should be rejected by the SOAP stack at a low level and would not allow 
us to ultimately target the domain we wished, but our fault injection method is capable 
of performing this type of corruption none the less. 
WS-FIT is capable of processing multiple connections to multiple servers 
concurrently. When a server's Hook Code makes a socket connection to WS-FIT a 
thread is created and this thread acts as a listener on the socket. All processing of 
messages is then carried out asynchronously, with only shared logging and monitoring 
operations synchronized. In this way it is possibly to construct test cases that are 
coordinated across a number of machines, for instance if there are three services on 
three different machines and each has a trigger event associated with it, it is possible to 
coordinate their triggers such that trigger (C) can only happen once trigger (B) has 
occurred, which can only occur after trigger (A) has fired. 
Each SOAP message is decoded using an Apache Xerces SAX parser. The SAX 
parser parses each message and calls appropriate abstract methods for each of the three 
sub-divisions of an XML tag, namely start, body and end. These abstract methods are 
implemented in the user script so that each element of the SOAP message is available in 
sequence to the user script. Each abstract method returns either the tag that it was 
supplied with, or a start containing an injected fault. Triggers and fault injection can 
thus be preformed on the SOAP message. 
The body part of an XML element can potentially be nested and this adds extra 
complexity to the processing algorithm, for in~~c~~3.!ll_i!'!~-tll~ S__QAP _messag~gi_ye!! __ _ 
in Table 5-1 we can see that each Body element is nested inside an Envelope tag. The 
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RPC message is, in turn, contained inside the Body tag and the RPC message element 
contains any parameters associated with this RPC call. 
Table 5-1: Example SOAP Message 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenv=http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/ 
xmlns:xsd=http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<soapenv:Body> 
<nsl:setTemp 
soapenv:encodingStyle= 
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/ 
xmlns:nsl= 
"http://heatercontroller.samples.dasbs.org"> 
<newTemp xsi:type="xsd:double"> 
80.0 
</newTemp> 
</nsl:setTemp> 
</soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
It is clear from this example that a mechanism is required to track triggers on 
messages and nested parameters. Since our input data will always be structured 
according to an XML Schema we can safely assume that all parameters will be nested 
inside the message element utilizing them. We therefore utilize a choice of triggers: 
1. Trigger on a message and have the script process the entire message body 
2. Trigger on a parameter within a message. 
The first type is used to trigger so that the whole message body is passed to the user 
script. It is then the responsibility of the user script to interpret the message body and 
inject faults in appropriate places. This allows the user script to inject faults that are 
syntactically -incorrect, -for- instance- they are- invalid--XML-or -invalidate-the -SGAP 
) 
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schemas being used. This also allows specialized test cases to be written which are not 
included in WS-FIT by default. 
Table 5-2: Example Script 
1:from org.dasbs.fit.exec import Servercontainer 
2:from org.dasbs.fit.exec import Injectscript 
3:from org.dasbs.fit.exec import ResultScript 
4:from string import find 
5:from operator import mod 
6: 
?:class UserResult(ResultScript): 
8: def init (self,graph): 
9: ResultScript. __ init __ (self,graph) 
10: return 
11: 
12:class userinjectScript(InjectScript): 
13: def __ init __ (self): 
14: InjectScript. __ init __ (self) 
15: self.reset() 
16: 
17: 
18: 
19: 
20: 
def reset(self): 
self.m_msg = 0 
self.m_param = o 
21: def create(self): 
22: return userinjectScript() 
23: 
24: def injectStart(self, name, attrs): 
25: if self.checkName(name, attrs, 'ns1:setTemp', 
'http://heatercontroller.samples.dasbs.org'): 
26: self.m_msg = 82 
27: return None 
28: 
29: def injectBody(self, name, attrs, body): 
30: self.m_param = 0 
31: if self.m_msg == 82: 
32: if name == 'newTemp' and 
mod(self.getResults().getCount('newTemp', None), 10) -- 0: 
33: self.m_param = 105 
34: if self.m_param == 105: 
35: print "the trigger has fired" 
36: return None 
37: 
38: def injectEnd(self, name, attrs): 
39: return None 
40: 
41:server.startServer(UserinjectScript(), userResult(monitorGraph)) 
parameter body is supplied to the user script and can be manipulated by it. Since only 
the body of the element is supplied to the user script, whatever fault the user script 
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injects will result in syntactically correct XML being generated since the tags will be 
the responsibility of the fault injection framework. It will be possible for the user script 
to supply an element body that will be invalid according to the schemas being used, for 
instance a double with a decimal point could be supplied for a parameter that is typed to 
an integer via a schema. 
This trigger mechanism is implemented in the user script (see Table 5-2). Each RPC 
message type is allocated a unique numeric value that is used to quickly identifY it. Also 
each parameter is allocated a unique numeric id. In the start method, the start tag of the 
message to trigger on is pattern matched and if it is detected the unique id for that 
message is stored in a variable. This variable has scope whilst the SOAP message is 
being processed and is reset when the next SOAP message is processed. This can then 
be used in the start, body and end methods in the user script as a trigger for a specific 
message. 
Parameters are triggered on in a similar way. The message variable is checked to see 
if the correct message body has been reached. If it has, pattern matching is preformed 
on the tag to determine if a particular parameter has been reached and if it has the 
unique ID for the parameter is stored in a second variable. This can be used in a similar 
way to the message ID to trigger on a specific parameter in all three script methods. 
The design for the first stage utilizes a two-stage trigger mechanism. The purpose of 
this is two fold: 
1. The first parser stage can be lightweight and can speed up the trigger process 
in S)'S1ems _with_sparsely_triggered_eyents _ 
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2. Since the whole message is parsed in the trigger stage out of sequence triggers 
can be constructed, for instance if a test script wants to modify an element in a 
message that occurs before the trigger element this can be done. 
This design has the disadvantage that it complicates the user script triggers. Since the 
trigger stage returns a simple Boolean to determine if the second stage should run, the 
second stage user script needs to do an amount of pattern matching as the message is 
parsed the second time to determine the correct place to insert the fault. Also multiple 
faults can be injected into the same message meaning that all pattern matching needs to 
be carried out on each message, since the only thing the trigger stage indicates is that 
the message needs a fault injecting into it, not which set of faults need to be injected. 
The two-pass design allows an initial check of the SOAP message to ascertain if any 
faults need to be injected. Then the second pass can be preformed which locates the 
specific points in the message where faults need to be injected. By using a two stage 
trigger mechanism WS-FIT is capable of injecting multiple faults into a SOAP message 
whereas a one stage trigger mechanism would be far more complex, for instance if we 
required a trigger test to determine that a fault must be injected into a message but the 
specific trigger tag came after the point where the fault was required to be injected then 
a one pass mechanism would need to reposition the buffer and inject the fault, whereas 
a two stage mechanism would do an initial pass to determine if a fault injection was 
required and then in the second stage locate the point in the message where the injection 
was required and inject the fault. 
Although the API used to construct scripts allows them to be written and executed 
--- ----·-- - ----~-- --- --- -·---- --------- - -- -
manually the WS-FIT tool implements a graphical user interface that automates the 
construction of triggers and allows predefined fault models to be applied. 
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Figure 5-9: Typical System Configuration Showing Latency Terms 
5.2.5 Latency Model 
As described in Chapter 3 any SWIFI technique will incur some form of overhead 
when in use. This section quantifies the overhead introduced into a WS-FIT 
instrumented system under a number of typical scenarios. To achieve this we defme a 
Latency Model that describes the temporal overheads introduced into a system under 
test. This model is demonstrated in Chapter 6 and is used to determine under what 
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conditions WS-FIT can be used with little impact on a running system and outline 
possible improvements to WS-FIT to further reduce its impact. 
5.2.5.1 Model 
To model the behaviour of the overheads introduced into a system under test, we 
break down WS-FIT into a number of discrete parts as shown in Figure 5-9. Each part is 
assigned a term which we use in our model. 
As described in section 5.2.2 there are a number of discrete steps involved in injecting 
a fault into a SOAP message using WS-FIT: 
1. Intercept SOAP message and transmit to Fault Injector. 
2. Receive Intercepted message from Hook Code. 
3. First Stage Trigger. 
4. Second Stage Full Trigger. 
5. Inject Fault. 
6. Transmission of modified message to Hook Code. 
7. Retransmission of modified message to remainder of SOAP Stack. 
There are two main paths through the fault injection system: 
1. If a fault in injected into the message all the steps listed above are followed. 
2. If a message does not pass the first stage trigger then steps 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 are 
executed in order. 
Tne stages snoWil -inFigure -5=9-liavefime--overlieaasassoCiateo witntnem and these---
are shown in Table 5-3. Each of the terms given in Table 5-3 is affected to differing 
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degrees by the properties of the messages being processed and these are given in Table 
5-4. 
Table 5-3: Overhead Terms 
Term Description 
Awl The average time taken to intercept the SOAP message in the Hook Code 
and write it to the socket. 
Ani The average time taken to transmit the SOAP message across the socket 
from the Hook Code. 
Arr The average time taken to read the SOAP message from the socket. 
~p The average time taken to put it in a form that WS-FIT can process. 
Aq The average time taken to perform a first stage trigger on the SOAP 
message. 
Att The average time taken to perform a second stage full trigger on the SOAP 
message. 
At~ The average time taken to inject faults into a SOAP message. 
Awt The average time taken to write the modified SOAP message to the socket. 
Ant The average time taken to transmit the SOAP message across the socket to 
the hook code. 
Art The average time taken to read the modified SOAP message from the socket 
and pass it on to the remaining part of the SOAP stack for transmission to 
source. 
Any of the terms that involve processing a message can be affected by the triggering 
mechanism. There are two types of trigger: 
1. A message trigger 
2. A parameter trigger 
There can be one message trigger per SOAP message type but there can be multiple 
· -·parameter-triggers-fora-single -SQAPmessage-type; All-triggers-detect-certainc"pattems~- ·- ·~ _., 
of elements within a SOAP message. 
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Table 5-4: Factors Affecting Overhead Terms 
Term Factors 
Awt This step is primarily affected by message size since no processing is 
carried out in this step. 
Am This step is primarily affected by message size since no processing is 
carried out in this step. It may also be expected that this latency would 
increase in discrete steps if a fixed size packet based network is being used, 
since increases in latency would occur as a modulus of the packet size 
since packets must be transmitted even if they are not full. 
Arr This is a function of the message size since no processing is carried in this 
step. 
~p This is a function of message size since payload start and end points are 
being searched for. 
Aq This is a function of message size and may also be affected by the number 
of message triggers since each one will have to be matched. 
Att This is a function of message size. It may also be affected by the number of 
message triggers and the number of parameter triggers since these will 
have to be matched. Finally the number of elements within the message 
may also affect the result depending on the implementation used, for 
instance a SAX parser. 
An This is a function of the number of parameter triggers on a single message, 
since there may be more that one, and also the time taken to actually inject 
a single fault into the message. 
Awt This step is primarily affected by message size since no processing is 
carried out in this step. 
Ant This step is primarily affected by message size since no processing is 
carried out in this step. It may also be expected that this latency would 
increase in discrete steps if a fixed size packet based network is being used, 
since increases in latency would occur as a modulus of the packet size 
since packets must be transmitted even if they are not full. 
Art This step is primarily affected by message size since no processing is 
carried out in this step. 
5.2.5.2 Latency introduced when no fault is injected 
Equation 1 gives the term Atnr that is the overhead introduced when no fault is 
injected into a message. This is the latency measured from the point of entering the 
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Hook Code to leaving the Hook Code and returning the original message to the SOAP 
stack so that it can be passed down the remainder of the stack. 
Equation 1 
5.2.5.3 Latency introduced when a fault is injected 
Equation 2 shows the term Atif that is the overhead introduced when a fault is injected 
into a message. This is the latency measured from the point of entering the Hook Code 
to leaving the Hook Code and returning the modified message to the SOAP stack so that 
it can be passed down the remainder of the stack. 
Equation 2 
5.3 Automatic Test Generation 
Automatic test generation in WS-FIT realises the FIT method described in Section 
4.3. The WS-FIT implementation must implement and populate two taxonomies to 
implement this method: 
1. The System Model which describes the system m terms of messages 
exchanged to form RPCs. 
2. The EFM that defines a set of fault models that can be applied to messages. 
5.3.1 System Model 
-The- firsrorthesetaxonomiesis the System ModeCThisc~m 15e-instailtiated -using the 
WSDL definitions of all the Web Services used to compose a system. Since WSDL is 
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XML based WS-FIT uses an XML parser to extract required information from the 
WSDL files. The format of these is described in Section 2.6 and Table 2-3 shows an 
example WSDL message. The relevant elements obtained from the WSDL are mapped 
onto the System Model as shown in Figure 5-10. 
As described in Section 2.6 a wsdl:portType defines a collection of wsdl:operations. 
A wsdl:operation is defined as a wsdl:input and a wsdl:output. The wsdl:input defines 
the request message of an RPC and the wsdl:output defines the response message. A 
wsdl:message is used to define the format of the message with wsdl:part defining the 
parameters/return values in a specific message. 
This structure maps onto the FIT System model with Services equating to 
wsdl:portType elements. There may be a number of Services defining the system under 
assesment so a number of wsdl:portType elements may have to be parsed into the 
system. It is also conceivable that more than one replica of a Service exists within the 
system (each service being on a different machine). This is dealt with by having 
multiple copies of the same wsdl:portType imported into the System Model and each 
one being tagged with the machine address of the host it is installed on. In this way 
triggers can be setup to only trigger on a particular wsdl:portType from a particular 
machine. 
Each wsdl:portType Is made up of a number of wsdl:operations and each 
wsdl:operation equates to a method in the System Model. Further each wsdl:operation 
contains both a wsdl:input element and a wsdl:output element and these point to the 
wsdl:message elements that are used at the method level in the System Model for the 
.ccc-------
request and response messages. 
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Figure 5-10: System Model Constructed from WSDL 
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Finally each wsdl:message is made up of wsdl:part elements. For request messages 
these make up the parameters and are unambiguous. For the response message we 
assume that the name follows the format of post-fixing the wsdl:part name with the 
word 'Return' to identify the return wsdl:part. 
When this information is mapped onto the generic System Model given in Section 4.3 
it creates a WS-FIT specific System Model. This specific System Model can be used as 
a basis for generating triggers described in section 5.2.2 that can identify specific RPC 
parameters within a SOAP message and allow faults to be injected at this level. 
5.3.2 Extended Fault Model 
The second taxonomy that must be implemented to realise the FIT method is the EFM 
defined in section 4.3. To demonstrate theWS-FIT implementation a sample EFM has 
been implemented. This is not intended to be exhaustive or complete but is rather to 
demonstrate the WS-FIT implementation. 
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The types of fault that can affect a Web Service based system have be classified as 
follows: 
Physical Faults: affecting memory or processor registers 
Software Faults: both programming errors and design errors. These can occur at 
either the application level or within the system boundary but we will only 
consider faults within the system boundary that may propagate to the system 
boundary as failures or be detected as errors inside the system boundary. The 
detection of errors within the system boundary assumes that the system is 
composed of more than one Web Service and that these services propagate the 
error between each other. 
Resource-management faults: such as memory leakage and exhaustion of resource 
such as file descriptors 
Communication faults: such as message deletion, duplication, reordering or 
corruption. Whilst in traditional distributed systems this class of errors is widely 
assumed to not have a large effect on middleware (since this is usually built on a 
reliable transport over a LAN) Web Service middleware runs over WAN s that 
may be more unreliable that LAN based systems (especially in message delivery 
times) 
Life-cycle faults: such as premature object destruction through starvation of keep-
alive messages and delayed asynchronous responses (outside specified timing 
constraints). 
~-, -- ---------- ----
This classification is intended to demonstrate how an EFM may be classified and is 
not intended to be exhaustive. 
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Initially WS-FIT fault models concentrated on communications faults since this fits in 
well with the stage one fault injector design. Subsequent evolutions of the fault models 
used have concentrated on Software Faults since these exercise the second stage of the 
WS-FIT implementation. 
WS-FIT implements the EFM by allowing functional decomposition of the top-level 
fault model into sub-sections and finally into methods that can be applied to individual 
parameters. Structuring the fault model in this way aids the designing phase of the fault 
model and allows a more comprehensive model to be constructed. This is similar to 
functional decomposition techniques used in such design methods as Y ourdon where 
three levels of decomposition are required by most projects to allow detailed designs 
and state machines to be constructed. This level of decomposition is arbitrary but 
appears to work well. 
WS-FIT uses a three level decomposition: 
Top level: This is a general grouping 
Second level: This is a detailed grouping and there could be many of these under a 
top-level heading 
Third level: This defines a detailed grouping group specific fault models together. 
Under the third level of decomposition individual fault models can be constructed. 
Each fault model is defined as a name, a textual description of its function and a script 
to implement this function. 
The script can be further decomposed into two parts: 
------·-·--------------------------
1. A script that implements any specialized GUI and static test generation. The 
GUI tool executes this when the fault model is applied to a parameter. As well 
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as generating the GUI this is a convenient place to implement any static data, 
either input or randomly generated. An example of this is given in Table 5-5 
in the Random Values between Upper and Lower Bounds model which 
requires the generation of a statically encoded sequence of random numbers. 
Most scripts do not require this script since only simple data is required at 
instantiation. For these scripts a simple GUI is used for data input that allows 
the entry of named types. An example of this is given in Table 5-5 Upper 
Bound that only requires the maximum valid value (given by a system 
specification). 
2. A script that generates the script fragment of the fault injection script that 
injects the required fault. This fragment of code is inserted into the test script 
to form part of the test campaign. The test script is generated by 'printing' 
lines of text which give the lines of code that make up the test script fragment. 
The scripting language used by WS-FIT is Python. In the initial prototype systems 
these scripts were generated by hand and run from a standard Python interpreter. In the 
WS-FIT implementation these test scripts are automatically generated from the EFM 
and can be executed natively from the GUI using the Jython package [3]. This allows 
scripts interoperability with the Java JVM used to implement WS-FIT and also allows 
them access to the GUI for entering data etc. An example of this is given in Table 5-5. 
This shows only one section of the fault model defined in Table 4-3 decomposed down 
to its most detailed level. 
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Table 5-5: Implemented Extended Fault Model 
• Software Faults 
o Perturbation of Data into a Service 
• values in Specified Range 
• Upper Bound 
o Replace specified parameter with the upper 
bound value specified for this parameter. 
if enable == 1: 
out.println(' # Upper Bound Check') 
out.print(' return ') 
out.println(vars.getConst('upperBound')) 
• Random Values between Upper and Lower Bounds 
o On test generation, generate a static 
sequence of randomly distributed values 
that lie between the upper and lower 
bounds inclusively. Cyclically substitute 
the next value from the statically 
generated sequence for the specified 
parameter. A static sequence should be 
used to provide a level of test 
repeatability although this repeatability 
may be effected by concurrency effects and 
timing. 
(For script see Table 5-6) 
Chapter 5- WS-FIT Applied to Web Services 
Table 5-6: Example Script 
import string 
# Check enable variable and only run generation 
# script if it is true. 
if enable == 1: 
# Writes a line to the generated script to 
# read the stored index variable. 
# This is used to index into the static sequence. 
out.print( 1 index = 1 ) 
out.print( 1 self.getResults(). 1 ) 
out.print( 1 getint(self.m_param,') 
out.println( 1 "index") 1 ) 
# Write a line to the generated script to read 
# the static sequence 
out.print( 1 sequence= 1 ) 
out.println(vars.getVarList("RandomSequence")) 
# Make sure the index for the static sequence 
# loops round at the end of the sequence. 
out.println( 1 if index>= len(sequence): 1 ) 
out.println( 1 index= 0 1 ) 
# Check for type of parameter. if it is an int 
# get rid of the floating point part. 
if vars.getConst("type").find("int") > 0: 
out.print( 1 value=') 
out.println( 1 int(sequence[index]) 1 ) 
else: 
out.print( 1 value= 1 ) 
out.println( 1 sequence[index] 1 ) 
# Write out a line to increment the sequence. 
out.println( 1 index= index+ 1 1 ) 
# Write out code to save the index back into 
# stateful storage 
out.print( 1 self.getResults(). 1 ) 
out.print( 1 setint(self.m_param, 1 ) 
out. pr intln ( I "index" , index) I ) 
# Write out code to record the new value to 
# the minotor graph for this parameter/ip 
# combination. 
out.print( 1 self.getResults(). 1 ) 
out. print ( 1 addValue ( "mon: I /Corruption of 1 ) 
out.print( 1 Data into Web Service/Values in') 
out.print( 1 Range/Random Values/%IP%", ') 
out.println( 1 str(value)) 1 ) 
out.println( 1 return str(value) 1 ) 
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5.4 Automatic Failure Detection 
As described in Section 4.4 the FIT method defines an EF AM that is comprised of a 
number of discrete failure modes classified into a taxonomy. As in Section 5.3 the 
EF AM described here is intended to demonstrate WS-FIT rather than be an exhaustive 
model that can be applied to any Web Service system. 
The EFAM is built upon a set of high-level failure modes. These classify how a Web 
Service can fail. The high-level classifications are: 
1. Crash of a Web Service 
2. Crash of a hosting Web Server 
3. Hang of a Web Service 
4. Corruption of data into a Web Service 
5. Corruption of data out of a Web Service 
6. Duplication of messages 
7. Omission of messages 
8. Delay of messages 
The effect of each of these modes will depend on the fault tolerance of the system as a 
whole. We can assume that a well-written Web Service should be able to detect and 
reject any corrupted data given to it and raise appropriate error responses. Although the 
rejection mechanism can vary we assume that the majority of error conditions are 
relayed by SOAP Fault messages since these equate to Java exceptions and the 
------ ----;-------o--;----.------o---·-. ·--· -----··--·--- ------
prevalent language in use in the construction of Web Services in Java. 
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We can further assume that the detection of duplicated and omitted messages 
generated by fault transmission mediums will be handled by the Network Protocol 
Stack. Since these failure modes do not generate any traffic at the middleware layer 
their detection by WS-FIT will not be possible. WS-FIT can be employed to detect 
duplicated or omitted messages at the SOAP stack level which could result from such 
activity as security attacks, for instance replay attacks. 
Crashes of services/hosting environments should be detected vta time-out 
mechanisms. For this experiment the fault injector framework has no means of checking 
for this. It will be addressed in later research. 
More problematic is an operation that corrupts data leaving the middleware. When 
corrupt data is passed through a SOAP stack it can be intercepted and examined. A 
detailed knowledge of the logic of the Web Service and its current state is required to 
determine if a result returned by a Web Service is correct. TheWS-FIT implementation 
of a EF AM uses available range data, supplied manually from the system specification, 
to determine if the value is in range. This will not catch all failures but it will give an 
indication of failure. 
Another problematic area is that of a service hang. Whilst this may superficially 
appear as a service crash it is indicative of corruption in the hosting environment. Since 
it may present the same symptoms to the application level it will be harder to detect. 
Differentiating between a service hang and a server crash will be left for future research. 
Finally, delayed messages may cause errors due to service life span issues. The Web 
Service_middleware should present-relevant-error- conditions to -the -application- for -
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delayed messages. The application layer must ultimately handle these. WS-FIT can 
handle this by delaying request/response packets. 
The High Level EF AM used to demonstrate WS-FIT is therefore defined in Table 
5-7. 
Table 5-7: High Level Failure Modes 
• 
• 
0 
• 
• 
0 
0 
• 
Crash of a Web Service 
Crash of a hosting Web server 
Hang of a Web Service 
Corruption of data into Web Service 
Corruption of data out of Web Service 
Duplication of messages 
Omission of messages 
Delay of messages 
As described in Section 4.4 this set of high-level groupings is decomposed into a 
taxonomy until a level is reached where a detailed description of the failure mode can 
be written. A generic script is then written to generate code for the fault injection 
campaign script that can detect the defined failure mode when applied to a parameter. 
An example of this is given in Table 5-8. 
'fable 5-8: Implemented Detailed Failure Model 
• Corruption 
o Data 
• 
• 
of data out of service 
out of range 
Data above upper bound 
• Check specified parameter against upper bound 
in specification and if it is greater than 
this value flag an error condition. 
If value > maxLimit: 
Flag error in log 
Data below upper bound 
• Check specified parameter against lower bound 
in specification and if it is less that this 
value flag an error condition. 
If value < minLimit: 
Flag error in log 
___ This EEAM_could then-be-applied -globally-to-all-messages--defined,-in-the -System - ~' 
Model (see Section 5.3.1) and would provide detection of unexpected failures. 
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To detect failures generated by specifically injected faults, injected by linking the 
System Model to the EFM, a link must be made from the EFM to the EF AM script 
corresponding to the expected failure mode as described in Section 4.4. The expected 
outcome from the fault injection may be no failure detected since a fault tolerance 
mechanism may be in place. 
In our implementation this stage of WS-FIT was implemented by post processing the 
generated logs manually but this facility could be integrated into the WS-FIT tool in 
future work. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has detailed an implementation of the FIT method detailed in Chapter 4 
that has been applied to Web Services, specifically using SOAP as the middleware 
protocol. 
It describes how the message based injection mechanism and triggering can be 
implemented to work with SOAP middleware and how this can be used to realise the 
method described in Section 4.2 by the use of Hook Code to intercept SOAP messages, 
decode and manipulate messages. 
WS-FIT demonstrates how the EFM (Section 4.3) can be implemented using a Python 
based scripting language. A system model can be created by importing WSDL for the 
Web Services making up an SOA and mapping certain WSDL elements to certain 
elements within the System Model taxonomy. The System Model can then be used to 
create triggers which the EFM can be applied to. 
----- ·--~~ 
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Finally the EF AM (Section 4.4) has been described and how this can be implemented 
via WS-FIT to detect failures in an SO A. An outline EF AM is shown as a 
demonstration. 
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Chapter 6 - Case Studies 
This chapter describes a number of case studies that demonstrate different areas of the 
FIT method through use of the WS-FIT tool. The case studies are divided into two 
groups: 
1. Case studies demonstrating the operation of the Fault Injection Mechanism 
(Section 6.1) 
2. Case studies demonstrating the application ofthe FIT method to SOA (Section 
6.2) 
The first set of case studies demonstrating the operation of the Fault Injection 
Mechanism are as follows: 
• Fundamental Operation of WS-FIT (Section 6. 1. 1) 
This demonstrates the basic features of the method: 
1. Fault Injection into a middleware message 
2. Trigger Mechanism 
3. Simple Parameter Perturbation 
• Latency Model (Section 6.1.2) 
This demonstrates the latency model outlined in Section 5.2.5. 
• Comparison ofFIT with Code Insertion (Section 6.1.3) 
This compares WS-FIT to another fault injection technique. 
The second set of Case Studies demonstrating the application of the FIT method to 
SOA are as follows: 
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• Fault Generation and Failure Detection (Section 6.2.1) 
This case study demonstrates test campaign generation and failure 
detection through the: 
1. Application of the Extended Fault Model for test campaign 
2. Application of the Extended Failure Model for failure 
detection 
3. Parameter Perturbation 
• Assessment of a Fault Tolerance Mechanism (Section 6.2.2) 
This case study demonstrates the use of parameter perturbation to assess 
the dependability of a fault tolerant SOA using the 'Software Faults' 
categorization of the Extended Fault Model and also the 
'Communications Fault' categorization of the Extended Fault Model. 
This Case Study also shows how the Extended Failure Model can be 
applied. 
1. Application of the Extended Fault Model to assess a fault 
tolerant SOA 
• Application of Communications Faults to an SOA (Section 6.2.3) 
This demonstrates how WS-FIT can be used to apply fault models which 
are categorized as 'Communication Faults' rather than 'Software Faults'. 
1. Application of the Extended Fault Model to a real-time 
----=,;:: 
--- -.--
-- --~--
scenano 
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6.1 Fault Injection Mechanism 
The case studies in this section demonstrate the main features of the FIT method 
through theWS-FIT tool. The key features demonstrated are: 
1. Injection into a message 
2. Trigger Mechanism 
3. Parameter Perturbation 
4. Acceptable Latency Overhead 
5. Comparison to Code Insertion 
6.1.1 Fundamental Operation of WS-FIT 
This case study demonstrates the basic operation of the WS-FIT implementation. The 
features exercised are: 
1. Injection into a message (rather than individual network packets) 
2. Triggering mechanism 
3. Parameter perturbation 
These features form the first stage fault injector on which the FIT method is based. 
6.1.1.1 Scenario 
This scenario is based around a simple client and server. The server exports a service 
constructed using simple data types that is utilized by a client. A SOAP application was 
written and deployed onto the server machine that provided a simple set of routines that 
-- ----~------·-~---
, __ ---- --c-alcillate_d_a-simple-inreger -sequence ot nllinlJ-ers.-An interface method was defined to 
return this sequence one value at a time. A SOAP client was written which polled back 
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the sequence of numbers via the Apache SOAP API. These two simple applications 
form the test-bed for the experiments described here. 
6.1.1.2 Configuration 
The middleware package used was Apache SOAP 2.2 with the container being 
provided by Apache Tomcat 4. Both the server and the client were hosed under Redhat 
Linux 8.0 running Java version 1.3.1. 
6.1.1.3 Results of the First Test Script 
This test was intended to check the middleware under a combination of fault 
conditions. A script was written to inject the following faults into the stream of SOAP 
messages: 
1. Every 1Oth sequence request from the client to the server, corrupting the 
encoding styles schema address 
2. Every 15th sequence response from the server to the client, corrupting the 
encoding styles schema address 
3. Discarding every 3rd sequence response from the server to the client 
4. Every 7th sequence request from the client to the server, inserting extra text 
into the <SOAP-ENV:Body> element after the method element 
The number of faults injected into the system by this test is approximately 25% of the 
total number of packets sent and received by the fault injector (see Table 6-1). 
Approximately 17% were corrupted SOAP packets, with the remainder being withheld 
---- -- -------resptirtSe ·p1iCkets. --- --- - -----
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The test was performed using a loop iteration of 1000, 15000, 45000 and 90000 and 
was repeated 5 times for each loop iteration. There was no variation in results for each 
set of results produced for a particular loop iteration value but there was a very small 
variation in percentage totals between loop iterations (see Table 6-2). 
Table 6-1: Faults injected by test 1 
Loop Total Faults Injected Responses Total Faults 
Iterations Packets (%) Discarded Injected (%) 
% 
1000 5551 17.26 8.11 25.37 
15000 83251 17.26 8.11 25.36 
45000 249651 17.26 8.11 25.35 
90000 499501 17.25 8.11 25.35 
Variance 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The fault injector recorded the following classes of faults: 
1. Failure expected and generated 
2. Failure expected but not generated 
3. Failure generated but not expected. 
A fourth category of response to injecting a fault is also inferred. This is No Failure 
expected, and is deemed to have occurred if a fault is injected into the system but no 
fault message is expected to be generated. This condition could occur when a response 
is sent back from the server to the client but the fault injector discards the message. The 
client cannot generate a fault message because it has no way of knowing that a response 
message is expected. 
Of the failure conditions generated (see Table 6-2), the 7% of failure expected and 
---- ---------
------ -----··· -- ~ -----~ ----
received were generated by the schema corruption case as expected. The 31% of no 
failure expected failures were attributed to the discarding of response packets from the 
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server to the client. This indicated a level of reliability within the middleware since all 
these error conditions appear to have been handled correctly within the middleware and 
the server remained stable. The reliability of the middleware was only assessed over a 
period of approximately 24 hours, due to time constraints, so our data can only indicate 
a level of reliability during this period of time and these conditions [37]. 
Table 6-2: Failures Detected by test 1 
Loop Failures Generated No Failures Expected Failures Missing 
Iterations {%} {%} {%} 
1000 7.10 31.96 60.94 
15000 7.11 31.98 60.92 
45000 7.11 31.98 60.91 
90000 7.11 31.98 60.91 
Variance 0.00 0.00 0.00 
The 60% failures missing figure were generated by the inserting of text into the 
SOAP-ENV:Body element. A failure was expected because the fault would break the 
SOAP specification although it was syntactically correct according to XML but no fault 
messages were generated. Although this was a small deviation from the SOAP 
specification it did not appear to affect the reliability of the middleware over the 
lifespan of the test, which continued to function correctly in all other respects. This 
could be caused by the SOAP implementation not installing a handler for the specific 
element body, since it never expects any data there according to the specification. 
Consequently this explains the continued functioning of the SOAP implementation 
because data within the SOAP-ENV:Body tag would just be silently discarded. 
This fault condition can therefore be classed as a non-catastrophic event but caused 
--~- ---------- ··---·- ----c~= 
-by arare event. we have classed this event as rare because its likelihood of happening 
outside of our fault injection experiment is extremely remote. It would require a 
:):;""-----
Chapter 6 - Case Studies 128 
corresponding bug m the SOAP implementation connected to the SOAP 
implementation receiving the message to generate the event. Its effects on the system as 
a whole seemed to be negligible during the lifespan of the test since the test case caused 
no server or service crashes and no application crashes. 
It was noted that the client application returned error conditions when faults were 
injected and its performance was degraded slightly due to a combination of timeout 
effects when response messages were discarded and the latency introduced by the fault 
injector parsing SOAP messages. 
Overall the middleware appeared to have a high degree of dependability since it 
continued to operate and service requests even when generating error conditions for 
which handlers had not been implemented in the SOAP implementation. Furthermore 
the test was executed over a period of 24 hours and no cumulative memory leaks or 
similar effects were seen. More data is required on determining a suitable duration for a 
test to determine the dependability of the middleware over long periods of time but this 
experiment would seem to indicate that the middleware does have a level of 
dependability when errors are present in the communications medium. 
6.1.1.4 Results of the Second Test Script 
The intent of this test is to check the dependability of the middleware with a 
simulated bad connection. A script was written that discarded every other request and 
response. This caused approximately 50% of the SOAP messages, both requests and 
responses to be discarded (see Table 6-3). A trigger was constructed to do this based on 
the message-type-and-the-frequency-of-the-message.--The-message -type-was-obtained. 
from the WSDL definition for the Web Service. 
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Table 6-3: Faults injected by test 2 
Loop Total Packets Messages Discarded Total Faults Injected 
Iterations {%} {%} 
1000 4001 49.99 49.99 
15000 60001 49.99 50.00 
45000 180001 50.00 50.00 
90000 360001 50.00 50.00 
Variance 0.00 0.00 
The same loop iteration and run repeats were used in Test 2 as in Test 1. There was, 
again, no variation in the results obtained within a repeated test with the same number 
of loop iterations. There is a small variance in % totals between loop iterations. 
Table 6-4: Failures generated by test 2 
Loop Failures Generated No Failures Expected Failures Missing 
Iterations {%} {%} {%} 
1000 0.00 100.00 0.00 
15000 0.00 100.00 0.00 
45000 0.00 100.00 0.00 
90000 0.00 100.00 0.00 
Variance 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Of the fault conditions detected 100% of the faults were of the class No Failures 
Expected (see Table 6-4). This is the expected result of the test since discarding a 
request message from client to server, from the server's point of view, will be the same 
as never having received the request. Discarding a response message from server to 
client generates no network fault messages since this is handled by a time out. The 
client application was manually monitored to verify that the correct error responses 
were giVen. 
Thi~ t~st a~peared ~? ~indi~a!~ that !he middlewar~ ~~er tes! has a high ~~gree ~f 
resilience to SOAP message loss over an unreliable network during the duration ofthe 
test, since the middleware continued to operate correctly under the presence of these 
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faults. No unexpected results were obtained indicating a level of dependability under 
this test case. Discarding the SOAP messages seemed to cause no adverse effects on 
either the client or the server such as server crashes/hangs. 
6.1.1.5 Parameter Perturbation Modification 
A test script was written to allow application return values to be changed. This 
experiment allowed the return data to be modified, whist still returning a valid SOAP 
response message. These tests generated no failures and the modified results were seen 
at the client program. 
A trigger was set which detected first a specific message (the response message from 
the server) and then a specific element within the message (the return parameter). This 
allowed the contents of the element containing the parameter to be modified without 
invalidating the syntax of the message. This in turn allowed the message to be passed 
across the network interface and be received and processed normally by the client 
protocol stack. 
This test was carried out to ensure that the fault injector infrastructure could reliably 
handle modifying SOAP parameter data, whilst still returning correctly formatted 
SOAP response messages. 
6.1.1.6 Evaluation 
This case study has demonstrated that the basic mechanisms employed to implement 
FIT can be applied to Web Services written using SOAP. 
It firstly demonstrated that WS-FIT can inject faults at a middleware message level 
-- -~- --- ----------~- --- ------~--~-- -------. 
rather than a network packet level by instrumenting the protocol stack at the appropriate 
level within the stack. This case study also demonstrated that WS-FIT can be used to 
:::;-.--- -
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injected faults which corrupt the syntax of a message which is akin to more traditional 
network level fault injection although it is not intended to be the main use of WS-FIT. 
This case study also demonstrated a potential weakness in the SOAP implementation 
under evaluation (not detecting extra text outside of elements in a SOAP message). 
Secondly this case study has demonstrated that the triggering mechanisms can target 
specific messages within an RPC exchange between a client and a server by parsing 
intercepted messages and determining the message type. The message type can be 
obtained from the WSDL definition of a Web Service. 
Thirdly it has demonstrated that WS-FIT can target specific parameters within an 
RPC exchange and inject faults into them so that the messages remain syntactically 
correct. This allows faults to be injected and processed by a SOAP stack as normal valid 
messages, thus allowing perturbed parameters to be propagated through the middleware 
layer to clients or Web Services. WS-FIT is therefore capable of injecting API level 
faults into a middleware system without the need for modification to the client or Web 
Service code. 
6.1.2 Latency Model 
These test cases will be used to demonstrate conditions under which the latency 
introduced by WS-FIT can be regarded as acceptable. This will indicate the types of 
SOA that can be assessed using WS-FIT without the instrumentation adversely 
affecting the system. A formal proof will not be attempted but rather demonstrate when 
various terms in the model detailed in Section 5.2.5 become significant. 
--- Th-etest cases wiWfirstestaolisli an empirical-measurement of a RPC execution time 
and subsequent test cases will be compared against this. We will go on to demonstrate 
_7;-----
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under what conditions various terms become significant and which terms can be 
disregarded. 
6.1.2.1 Scenario 
The test cases use a simple SOA that demonstrates types and interconnections that 
WS-FIT supports. The system is deliberately simplistic so that timings can easily be 
measured. 
The scenario utilises a test Web Service calledLatencyTest. It has two main groups of 
service methods: 
• Ten service methods that take an integer parameter as input and return the 
integer parameter as the output. This group of methods are called sequentially 
in a loop to allow both multiple message triggers and parameter triggers to be 
added. Each service call is comprised of two messages (a request and a 
response) and each message contains one parameter, either a call parameter or 
a return parameter. The SOAP messages that make up these exchanges 
contain a relatively small number of XML elements. 
• A single service method that takes an array of strings as input and returns the 
same array of strings as the output. This method is used to provide a message 
with a large number ofXML elements. 
6.1.2.2 Configuration 
The test scenario utilizes three machines to minimise interference effects from 
machine loading. Two 1.2Ghz AMD Sempron based system~,_ ~ach with_1?6M!LC>f 
------------ ·-- - ------- ~ -·--- -----------
RAM running Fedora Core 3 Linux were used to host the LatencyTest service and the 
client. A separate lGhz G4 based system with 392MB of RAM running MacOS 10.3 
Chapter 6 - Case Studies 133 
was used to run WS-FIT. Various combinations of connection were used to simulate 
different network configurations (See Table 6-5 and Table 6-6). 
Table 6-5: Configuration 1 
Client LatencyTest WS-FIT 
Service 
Client 1 Mb Broadband 
Internet 
LatencyTest 1Mb Broadband 1OOMb Ethernet Service Internet 
WS-FIT 1OOMb Ethernet 
Web Services were hosted using the following software: 
• Apache Jakarta Tomcat 5.5.4 
• Sun Microsystems Java 2 Platform, Standard Edition, Version 1.4.2.06 
• Middleware was provided using: 
• Apache Axis Version 1.1 
• Sun Microsystems JavaMail Version 1.3.2 
• Sun Microsystems JavaBeans Activation Framework Version 1.0.2 
• Apache XML Security Version 1.2.0 
Two network configurations were used. One to simulate interconnections between 
Web services over an Internet (Table 6-5) and one to simulate a more controlled 
network environment (Table 6-6). 
·-"'"".,-------" - ~ --- -- ---------
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Table 6-6: Configuration 2 
Client LatencyTest WS-FIT 
Service 
Client I OOMb Ethernet 
LatencyTest 100Mb Ethernet I OOMb Ethernet Service 
WS-FI'f I OOMb Ethernet 
6.1.2.3 Internet latency 
The data shown in Table 6-7 was gathered using Configuration I (See Table 6-5). 
This data is empirical and is not intended to be an exhaustive study but to give a rough 
baseline to compare WS-FIT instrumented services to. The first group of services was 
used to gather data. Each group of ten service method calls was iterated I 000 times and 
averages were taken of this data. 
Table 6-7: Timings ofRPC Across an Internet 
Average Standard Deviation Min Max 
(ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) 
Normal1 167.72 19.64 92.07 3808.07 
Normal2 167.48 28.76 90.78 6041.78 
Loaded Connection 374.16 834.13 89.95 17579.95 
The total time taken to perform an RPC was obtained by recording the time just prior 
to making the RPC call and the time just after the RPC returned and subtracting the two. 
This time includes the time taken by the SOAP stack to process the RPC but this time 
should be a constant if the same environment is used to run subsequent test. 
Table 6-7 shows three measurements of total RPC execution time across an Internet 
connection. The measurements labelled Normal were taken using a client and server 
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connected by a lightly loaded connection. Since the Internet connection between the two 
machines could not be regulated some variation between the results is to be expected as 
can be seen in the results. 
The measurements labelled Loaded Connection were obtained with a loaded network 
connection to show how this can affect round trip RPC times. Whilst the test was 
running, a large file was intermittently transferred from the server running the 
LatencyTest service. This shows that there can be a great variation in RPC execution 
time according to the loading of the Internet connection. The value given by this 
measurement should be considered extreme and a smaller execution time should be 
expected. Axis 1.1 uses a default timeout value of 10 seconds. 
6.1.2.4 Triggering 
These tests are used to assess the impact of the WS-FIT trigger mechanism on a 
running system. The results were generated by calling the group of ten similar service 
methods in a 1000 iteration loop and applying a sequence of different trigger setups 
each time. The trigger setups ranged from no triggers to 20 triggers (one for each 
parameter and return the values). The test run by the trigger was a random corruption 
test as defined in the fault generic fault model given in Table 5-5. The SOA used 
network configuration 2 (see Table 6-6) to eliminate major timing variations introduced 
by network transfers. 
The SOA under test was instrumented as shown in Figure 6-1. WS-FIT was 
instrumented to provide timings for ~rr, ~p, ~q, ~t., ~ti and ~wt· The client side Hook 
Code-was-also -instrumented--to-record-- -the- -client-side- ~wi- and-~rt.-Since- the 
synchronization of the clock on the machines used could not be guaranteed it was not 
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possible to measure ~ni and ~nt directly. We have assumed that ~ni and ~nt are 
approximately the same since similar amounts of data will be transferred across the 
same network link. We therefore approximate these values by subtracting all the other 
measured terms from the total RPC execution time to get ~ni + ~nt · 
··-·-·-·-·-·-·-·-
.-·-·-·-·-
- • - • MoooogoTo&.., .. 
..,___ Me•ege From Seftlice 
Figure 6-1: Basic Fault Injector Configuration 
Figure 6-2 shows the average RPC execution time for a call to LatencyTest. The 
values displayed are averaged over the loop iteration. For the tested number of triggers 
(20) the increase in latency appears to be linear, with an equation of: 
y = 4x/10000 + 0.0379 
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This makes the latency injected into the system less than the standard deviation for 
the internet transfer time given in Table 6-7 which should be acceptable for most 
applications since all Web Service systems should be designed to tolerate this level of 
latency due to the relatively unpredictable nature oflntemet transfer times. 
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Figure 6-2: Total RPC execution timings 
A more detailed breakdown of timings is given in Figure 6-3. This graph gives each 
term as a percentage of the total. From this we can see that L1p is the most significant 
term, ranging from 66% to 83% making it the most significant factor when processing 
messages with small numbers of elements. This is due to an amount of processing 
required after reading the data sent from the Hook Code toWS-FIT to put it into a form 
readable by the SAX parser. This requires several string searches to find certain points 
in the message and hence is relatively constant throughout this test since the size of the 
message in bytes is relatively constant. We can also see that whilst L1u increases L1ti 
remains roughly constant. 
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This set of results is used to assess the impact of theWS-FIT trigger mechanism on a 
running system when the messages contain a large number of elements. The results 
were generated by calling the Latency Service method that takes an array of strings and 
returns an array of strings in a 1000 iteration loop. 
Three tests are preformed: 
1. Execute test with no WS-FIT instrumentation which provides a baseline to 
compare the following tests against; 
2. Instrument the system but do not apply any triggers which allows us to 
measure the latency of the first part triggering mechanism; 
3. Apply a single trigger. 
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A range of array sizes were tested for ranging from and array containing 1 element to 
an array containing 500 elements. The system was setup to use network configuration 2 
(see Table 6-6) to eliminate major timing variations introduced by network transfers. 
The data given in Figure 6-4 shows the total RPC execution timings for the system 
running with no WS-FIT instrumentation. This data shows a small linear execution time 
increase over the given array size range. 
y = 3x/10 
The data given in Figure 6-5 shows the system running with WS-FIT instrumentation 
but no active triggers. The data shows a polynomial increase in RPC execution time of 
y = 3x2/100000 + 41x/10000 
For this test the latency rise is dictated by the size of the message since it must be 
scanned by the first stage trigger that gives a character based latency. 
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6.1.3 Comparison of FIT with Code Insertion 
This case study compares WS-FIT to Code Insertion fault injection and demonstrates 
that it can achieve comparable results. This case study also demonstrates the value of 
WS-FIT in providing a framework for certification testing of Web Services. The test 
case simulates a complex real-world scenario and WS-FIT is used to locate a defect in 
the design of the SO A. 
6.1.3.1 Scenario 
Our system is based on a simulation of a self-regulating heating system (see Figure 
6-6). The system is composed of three main elements: 
1. Heater coil 
2. Thermocouple 
3. Controller 
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A driver to both the heater coil and the thermocouple are provided via a Web Service. 
In a real world application these could be embedded devices. The heater coil hardware 
is designed to allow only small stepped changes to the power. It also has an upper limit 
to its power output of 1 oo·c, if set above this limit the coil will burn out. 
6.1.3.2 Configuration 
Figure 6-6: SOA with WS-FIT Instrumentation 
Each Web Service is hosted on a separate server as shown in Figure 6-6. The 
Thermocouple service is hosted on an instrumented server whilst the HeaterCoil service 
is hosted on an unaltered server. 
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The controller is hosted on a third server. It allows a required temperature to be set. 
The Controller service runs a continuous polling loop that periodically polls the 
Thermocouple service to check that the actual temperature is equivalent to the required 
temperature. If it is not the Controller increments or decrements the power supplied by 
the HeaterCoil, thereby increasing or decreasing the temperature. 
In our simulated system the Thermocouple requests the currently set power from the 
HeaterCoil and calculates the temperature based on this. In the real system this 
information would come from the thermocouple hardware. 
A simple state machine is implemented by the controller to first increase the 
temperature to 10°C, then decrease the temperature to SOC and finally increase and hold 
the temperature at TC. 
The test case is performed using two different configurations: 
1. A WS-FIT instrumented system 
2. A system using Code Insertion. 
By comparing the results from these two configurations we demonstrate that WS-FIT 
can be used to produce compatible results to Code Insertion whilst being less invasive. 
6.1.3.3 WS-FIT Experiment 
As shown in Figure 6-6 a small amount of hook code must be installed on any server 
on which faults are to be injected. By strategically positioning this hook code on certain 
machines WS-FIT can be used as part of the certification process for individual 
______f_<mmonents of a_s)'stem._ .&>_r_example_iLthe_ instrumented-SOAP stack is_positioned on 
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the server running the HeaterCoil service it could be used to certification test the 
Thermocouple or Controller since no changes are made to these servers. 
Our system is set up to certification test the HeaterCoil service so we have chosen to 
position the instrumented SOAP stack on the machine running the Thermocouple 
service (see Figure 6-6). In this way we can monitor the output of the Thermocouple 
driver and inject faults into the messages received from the HeaterCoil (without 
modifying the HeaterCoil code or environment). 
A script was constructed to monitor temperature response messages between the 
Thermocouple and the Controller. A trigger was created to inject a fault into the 
getPower responses received by the Thermocouple from the HeaterCoil after the 
temperature has reached a certain limit. By modifying this response to give a constantly 
low value we will attempt to force the controller to continually increase the power 
emitted by the heater coil, thus causing the heater coil to exceed its maximum power. 
This configuration uses two test scripts. The first is a control script that passes all 
messages through unaltered to their destination and is used to monitor SOAP messages. 
The second script is the one described above. While running a test script, the fault 
injector framework logs a variety of data including unmodified and modified messages. 
6.1.3.4 Code Insertion Experiment 
This configuration demonstrates that Code Insertion can produce similar results to 
those of WS-FIT. The original code for the services was taken and perturbation 
functions were inserted at appropriate points to perturb parameters in a similar way to 
,. ____ thoseinSection 6T.T3-. --~-- -
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Two points were identified for Code Insertion in this scenario but in practice with a 
complex SOA many more insertion points would potentially be needed, for instance 
where RPC calls are called from multiple places in the code. Inserted code is marked in 
grey on Figure 6-7. 
private int injectl(int power) { 
int injectPower; 
if (power > 5) { 
injectPower 5; 
} else { 
injectPower power; 
} 
System.out.println(power + "," + 
injectPower); 
return injectPower; 
public int getTemp(int ctx) 
throws java.rmi.RemoteException 
HeaterCoilServiceLocator locator = 
new HeaterCoilServiceLocator(); 
try { 
HeaterCoil service = 
locator.getHeaterCoil(new URL( 
getHeaterContext(ctx) .getUrl())); 
return injectl(service.getPower( 
getHeaterContext(ctx) .getCtx() )) * 
POWER TO TEMP; 
catch (MalformedURLException e) { 
e.printStackTrace(); 
throw new RemoteException( 
e.getMessage()); 
catch (ServiceException e) 
e.printStackTrace(); 
throw new RemoteException( 
e.getMessage()); 
Figure 6-7: Instrumented Thermocouple Routine 
The first insertion point was in the getTemp routine in the Thermocouple service (See 
Figure 6-7). The second was a Controller routine where the controller calls the 
Thermocouple getTemp routine. This insertion point was constructed to modify the 
~----
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value returned by the call to getPower of the HeaterCoil service. This corresponds to 
the getTempResponse SOAP message that was logged and modified in the WS-FIT 
configuration. As in theWS-FIT configuration the returned power was set to a constant 
value once it had reached a certain value, thus attempting to force the Controller service 
to continually increment the heater coil power. Both the original value and the modified 
value were logged. 
The second insertion point was implemented to log the modified temperature to the 
system log on the server running the Controller service so a comparison of injected 
temperature to actual temperature could be made. 
To obtain data similar in form to that obtained from the WS-FIT configuration the 
two log files were combined via a simple shell script. 
6.1.3.5 Results 
Three series of data were collected: 
1. Control experiment (Figure 6-8) 
2. Fault injection experiment using WS-FIT (Figure 6-10) 
3. Fault injection experiment using Code Insertion. 
The control experiment was carried out using WS-FIT running a 'null' script that 
injected no faults but captured all messages received by and sent to the Thermocouple 
service. These messages were analyzed to give a temperature plot of the system when 
running under normal conditions. The data obtained from this experiment (Figure 6-8) 
__ ji!_di~Jl.tes _ th~._t th~~y:~t~m_fim~tiQllS_acc_ording _ _to_the_state_macbine _given _in_Section __ 
6.1.3.1. This experiment gave us a basis for comparison with the following fault 
--~ 
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injection experiments. 
The following metrics were extracted from the logged data: 
1. The temperature returned by the Thermocouple to the Controller 
2. The power reading sent by the HeaterCoil to the Thermocouple 
3. The power reading supplied to the Thermocouple with a fault injected into it. 
Results of Injected Fau lts 
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Chapter 6 - Case Studies 147 
Results of Control 
u 
~ I 6 ~~+-----------------------------------------------~ 
! 
0~--,---~---T--~----r---~--~---r--~--~----r---.---~---r--~--~ 
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001 1101 1201 1301 1401 1501 
Messages Exchanged 
Figure 6-8: Control Temperatures 
Figure 6-9: Returned Temperature with Fault Injected 
Results of Injected Faults 
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Figure 6-10: Actual Temperature of Heater Coil 
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The logged data was converted into temperature graphs, one for the temperature 
returned by the Thermocouple and one for the actual temperature. The actual 
temperature was extrapolated from the power reading sent by the HeaterCoil to the 
Thermocouple. 
The control data shown in Figure 6-8 clearly demonstrates that the system is 
functioning according to specification with only random variations (introduced 
deliberately as part of the simulation). 
The data returned by WS-FIT (Figure 6-10) demonstrates a problem with the design 
of the SOA. Once a trigger condition has been met the fault injection modifies the 
power sent to the Thermocouple to a power that indicates a temperature of 1 OC and 
holds at this temperature. The controller is written in a simple fashion. According to its 
criteria the temperature is too low so it keeps ramping the power to increase the 
temperature. The heater coil soon exceeds its maximum operating temperature and in a 
real system would malfunction. The Code Insertion configuration yielded results 
identical to those obtained using theWS-FIT configuration (see Figure 6-10). 
The scenario used here could be caused, under real world conditions, by a 
thermocouple malfunctioning and thus causing an invalid reading to be received. It 
would indicate that some form of fault tolerance mechanism is required in the system, 
for instance a piece of guard code in the heater coil driver service. 
6.1.3.6 Evaluation 
This case study has demonstrated how the FIT method can be used as part of a 
specifidition oased certification strategy. Tfie comparison or- Ws~:F1T with. Code 
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Insertion has indicated that it is less intrusive, requiring just one set of modifications to 
the network stack as opposed to many potential modifications for Code Insertion. 
Our proposed method allows specific components within a SOA to be certification 
tested, provided that strategic decisions on instrumented SOAP stacks are taken based 
upon which components will be certification tested. 
Finally Code Insertion requires access to the service source code to allow placement 
of extra code where as WS-FIT tests can be based entirely on the WSDL specification 
since it requires no modifications to the service code. Also Code Insertion may require 
instrumentation of the code in multiple places to capture or perturb parameters to a 
single method, for instance if a remote method is called from more that one place. 
6.2 Application of FIT to SOA 
The case studies in this section demonstrate the application of the method FIT method 
through theWS-FIT tool to SOA. The key features demonstrated are: 
1. Application of the Extended Fault Model for test campaign generation 
2. Application of the Extended Failure Model for failure detection 
6.2.1 Fault Generation and Failure Detection 
This case study demonstrates test campaign generation and failure detection through 
the: 
1. Application of the Extended Fault Model for test campaign generation 
2. Application of the Extended Failure Model for failure detection 
3. Parameter Perturbation 
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6.2.1.1 Scenario 
To provide a test bed to demonstrate WS-FIT a test system has been constructed that 
simulates a typical stock market trading system (See Figure 6-11 ). This system is 
composed of a number of elements: 
1. A Web Service to supply real-time stock quotes 
2. A Web Service to automatically trade shares 
3. A bank Web Service that provides a simple interface to allow deposits, 
withdrawals and balance requests 
4. A client to interact with the SOA 
The stock quote service is implemented to use a large repeatable dataset, stored in a 
backend database to produce a time based real-time stock quote. Since the quote service 
is based around a database containing the simulated quote values it is possible to 
replicate a test run exactly by resetting time etc. to a set of starting conditions. The 
trading service implements a simple automatic buying and selling mechanism. An upper 
and lower limit is set which triggers trading in shares. Shares are sold when the high 
limit is exceeded and shares are brought when the quoted price is less than the lower 
limit. 
The buying and selling process involves transferring money using the bank service 
and multiple quotes (one to trigger the transaction and one to calculate the cost of the 
transaction). Since these multiple transactions involve processing time and network 
transfer time this constitutes a race condition as the quoting service produces timed real-
time quotes. Any such race condition leaves the potential for the system to lose money 
since the initial quote price may be different from the final purchase price. 
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Figure 6-11: Instrumented System 
6.2.1.2 Configuration 
This paper details three different series of data: 
1. A baseline set of data with the system running normally 
2. A simulated faulty/malicious service 
3. A simulated heavily loaded server 
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The test system was implemented using Apache Tomcat 5.0.28 with Web Services 
implemented using Apache Axis 1.1, hosted on Fedora Linux Core 2 running on 2Ghz 
IA-32 Processors. 
Since the Extended Failure Model has not been implemented in WS-FIT at present it 
has been applied by hand. The method described by the Extended Failure Model has 
been implemented either by writing specialized scripts that detect failures in real time or 
post processing of log information to flag failures. 
6.2.1.3 Baseline Test 
The baseline test is designed to demonstrate the system runnmg under normal 
conditions. This provides a series of data to compare further test cases against. We 
instrument the system for all tests. This instrumentation allows faults to be injected into 
the system and also monitor the RPC exchanges between Web Services (See Figure 
6-15). It has been demonstrated in Section 6.1.2 that the latency introduced by this 
instrumentation is negligible when compared to Internet message transfer times 
involved in a SOAP based SOA. 
Table 6-8: Baseline Test Series 
Test 1 Test2 Test3 Test4 TestS 
Match Miss Match Miss Match Miss Match Miss Match Miss 
Match 99.00 1.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
% 
Average 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Time 
StdDev 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
The -first series of data-collected from the-normally running~ system allows us-to verify 
that the system operates according to its specification. Table 6-8 shows a summary of 
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the results collected and demonstrates that the deviation between the original quoted 
prices and the transaction completion price is negligible 0.2%. 
Comparlslon of Test Runs 
90 
80 
70 
~ 60 
A. 
ID 
1:1 
~50 
., 
.. 
't: 
A. 40 
f! 
• I: 
Ul 30 
20 
10 
0 
0 
-· · Test Run 1 --Test Run 2 - Test Run 3 - Test Run 4 --ill-Test Run 5 
Figure 6-12: Baseline Test Series 
The test case was iterated five times and the transactions from each were compared. 
Apart from minor timing variations the analysis showed that the test case was repeatable 
as can be seen in Figure 6-12. This plot is drawn as a line graph to show the trend of 
purchase and sales and to make discrepancies between runs clear. This also allows the 
sequence in which transactions occur in any run to be clearly represented. In this plot all 
five test runs produced similar results so the points plotted and lines drawn linking them 
together appear as one line. 
6.2.1.4 Faulty/Malicious Service 
The second test series simulated a faulty/malicious quote service by applying one of 
the Extended Fault Model tests to the quote service. The test chosen was a test that 
generated a random value that is within the specified range for the parameter it is 
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applied to. The random model used injects a normally distributed randomly generated 
value that replaces the RPC parameter specified. The same starting conditions as the 
first test series were used and the test was iterated five times. 
Table 6-9: Attack Injection 
Test 1 Test 2 Test3 Test4 Test 5 
Match Miss Match Miss Match Miss Match Miss Match Miss 
Match% 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
fAverage 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Time 
StdDev 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Table 6-9 shows the results of the analysis. The data shows a clear deviation from the 
first test series since the quote service is returning different data. Each test run was 
repeatable since the randomly generated sequence was contained statically within the 
test script. During all test runs the system appeared to run correctly from a user 
perspective but by comparing it to the first test series it is clear that the system was 
being corrupted by the fault, with the consequence that the share trades were inaccurate 
(see Table 6-9 and Figure 6-13). 
Figure 6-13 is drawn as a line graph to show the trend of purchase and sales and to 
make discrepancies between runs clear. This also allows the sequence in which 
transactions occur in any run to be clearly represented. In this plot all five test runs 
produced similar results so the points plotted and lines drawn linking them together 
appear as one line. The baseline plot is shown as a sixth line but since the original 
baseline plot has a small scale compared to the scale used in this plot the baseline 
appears as a single straight line near the bottom of the Y axis. 
The Extended Failure Model is capable of detecting this smce our specification 
specified a time duration for quote repeatability. Within this period the quote service 
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must return the same result. Since each value from the quote service is replaced by a 
random value and the quote that triggers the purchase/sale and the purchase/sale quote 
fall within this time duration, it was possible to customize the Extended Failure Model 
with a script to detect this from the data extracted from the WSDL and original 
specification. 
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Figure 6-13: Attack Data Series 
1000 
The test series showed that it was possible for the system to be corrupted/attacked 
without the user being aware of any such failure. 
6.2.1.5 Latency Injection 
The third and final series of data in this set of tests again injected a fault into the 
system. This fault was an increased latency induced into the quote service. This latency 
simulates server loading. To implement this one of the predefined tests in the Extended 
Fault Model. The test used introduced a delay into the system based on a possion 
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distribution. The distribution is statically encoded into the test script to allow for 
repeatability. Latency was first introduced into the quote service and data was collected. 
Then a second series of data was collected with the latency introduced into the bank 
service. The test was iterated over five runs. 
Table 6-10 contains the results from the injection performed on the quote service. 
This clearly shows that the system is functioning differently to the baseline test series. 
By analysing the test data gathered it can be see that the quote value that triggers a 
sale/purchase of shares differs from sale/purchase price approximately 63% of the time. 
This is due to some quote values being delayed long enough to cause the quote to fall 
into the next quote period (see Figure 6-14). 
Figure 6-14 is drawn as a line graph to show the trend of purchase and sales and to 
make discrepancies between runs clear. This also allows the sequence in which 
transactions occur in any run to be clearly represented. In this plot all five test runs 
produced slightly different results so the sequencing of the points plotted can be seen by 
following the line linking any given set of points for a run. This allows discrepancies in 
both timing and transaction to be seen. The baseline is shown as a sixth line on the plot 
for comparison. 
Table 6-10: Latency Injection 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test4 Test 5 
Match Miss Match Miss Match Miss Match Miss Match Miss 
Match 39.00 61.00 32.89 67.11 40.00 60.00 38.00 62.00 36.96 63.04 
% 
Average 3.23 24.86 2.33 23.94 3.40 25.11 3.69 24.64 3.93 24.03 
Time 
StdDev 4.22 7.63 3.40 7.82 4.29 7.43 5.38 7.75 5.20 8.52 
--- - -- -
- -
- - - ~-------- ----
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We repeated this test by injecting the same latency into the bank service rather than 
the quote service. This produced results comparable to those obtained above. Since the 
race condition designed into the system includes both a call to the quote service and the 
bank service this similarity is to be expected. 
This test series demonstrates not only that the system Is susceptible to delays 
introduced by loaded servers but also that a user of WS-FIT need not have detailed 
knowledge of the system to use the Extended Fault Model since it is not critical where 
latency is introduced into this system. Again Extended Failure Model can detect this 
failure using the same failure model test as the second test series. 
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Figure 6-14: Latency Test Series 
6.2.1.6 Evaluation 
This case study has demonstrated that the Extended Fault Model can be used to 
automatically generate fault injection test campaigns. This required a minimum of user 
intervention, apart from constructing the ontology for the SOA by importing WSDL, 
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and selecting the services/methods to inject faults into. For the test scenano 
demonstrated that applying the same latency injection to a number of points in the 
system could generate a similar effect. This demonstrated that, for this test scenario, 
user knowledge of the injection point was not important to the test outcome. 
The Extended Failure Model was applied to the test results to demonstrate its 
potential for detecting failures in a SOA. The current Extended Failure Model is a proof 
of concept and further work is required to enhance this and integrate it into the WS-FIT 
tool. 
Finally this case study demonstrated that it is possible to create parameter 
perturbation using WS-FIT and use it to aid in the dependability assessment of an SOA. 
6.2.2 Assessment of a Fault Tolerance Mechanism 
This case study demonstrates that parameter perturbation can be applied to a non-
trivial system using WS-FIT. Specifically this case study assesses a Multi-Version 
Design (MVD) fault tolerance mechanism intended to increase the overall dependability 
of an SOA. This is an important use ofWS-FIT since Fault Tolerance is one of the four 
means of countering threats to a system and hence increasing its dependability. 
6.2.2.1 Scenario 
To provide a test bed to demonstrate WS-FIT we have constructed a test system that 
simulates a typical stock market trading system that incorporates a MVD system called 
FT -Grid [ 69]. This system is composed of a number of Web Services: 
1. A servi~e to s~~PP!Y_r~a!-_t~~ ~tock _qu~tes 
2. A service to automatically trade shares 
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3. A bank service that provides deposits, withdrawals and balance requests. 
The trading SOA implements a simple automatic buying and selling mechanism. An 
upper and lower limit is set which triggers trading in shares. Shares are sold when the 
high limit is exceeded and shares are purchased when the quoted price is less than the 
lower limit. The buying and selling process involves transferring money using the bank 
service and multiple quotes, one to trigger the transaction and one to calculate the cost 
of the transaction. These multiple transactions involve processing and network transfer 
time, and this constitutes a race condition since the quoting service produces real-time 
quotes using a time-based algorithm. Any such race condition leaves the potential for 
the system to lose money since the initial quote price may be different from the final 
purchase price. 
6.2.2.2 Configuration 
We instrument each server in the system to eliminate any bias caused by the slight 
latency introduced by WS-FIT. This instrumentation allows faults to be injected into the 
system and monitor the RPC exchanges between Web Services (see Figure 6-15 and 
Figure 6-16). 
There are three different series of test data: 
1. A baseline with the system running normally 
2. A simulated malicious service 
3. A simulated heavily loaded server 
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There are two configurations of the SOA for each test series: 
1. The SOA running with a single quote service (Figure 6-15). This will be 
known as configuration cl 
2. The SOA running with 5 replicated quote services using FT-Grid to provide a 
fault tolerance mechanism (Figure 6-16). This will be known as configuration 
c2 
C1 is used to provide a baseline system to compare C2 against. To demonstrate that 
our results are repeatable each test series is repeated four times. 
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The test system was implemented using Apache Tomcat 5.0.25 with Web Services 
implemented using Apache Axis 1.1 , hosted on Fedora Linux Core 2 running on dual 
3Ghz IA-32 Processors. Each quote service was hosed on a separate Tomcat server to 
avoid interaction effects. 
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Quote Service 
Fault Tolerance Co-ordination Service 
Bank Service 
Figure 6-16: Instrumented FT-Grid SOA 
This results collected from the configurations simulate three different test conditions: 
1. Normal SOA Operation 
2. Malicious Service 
3. Server Loading 
6.2.2.3 Normal SOA Operation 
This test is designed to demonstrate the system running under normal conditions (C1) 
and to provide a baseline to compare further test cases against. It also demonstrates that 
C2 improves the system in terms of reliability whilst minimising the overhead 
introduced by the fault tolerance mechanism itself. 
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The first series of data collected from C1 allows us to verify that the system operates 
according to its specification. The data given for each configuration and test type in 
Table 6-11 is split into three parts (Normal, Malicious and Server Loading). For each 
configuration and each test type four metrics are shown: 
1. Percentage match between trigger price and sale/purchase price 
2. Time for a successful transaction 
3. Time for a failed transaction 
4. Percentage of transactions that have a successful consensus. 
From the data given in Table 6-11 it can be seen that under normal operation C2 
causes approximately the same number of mismatches as C1 indicating that FT-Grid 
does not adversely affect the system. It should be noted the FT -Grid does cause a small 
latency of0.22 seconds in overall transaction time when compared to C1. 
Table 6-11: Summary of Data From Test Cases 
Normal Malicious Loaded Server 
c1 c2 c1 Cz c1 c2 
Match% 99.50 99.00 0.00 99.71 37.37 76.33 
Transaction Time 0.05 0.27 N/A 0.22 3.16 3.28 
(sec) 
Transaction Time 0.06 0.37 0.04 0.20 24.64 11.59 
(Failure) (sec) 
Consensus% N/A 100.00 N/A 68.38 N/A 50.31 
6.2.2.4 Malicious Service 
The second test series simulates a malicious quote service by applying one of WS-
FIT's predefined fault model tests to the quote service. The test chosen generated a 
was used and was applied to 2 ofthe 5 replicated quote services. 
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Figure 6-17 is drawn as a line graph to show the trend of purchase and sales and to 
make discrepancies between runs clear. This also allows the sequence in which 
transactions occur in any run to be clearly represented. In this plot all four test runs 
produced similar results so the points plotted and lines drawn linking them together 
appear as one line. The baseline plot is shown as a fifth line but since the original 
baseline plot has a small scale compared to the scale used in this plot the baseline 
appears as a single straight line near the bottom of the Y axis. 
Figure 6-18 is drawn as a line graph to show the trend of purchase and sales and to 
make discrepancies between runs clear. This also allows the sequence in which 
transactions occur in any run to be clearly represented. In this plot all four test runs 
produced slightly different results so the sequencing of the points plotted can be seen by 
following the line linking any given set of points for a run. This allows discrepancies in 
both timing and transaction to be seen. The baseline is shown as a fifth line on the plot 
for comparison. 
The malicious service data contained in Table 6-11 shows the results of the simulated 
attack using C1. This data demonstrates a clear deviation from the normal system since 
the quote service is returning corrupt data and there is a 100% mismatch between 
trigger and sale/purchase quotes. By comparing the trend given in Figure 6-17 with the 
baseline trend shown by the crosses, it is clear that the system is under attack but since, 
under normal operation, this data would not be available it would not be possible to 
easily detect this attack. 
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Figure 6-17: C1 Malicious Trend 
By comparing this data to the attack data for C2 we can demonstrate that the FT -Grid 
voting has rectified a proportion of the attack. This can be seen by comparing C1 (See 
Figure 6-17) with C2 (See Figure 6-18). Since FT -Grid has been configured to use 
consensus voting, any value returned to the trading service can be guaranteed correct 
since corrupted values are rejected. We see that with only 3 reliable quote services out 
of 5, consensus is reached in 68% of all transactions. Further this operation introduces 
no more latency into the system than when running C2 without injected faults . 
Chapter 6 - Case Studies 166 
Comparision of Test Runs 
90 
80 
-70 
A. 
ra 6o 
" -G.l 50 
u 
'i: 
A. 40 
G.l 
:a 30 
.c 
(I) 20 
10 
0 
0 200 400 600 BOO 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 
Time (seconds) 
---- Test Run 1 -- Test Run 2 ···· · Test Run 3 --Test Run 4 x Baseline 
Figure 6-18: C2 Malicious Trend 
6.2.2.5 Server Loading 
The third series of data injects a latency fault into the quote service and this simulates 
server loading since the request to the server from the client is delayed. To implement 
this one of the predefined tests in the Extended Fault Model that introduces a delay into 
the system based on a poisson distribution was applied. For C2 the fault was injected 
into 2 out of 5 of the replicated quote services. 
For C1 it can be seen that the match rate between trigger and sale/purchase quotes has 
fallen to 37%. This indicates that the latency is causing the race condition between 
trigger and sale/purchase quotes to fail. This can be verified by examining the average 
transaction time for a mismatch, which is 24 seconds. This is double the frequency used 
to generate the real-time quotes and is causing the sale/purchase quote to be miss-
calculated. By comparison the match rate for C2 is 68%. Since the voting algorithm is 
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written to accept the first three returned values and discard the rest C2 ts not as 
susceptible to latency as C1. 
6.2.2.6 Evaluation 
Our initial dependability analysis of FT-Grid using WS-FIT uncovered a number of 
problems that had gone undetected during development testing and would have been 
hard to detect using conventional test methods. Firstly, when running the two sets of 
baseline tests for cl and c2 it became apparent that a 2 second latency was being 
introduced into the system. This was tracked to the service discovery mechanism, which 
was performing a UDDI lookup for every operation. This was modified to cache the 
initial service discovery for reuse and only request a discovery when the cache becomes 
invalid. 
A second problem was uncovered which biased the consensus voter to favour certain 
services over others partly as a result of the above fix. Initially FT -Grid performed a 
service discovery and then invoked the services in a linear manner. It was hoped that the 
service discovery was sufficiently different each time to provide some different in 
ordering. When the service discovery was cached this then favoured the services started 
first, and hence biased the voting mechanism. This was eliminated from FT -Grid by 
randomising the service invocation order each time from within FT -Grid. 
The above demonstrates that WS-FIT can be effectively applied to a fault tolerance 
mechanism during development to debug a system. The above faults were unexpected 
and had gone undiscovered during the previous development of this third party code. 
An interference effect- caused-by excessive latency being injeCted into a-service was 
also observed. If a large enough latency was injected into a server a marked degradation 
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in performance was seen. This is more than would be expected from the system since 
FT -Grid should compensate for latency effects in the system as we have demonstrated 
in section 6.2.2.5. This may be due to an interaction between the Web Service container 
and WS-FIT. Latency is injected by a single thread in WS-FIT (one per server) so if the 
latency injected is greater that the frequency of the service call then the server may still 
be blocking on the previous latency from WS-FIT, hence the degraded performance. It 
is believed that this effect is only present in extreme latency injection but further 
research is required to determine the exact cause. 
The analysis of the data given in section 6.2.2.3 simulating Normal SOA Operation 
demonstrates that for this scenario FT -Grid works in a non-invasive manner with only a 
small latency introduced. Whilst this latency is not significant in the context of this 
demonstration, since timing constraints are in the order of 5s or greater, it could become 
significant in systems with tighter timing constraints. Although these results are 
promising more experimentation is required to determine if this latency is fixed or if it 
is cumulative, etc. This in turn will give an indication of the scalability ofFT-Grid. 
This data also shows that WS-FIT can be used in a non-invasive way when applied to 
a system with the given timing constraints and not adversely affect the operation of the 
system. The timing constraints specified are typical of a Web Service system operating 
over the Internet. 
The data collected for a simulated SOA Operating with a Malicious Service shows a 
marked increase in reliability when using FT -Grid. This is due to the consensus voting 
mechanism utilized by FT -Grid. This ensures that single corrupted values cannot be 
:s--
passed to the utilizing client. Although there is a drop in the number of readings that are 
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accepted by the client the overall operation of the system can continue at a degraded 
level. The degradation was 32% for this test scenario. 
This data demonstrates that WS-FIT and its EFM can be used to effectively assess the 
fault tolerance mechanism employed here and simulate a service who's integrity has 
been compromised. 
The scenario that simulates an SOA Operating with Server Loading indicated a 
marked improvement when operating in the FT -Grid configuration when latency was 
introduced. It was observed that whilst C1 was susceptible to latency and an increased 
number of mismatched readings were observed, C2 saw a reduction in this due again to 
its consensus voting mechanism. The voting mechanism is designed to vote on the first 
3 values returned and discard the other two is consensus if reached. Consequently any 
delayed values are discarded and the effect of any latency within the quote services is 
reduced. 
This data demonstrates that WS-FIT and its EFM can be applied to a fault tolerance 
mechanism to assess its operation in the presence of delayed communications, in this 
case simulated server loading. This is a more traditional application of fault injection 
not involving any parameter perturbation or other data corruption demonstrating that 
WS-FIT can be used to inject standard fault models as well as message level parameter 
perturbation. 
6.2.3 Application of Communications Faults to an SOA 
This case study demonstrates how WS-FIT can be used to apply fault models which 
-··----
are categofizea as 'Comniunicatiori-Faiilts' nither tlian 'Software Faults'. It will 
demonstrate how theWS-FIT method and tools can be used to assess whether a Web 
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Service based system can meet its timing constrains under extreme conditions. We will 
demonstrate the test case can be automatically generated from our extended fault model 
and this can be compared to previous experiments that we conducted on the same 
system using manual methods. 
6.2.3.1 Scenario 
The test scenario will be based around an electronically controlled heater system. In 
the scenario a 'heater unit' is made up of a thermocouple, a heater coil and a control 
unit. The thermocouple and heater coil hardware are interfaced to two separate 
machines whilst the heater controller runs on a third machine. 
Figure 6-19: 'Heat Unit' Design 
Chapter 6 - Case Studies 171 
Driver functionality is provided by a Web Service runnmg on each machine: 
Thermocouple to drive the thermocouple hardware; Heater to drive the heater coil 
hardware; and HeaterController to provide a coordination facility for both the 
Thermocouple and Heater Web Services. (See Figure 6-19) 
With embedded smart devices becoming more prevalent this type of system may 
become more common in the future, and testing reliability and security aspects will 
become crucial [45]. This system could be constructed with three embedded 
microprocessor boards, running an embedded OS and could conceivably be running a 
full web server connected to the outside world via an Internet connection for remote 
monitoring and control. 
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The Heater service allows power to be applied in small increments vta two 
operations: incPower and decPower. The heater coil power increments are logarithmic 
Chapter 6 - Case Studies 172 
in nature (See Figure 6-21 ), therefore if linear behaviour is required a control algorithm 
is required to provide this. 
Thermocouple allows the current temperature to be read back via the getTemp 
operation. Since power to the heater coil can only be modified in small increments the 
HeaterController provides the setTemp operation that uses a time-based algorithm that 
issues incPower and decPower operations to the Heater to set the correct power level. 
The current temperature is monitored by HeaterController to provide feedback into the 
algorithm. HeaterController also provides the current temperature to the client program 
via the getTemp operation. 
This 'heater unit' is to be used in a chemical process. A sample is to be heated over a 
precisely defined period with a precisely linear temperature rise to a temperature of 
60°C. This constitutes the SLA for the HeaterController. 
6.2.3.2 Configuration 
Figure 6-21 shows the modelled behaviour. A client program is to be used to provide 
this behaviour. This client will send the temperature every second to HeaterController 
via the setTemp operation. The HeaterControl/er will then use its time-based algorithm 
( 10 adjustments per second) to adjust the power the heater coil supplies. The small time 
steps used by the client should ensure that the temperature rise is linear. 
This test scenario will demonstrate how WS-FIT can be used to modify latencies in a 
system. WS-FIT will allow this to be achieved without the need for any additional test 
harness or test code. 
Each machine in the system will be instrumented with a modified SOAP stack. This 
will allow us to not only inject faults on any machine but also capture and log all traffic 
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to that server. This logged traffic can then be analyzed off line to determine latencies, 
etc. 
By using theWS-FIT tool it is possible to introduce latencies into any RPC messages 
and also monitor messages sent/received. In this way we can assess the system and 
determine if the fault tolerance mechanisms included in the system are adequate, if the 
system is scalable, etc. 
6.2.3.3 Results 
Initially we will run the system with no fault injection triggers set. The system is 
executed for a length of time under normal conditions to determine baseline timings 
from the collected log. WS-FIT has the capability to visualize parameters in SOAP 
messages in real-time. The data from these visualizations can be output to file to allow 
offline processing in spreadsheets. 
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Figure 6-21: Model compared to Linear Client 
Chapter 6 - Case Studies 174 
The system can be assessed by monitoring the getTemp operation (See Figure 6-21 ). 
This data shows that under normal operation, the system operates as required and the 
client algorithm effectively removes the logarithmic nature of the heater coil from the 
overall system. We can compare the operation of the system with the model to confirm 
this. 
An analysis of the log files generated by WS-FIT shows the frequency of incPower 
and deeP ower operations sent between the HeaterController and Heater. The maximum 
theoretical throughput of these messages is 10 per second. This data shows that the 
current system is running within this throughput constraint with an incPower/decPower 
message being sent on average every 1. 07 seconds. 
6.2.3.4 Test Case Generation 
The test case generation is based around the EFM detailed in Chapter 5 that can be 
used to provide automatic test case generation from a predefined set of alternatives. The 
test cases uses the scenario described in Section 6.2.3.1 but instead of devising a test 
script based on the Web Service design we will base our analysis purely on the Service 
specification which will be derived from the WSDL interface specifications and 
separately specified bounds for all parameters (both input and output parameters). 
Our experiment will be designed to inject latency into the system at an appropriate 
point. The injection trigger must be chosen with care since we are attempting to change 
the maximum throughput of the system. 
To determine the effectiveness of a particular injection point we utilized the feature of 
WS=FIT Wliicli allows real-time visualization ofRPC parameters. A monitor -can-be set 
on any RPC parameter contained in a SOAP message and these can be used to give a 
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visual representation of the system as it is running. This can be used to determine that a 
test script is producing the desired results. 
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Figure 6-22: Constructing a Detailed Fault Model 
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( Delete Script ) 
Once it has been determined which RPC to target a detailed model must be selected 
from the Extended Fault Model. Since no detailed knowledge of the implementation of 
the system can be assumed, other than its specification, the detailed model takes general 
parameters and constructs a specific test case from these. If a suitable model was not 
present in the model a new detailed test could be added with theWS-FIT tool. 
The fault model test is composed of a simple script which takes the various attributes 
associated with a WSDL defined message, for instance parameter name, parameter type, 
upper and lower bound, etc. and use these to generate a piece of test code to be inserted 
into the main test script in the same way that a manually written script is inserted into 
the main script. 
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The fault model test does not actually run as part of the main test script, it merely 
generates static code for the main test script. In this way it is possible to maintain a level 
of repeatability of testing, since any random values introduced should be statically 
encoded into the main test script and executed in subsequent runs. 
6.2.3.5 Latency Injection 
Since WS-FIT is attempting to affect the throughput of the system the first injection 
point will introduce a latency into the setTemp operation sent between the client and 
HeaterController. The client sends a setTemp operation to the controller every second 
with the required temperature at that point in time. The HeaterController will then use a 
loop running in a thread to increment/decrement the Heater. The threading of this 
algorithm allows it to run asynchronously. 
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The first test script was generated by adding a fault model to the setTempRequest 
message. From the Extended Fault Model the Message Within Tolerance model was 
selected. This model delays the return of a message from the FIE to the Hook Code 
which is within the tolerance of the SOAP protocol stack. 
The first test introduces a 10 second delay into sending the setTemp operation to the 
HeaterController. This latency was chosen because it was large enough to be noticeable 
but less that the default timeout set by SOAP stack for the timeout of RPC operations. 
The visualization feature was used to monitor the thermocouple readings to determine if 
the test scenario had adversely affected the system. 
In this case the temperature increase was not adversely affected. It is possible that this 
is due to the asynchronous nature of the HeaterContro/ler. Since the HeaterController 
is capable of increasing the power to the Heater independently, introducing the latency 
at this point caused the client to request larger temperature increases at a lower 
frequency rather than smaller temperature increases at a higher frequency. The simple 
fault tolerant nature of the HeaterController design allowed these requests to be 
correctly serviced. This is verified by the information contained in the log files once 
they were analyzed. 
The second test introduced latency into the message exchanged between the 
HeaterController and the Heater. As explained previously the HeaterController runs in 
an asynchronous manner, largely independent of the other latencies introduced by other 
components. The HeaterController sends incPower and decPower operations to the 
Heater dependent on the temperature returned by the Thermocouple and the required 
temperature set by the setTemp operation. 
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Figure 6-24: Injecting Latency into the System 
The script introduced a 1 second delay into sending each incPower and decPower 
message to the Heater. In this way the throughput of the HeaterContro/ler to 
Thermocouple message exchange was reduced, and thus the performance of the system 
as a whole was altered. 
The visualization facility was used to monitor the results of this experiment The 
results are given in Figure 6-24 and clearly demonstrate that the SLA for this system 
has not been met Further analysis of the log files confirms that the throughput of 
messages has been significantly reduced and hence the required rise in temperature 
cannot be achieved. 
6.2.3.6 Evaluation 
This scenario has demonstrated how WS-FIT can be used as an aid to dependability 
assessment of QoS constraints. WS-FIT has been used to perform a quantifiable 
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experiment on a simple Web Service based system and used the results to assess the 
impact of unexpected latencies within the system. 
It further demonstrates how the EFM can be used to automatically generate test cases 
from WSDL definitions and specifications with comparable results to test cases 
generated manually. The user can also enhance the EFM through theWS-FIT tool. 
6.3 Summary 
This chapter has presented a number of case studies that demonstrate key features of 
the FIT method and its realisation in WS-FIT. 
The first case study (Section 6.1.1) demonstrated that WS-FIT can inject faults into 
middleware messages, rather than network packets. Using this as a basis the triggering 
mechanism was demonstrated by allowing specific middleware messages to be 
triggered upon. Since individual messages could be targeted it was possible to perturb 
individual parameters within the targeted message. 
The second case study (Section 6.1.2) demonstrates that WS-FIT can be used in an 
Internet based Web Service system in a non-invasive way, with the latency overhead 
being acceptable when used in this configuration. This case study further examined the 
types and amounts of data that can be exchanged in an SOA instrumented with WS-FIT. 
The third case study (Section 6.1.3) demonstrated how the modified Network Level 
Fault Injection technique can be used as part of a specification based certification 
strategy and how it can be used to achieve the same effect as Code Insertion fault 
injection but with the added benefit that it is fare less invasive. Code Insertion also 
. ------------------. --------------- ----------- -- ---
requires access to the service source code to allow placement of extra code where as 
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WS-FIT tests can be based entirely on the WSDL specification since it requires no 
modifications to the service code. 
The fourth case study (Section 6.2.1) builds on the features demonstrated in the first 
three to show how the extended fault model and extended failure models can be applied 
to a SOA to perform a dependability assessment. This case study has demonstrated that 
the Extended Fault Model can be used to automatically generate fault injection test 
campaigns. The Extended Failure Model was applied to the test results to demonstrate 
it's potential for detecting failures in a SOA. This was accomplished by hand although 
at a future time it is envisaged that this functionality could be incorporated into the WS-
FIT tool. Finally this case study demonstrated that it is possible to create parameter 
perturbation using WS-FIT and use it to aid in the dependability assessment of an SO A. 
The fifth case study (Section 6.2.2) used WS-FIT to evaluate a fault tolerance 
mechanisms. Dependability attributes of reliability, integrity and performance were 
assessed by simulating threats in the SOA at known points thus verifying the means that 
were used to eliminate them. This case study not only allowed the demonstration of the 
dependability means and indicated that it provided an increase in dependability but was 
used as part of the debugging process to allow the discovery and repair of two 
undiscovered faults in FT -Grid. It was demonstrated that WS-FIT can be used in a non-
invasive way when applied to a system with timing constraints and did not adversely 
affect the operation of the system. Timing constraints used are typical of a Web Service 
system operating over the Internet. Finally it was demonstrated that WS-FIT can also 
inject faults that do not involve parameter perturbation and thus function as a more 
traditional fault injector. 
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The final case study (Section 6.2.3) was a more detailed demonstration of how 
Communications faults can be applied to a SOA. It was further demonstrated how the 
EFM can be used to automatically generate test cases from WSDL definitions and 
specifications with comparable results to test cases generated manually. A 
demonstration of how the EFM can be enhanced using the tool was also given. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
This thesis has presented research on devising a dependability assessment method for 
Web Services using network level fault injection. Although this work is based on 
standard Web Services the middleware combination used forms the core of current Grid 
middleware Globus 4 so the methods and techniques developed here should be 
applicable to this emerging field. 
After reviewing current research it was found that little work had previously been 
undertaken on perfonning dependability assessment of distributed middleware and in 
particular Web Service and Grid middleware. The closest related work was undertaken 
on the assessment of CORBA middleware by using network level fault injection. This 
presented promising results but it was based on standard network level fault injection 
techniques and as such assessed only the middleware mechanism and protocol stacks 
rather than the CORBA components. 
The FIT method, defined in Chapter 4, uses network level fault injection as a basis 
but extends it in two ways. Firstly it operates at a middleware message level rather than 
a network packet level, thus allowing complete middleware messages to be processed 
rather than having to rely on messages being contained within a single packet. Also by 
operating above the network interface level messages are can be intercepted before they 
are signed or encrypted thus allowing them to be decoded. 
Secondly the FIT method allows, not only normal fault injection techniques to be 
applied to a middleware message, but targeted perturbations of RPC parameters. This 
can be accomplished by processing the message and combining this with information on 
the structure of the interface and messages exchanged. Using this information to 
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construct triggers it is possible to inject specific faults into RPC parameters in a way 
this is comparable to how Code Insertion fault injection injects faults at an API interface 
but in a far less invasive way. 
The FIT method also incorporates a method for classifying and applying fault models 
to a Software-Oriented Architecture (SOA). This is the Extended Fault Model (EFM) 
and it is constructed as a taxonomy classifying faults into specific groupings to aid in 
their application to SOA, thus allowing a toolkit of common fault models to be 
constructed that can be easily applied. 
This can be combined with the FIT concept of a System Model that is derived from 
Interface Definition Language (IDL) definitions of the Services and organizes the SOA 
into a taxonomy with Services at the top level and message parameters at the bottom 
level. Each parameter can be used as a trigger and then be linked to fault models 
contained in the EFM to generate a fault injection campaign. 
Finally the FIT method includes a third taxonomy that allows the classification of 
failure modes in a similar way to the EFM. This is the Extended Failure Model (EF AM) 
and it can be applied in two ways: 1) Applied globally to an SOA to detect unexpected 
failures; 2) Linked to a model in the EFM to detect failures caused by injected faults. 
A realization of the FIT method has been implemented called WS-FIT as detailed in 
Chapter 5. This applies the FIT method to Web Service middleware. WS-FIT 
implements the EFM and System Model whilst the EF AM must be applied by hand to 
the recorded log file at present although it could be incorporated into the tool in the 
fl1t!,lr~. I_b_c;t LOL_definitions for _the _SeiYice_ interfaces and-messages-are extracted- from 
the WSDL definition for the Web Services making up an SOA. 
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The case studies conducted and documented here are intended to demonstrate this 
novel method and its applicability to providing dependability assessment of SOA. The 
case studies documented in Chapter 6 determine parameters for using WS-FIT in a non-
invasive way and demonstrate the key features of the FIT method and its 
implementation WS-FIT. The first (Section 6.1.1) demonstrates the basic operation of 
WS-FIT; The second (Section 6.1.2) demonstrates that under typical Web Service 
environments WS-FIT introduces an acceptable latency overhead into an SOA under 
assessment; the third experiment (Section 6.1.3) compares WS-FIT to another fault 
injection technique and shows it can perform in a comparable way whilst being less 
invasive; the fourth (Section 6.2.1) demonstrates the application of the EFM and the 
EF AM~ the fifth (Section 6.2.2) demonstrates the application of WS-FIT to assess a 
dependability means (Fault Tolerance); whilst the final (Section 6.2.3) demonstrates 
that WS-FIT can perform more traditional fault injection techniques. 
7.1 Criteria For Success 
This section will discuss how this thesis addresses the original criteria for success. 
The following five criteria will be addressed: 
• Method 
• Tool 
• Test Case Construction Method 
• Analysis Method 
• Applicable to both development and testing phases 
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7.1.1 Method 
Devise a method based on network level fault injection to perform 
dependability testing of Web Services. This method should be comparable to 
other code insertion methods but with the added benefit of minimal 
alteration to code. 
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This thesis has documented a method based on a modified version of network level 
fault injection (Section 4.2) which allows parameter perturbation to be achieved as well 
as a more traditional use of network level fault injection, for instance Corruption; 
Reordering; and Dropping of network packets. This method has been applied to Web 
Services through the WS-FIT tool (Section 5.2) and it has been demonstrated that 
parameter perturbation can be applied (Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.3, 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). 
Further WS-FIT can be used in a non-invasive way, for instance with minimal 
introduced latency (Section 5.2.5 and 6.1.2) and also WS-FIT has been compared to 
Code Insertion fault injection (Section 6.1.3). It has been demonstrated that Code 
Insertion fault injection requires both access to the source code and many modifications 
whilst WS-FIT requires only the insertion of hook code in two places in a middleware 
stack. Since these modifications need not necessarily be on the machine hosting the 
service (Section 5.2) it is conceivable that WS-FIT could be used as part of a 
certification strategy since the server running the code need not be changed in any way 
from a production environment. 
7.1.2 Tool 
Construct a- tool-for use with the -method This wol-will be- tltilored to 
injecting fault into SOAP packets and will handle the decoding of SOAP 
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packets so that lightweight scripts can be written by the user to implement 
test cases without the complexity of decoding SOAP packets. 
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The FIT method (Chapter 4) has been realized in a tool (Chapter 5) that applies the 
FIT method to Web Services using SOAP middleware. The tool intercepts and decodes 
middleware messages (Section 5.2) to allow the construction of lightweight test scripts 
(Section 5.3) that do not require SOAP messages to be decoded by the scripts. 
The application of theWS-FIT tool to Web Services and the generation of scripts is 
demonstrated in Appendix A where a sample script is generated via the tool. A further 
demonstration of the use of scripting is given in Sections 6.1.3 and 6.2. 
7.1.3 Test Case Construction Method 
Devise a method to construct test cases for the method given above. This 
method should be devised to allow easy automation so that it can be 
incorporated into the tool. 
The FIT method describes the concepts of a System Model and an Extended Fault 
Model (Section 4.3) that allows the construction of test scripts. The System Model 
represents all operations that can occur within the system so that triggers can be defmed, 
whilst the Extended Fault Model contains predefined fault models that can be applied to 
these operations. The use of the Extended Fault Model and System Model is 
demonstrated in Sections 6.1.3 and 6.2 where it is applied to a SOA to construct a fault 
injection campaign. A further demonstration of the use of the Extended Fault Model is 
given in Section 6.2.2 where it is applied by a third party to a third party system to 
· ~assessa-aepencUi5ility means. 
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7.1.4 Analysis Method 
Devise an analysis method to assess dependability of result sets generated 
by the method. This analysis method should be applicable not only to the 
test phase of system development but also to the development stage. 
The FIT method defines the concept of an Extended Failure Model and how to use it 
(Section 5.4). The Extended Failure Model contains a taxonomy that groups individual 
failure modes so they can be easily applied to a System Model. Whilst this mechanism 
has not been integrated into theWS-FIT implementation it has been possible to apply it 
by hand to demonstrate its potential. The application of the Extended Failure Model has 
been demonstrated in Section 6.2. 
7.1.5 Applicable to both development and testing phases 
The methods and tools should be applicable, no only to the testing phase of 
a project but also to the development phase. The method should also be able 
to test systems without access to source code. 
The Extended Fault Model (Section 4.3) and Extended Failure Model (Section 4.4) 
are applicable to systems in a testing phase as demonstrated in Section 6.2.1 and to 
systems in a development phase as was demonstrated in Section 6.2.2 where previously 
unknown faults were uncovered in a third party system. 
7.2 Future Work 
Firstly we intend to apply WS-FIT to more complex systems to allow us to, not only 
improve and develop our method and tools, but to collect metrics for use by our 
-- -~- -- - ~---· --~-----·---------------~ 
-------- ---- -
-------------------
Extended Fault Model and Extended Failure Model. This will allow us to refine our 
ontology and assess its reliability in detecting failure states in SOA. 
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In Section 6.1.2 WS-FIT was demonstrated to introduce a polynomial latency 
overhead when applied to RPC messages that contained large numbers of multiple 
elements within a SOAP message, for instance large arrays. Whilst this latency was 
demonstrated to be acceptable for small numbers of elements it quickly becomes 
invasive with increasing element size. Research is therefore required into reducing this 
latency overhead possibly by eliminating the use of a SAX parser and using a custom 
written state machine instead which may reduce the latency to a linear latency. 
Currently theWS-FIT implementation does not integrate the Extended Failure Model 
into the tool and this part of the method must be applied by hand to the generated logs. 
Whilst this is acceptable for short test campaigns it would soon become time consuming 
for analysing large test campaigns that may run for log periods of time. We therefore 
propose that theWS-FIT tool should be extended to include this functionality, either as 
a post processing step or as part of the runtime visualization. 
The Extended Fault Model and Extended Failure Model detailed in this thesis are 
intended only as proof of concepts and will need populating before they can be useful to 
real world dependability assessment case studies. Further enhancements should be made 
so that they will be capable of producing metric-based evaluations of fault injection on 
SOA. The aim is to improve dependability in services by providing criteria and metrics 
capable of evaluating dependability as well as uncovering faults for fault removal. This 
should produce comparison metrics capable of facilitating value judgments in the 
dependability of competing services as well as being of use in the debugging and testing 
phases of a product to assess dependability means. 
One of the aims of this research has been to utilise FIT with current Grid 
technologies. Integration with the Globus 4 Toolkit would be advantageous since 
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Globus is the front running Grid technology and should be relatively straightforward 
since they share both Tomcat and Axis SOAP as a core but detailed experiments will 
have to be carried out in order to determine differences in message syntax. 
From the case studies carried out here it was ascertained that the FIT method requires 
an experienced tester to utilize the method since expert knowledge of testing is required 
to select injection points within the system. Whilst FIT simplifies this process it has not 
been possible at this stage to totally automate the process. The FIT method currently 
defines an ontology that describes a system, the faults that can occur within it and the 
failures that can be observed. These are linked to allow specific failures to be deteched 
after a fault injection. Another ontology and engine is required that would utilise this 
information as a base but would construct fault injection campaigns utilising heuristic 
testing and rules captured in the ontology. 
Finally applying FIT to a binary middleware, for instance CORBA, would 
demonstrate that FIT could be easily ported amongst dissimilar middleware products. 
CORBA is a good candidate since there is widespread use of CORBA and it also shares 
the concept of an IDL to define its interfaces. CORBA IDL does not define message 
formats for RPC exchanges but these can be inferred from the CORBA specification 
and since these message are binary in nature they would provide a good test of the 
portability of FIT since WS-FIT is based on an XML format message. 
7.3 Summary 
This thesis has documented the FIT method and the WS-FIT tool that realizes this 
method.-The-F'I'f-method-fulfils the criteria detailed in Ghapter-1 and-provides a-basis 
for future research. 
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The modified version of network level fault injection, which works at a middleware 
message level rather than a packet level, used by the FIT method allows faults to be 
injected into Services in a manner that is comparable to Code Insertion fault injection 
with the added benefit that it requires far fewer modifications to a system than Code 
Insertion and can be implemented without the need for access to the source code of the 
servtce. 
The System Model described here allows a service-based system to be described for 
the purpose of constructing triggers on messages without access to the Service source 
code. These triggers can then be used as a basis to undertake traditional network level 
fault injection or parameter perturbation. 
The Extended Fault Model allows fault models to be categorized into descriptive 
classifications that can then be used to guide construction of fault injection campaigns. 
These fault models can then be linked to specific parameters/messages in the System 
Model and fault injection scripts can be automatically generated. 
The Extended Failure Model allows failure modes to be categorised into descriptive 
groupings that again can aid a tester in selecting the correct failure mode. Individual 
failure modes can then be linked to individual fault models as expected outcomes and 
thus allow automation of failure detection to take place. 
WS-FIT is the realization of the FIT method and it has been applied to a number of 
case studies and has successfully demonstrated these features. It has also been applied 
successfully to a third-party SOA to evaluate a dependability means (fault tolerance) 
__ and not onjy_~rform~d_this_dependabilityassessment but allowed debugging of _the 
mechanism to be undertaken to uncovering two unknown faults in the SOA. 
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Appendix A- WS-FIT Tool 
This appendix describes the operation of theWS-FIT tool. WS-FIT is implemented as 
a GUI application written in Java. Java was chosen because it allowed portability 
between platforms and there were also a number of packages available which simplified 
the parsing of SOAP messages. Python was chosen as the scripting language because it 
allowed object oriented scripts to be written which simplified the design and 
implementation of the support classes and also because it can be executed natively using 
the jython package from a Java JVM. 
The WS-FIT GUI is divided into a number of tabbed panes (See Figure A-1 ). They 
are: 
][njection Model - Allows a System Model to be constructed and used as detailed in 
Section 5.3.1 
Fault Model - This allows the entry and manipulation of the Extended Fault Model 
described in Section 5.3.2 
Execution - Allows a constructed test campaign to be executed and logged. This also 
allows real-time visualization of specified RPC parameters. 
Other tabs are implemented for debugging purposes. 
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"'"'" '"" 
File System Model Fa=u=lt =M=od:_::e_l -,--.,----:-:-~=--=======::=-
About Injection Model Fault Model Execution Script Analys is 
Web Service - Faull Injection Technology 
University of Dumam 
Vtr>lon O.S Calphal 
Figure A-1: Start-up Screen 
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The Fault Model tab (See Figure A-2) allows the entry and manipulation of the 
Extended Fault Model (EFM). As shown in Table 5-5 a proof of concept EFM has been 
developed and this can be modified by using the Fault Model tab. 
The Fault Model tab is split into three main parts: 
1. A tree on the left hand side ofthe tab representing the Extended Fault Model 
2. A dialog on the right hand side of the tab that allows data entry and display. This 
is context sensitive and its contents depend on which type of element is selected 
from the EFM tree on the left hand panel. 
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3. A set of context sensitive buttons on the lower right hand side of the tab. Again 
these are context sensitive and depend on which type of element is selected from 
the EFM tree in the left hand panel. 
File System Model Fault Model 
I About lr\iection Model I hliltMHel j Execution Script Analys is ) 
:.. Custom Fault Model 
., Corruption of Data Into Web Service 
., 
., 
., 
., 
Vaules In Range 
Random Vaules 
Variable : enable 
-
_ lnfomatlon Script 
Upper Bound 
Variable : enable 
lnfomatlon Script 
_ Generate Script 
Lower Bound 
Variable : enable 
_ lnfomatlon Script 
Generate Script 
Corruption of Data out of Web Service 
Figure A-2: An Extended Fault Model 
The tool allows new high-level groupings of fault models to be added, such as 
Software Fault, Physical Fault, etc. and then sub-groupings to be added as 
decompositions until a fault model can be defined through scripting. 
As a brief example a Communications Faults grouping can be added and grouped 
within this a sub-grouping of Server Loading (See Figure A-3). This can be done 
through the context sensitive buttons. At each stage the names for each of these 
categorizations can be entered. 
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File System Model Fault Model 
I About 1'1)oction Model Fault Model Execution Script Analysis 1 
Custom FiUlt Model 
9 COrruptiOn of Oiti Into Web Service 
• Vaules in Range 
• Random vaules 
Variable. enable 
lnfomatlon SCript 
• Upper Bound 
Variable. enable 
lnfomatlon SC ript 
Generate SCript 
• Lower Bound 
Variable: enable 
tnfomatlon SCript 
Genorate SCript 
COrruption ol Data out of Web Servi<e 
• Communlutlons Faults 
SubSMtlon 
Sub Section Name: Server Loading 
Figure A-3: Adding a new Sub-Section to a Extended Fault Model 
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Once suitable categorizations have been entered a fault model can be added to the 
appropriate sub-group (See Figure A-4). A Fault Model is made up of a python script 
that generates a fragment of script to run as part of the fault injection campaign (See 
Figure A-5). Details of how the script is implemented are given in Chapter 5. The script 
shown in Figure A-5 implements a simple constant delay in processing the SOAP 
message. This can be though of as equivalent to a server with a constant loading and 
therefore a constant latency in returning a SOAP request. A generate script is the 
minimum required to implement a fault model. 
Some fault models will require data to be entered, for instance a variable to say if the 
fault model is enabled or a value to say how many times to iterate a sequence. These 
can be added to the Fault Model by using the Add Variable button (See Figure A-6). 
These state variables are then stored as part of the state information available in the 
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System Model (See section 0) that also contains other state information such as 
parameter upper and lower bounds. This state information can then be retrieved and 
used in the scripts. 
File System Model Fault Mo:::..:de'-1 --,=:=c==:;=:=:::;=::;:=;:7'1'"'~~7r:;=:-:-::-::====;=,=::=;:=.=:;::=;----------
J About Injection Model 1 --1 Execution S<ript Anolyols ) ----------
Custom Fauft Model 
• CcwrupbOn d o.ua into Wt 
Y Vaulu In Range 
VINblt: INbl 
lnlor'Ntlon Scri~ 
1' Upper Bound 
V1.Nble . tnlbl 
lnlomition SCr1' 
Gener~.tt SCrlpl 
"' l.OWir lourd 
VaNbtt . tMbl 
lnfonuUon Scri' 
Gtneratt Script 
Cotruption cl Dati. out ol ' • 
• Comrnunlutions Faulrs 
• ~ Serwr loading 
FoultModt!Node 
Tut Name: Con.st.tnt 
( Add Variable ) ( Add Info Script ) ( Add Gen S<ript ) ( Add Monitor ) ~ ~ ~ 
Figure A-4: Adding a new Fault Model to the Extended Fault Model 
Some scripts require complex setup and initialization. For this purpose it is possible 
to add an information script in the same manner as a generate script. The info script is 
executed when the fault model is selected and can be used to display an interface that 
can be used to enter complex information as well as processing the information. If the 
information script is not present any variables added to the fault model are 
automatically displayed as appropriate controls, for instance check boxes for Boolean 
variables, text boxes for string variables, etc. 
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J Custom Fauk fllode l 
Y Co.-ruptlon of oa .. lmo Wt!b SoMCe 
• VauJes In Range 
Y Random Vaules 
.. 
.. 
Variable. enable 
lnfo.-natlon Script 
Upper Bound 
Variable. enable 
lnlo.-nauon Script 
Generare Script 
Lower Bound 
Variable: enable 
lnfo.-nallon Script 
Generate Script 
CO<ruptlon of oa .. out of Web Sorvite 
" CommunkaUOns Faults 
Y Server Load ing 
,. conisi .. l"'lllllll 
Variable: enable 
if enable •• 1· 
out.println(l Constant Server Loading1 
out.prin!ln(lime.Sieep(l)') 
Cen~ripl 
( Delete ~ript ) ~ ~ { Delete ) 
Figure A-5: Adding a Generation Script to a Fault Model 
File System Model Fault Model 
J About Injection Model Fault Model Execution ~npt An~VSIS 
Custom Fault Model 
Y Corruption of oa .. Into Web Service 
Y vaulu In Range 
• Riilndom Vaults 
Variable enable 
lntomotion Script 
Y Upper Bound 
Variable. enable 
lnlo.-nauon Script 
Gentrltt Scr1pt 
Y LDwer Bound 
Variable; enable 
lnfo<natlon Script 
Generace Script 
Co.-ruptJon of oa .. out ot Web Service 
• COmmunications Faulu 
Y Server Loading 
• Constam 
_ Generate SCnpt 
Figure A-6: Adding a variable to a script 
Var 
Variable Name: enable 
V.ariable Label : enable 
Variable Type: :;o;K~ 
( Delete Variable ) ~ ~ ~ 
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A.2 System Model 
Once an EFM has been constructed it can be applied to a system model. A system 
model can be constructed by using the Injection Model tab. 
Since a System Model is made up of interface definitions a System Model can be 
populated by importing WSDL definitions for all services making up an SOA. This is 
done using the Import WSDL function (See Figure A-7). 
',...,..." 
file System Model fault Model 
-----1 About 1'1)tctlon Modtl fault Modtl Execution Scri pt A~Wvsl• !--- --- --
.. , 
SknpleTrl.dt .wsdl 
StockQuote.wsd l 
Open 
Wodnudaf: MAr II , 2001 1:14 Ptol 
Wednesday, Mly 11, 2005 1:53 PM 
Wtd nudiy, Ml.y 11, 2005 1 51 PM 
file Format : , WSDL File• (.wsdll ------,:ij 
Figure A-7: Importing WSDL into a System Model 
Imported WSDL is decomposed into a tree structure in the left hand tree pane. This 
shows a root entry for the Web Service, followed by the PortType, Operations, 
Messages and finally Parts. 
Any number of Web Service can be imported in this way including duplicate Web 
Services to represent replicated services running on multiple servers. To differentiate 
these replicated Web Services the server address can be added to a specific Web Service 
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definition (See Figure A-8), thus making it a unique IP/Web Service combination that 
can be used as part of the triggering mechanism. In this way different IP/Web Service 
combinations can hand different fault models applied to them . 
. ('\ ('\ ('\ 
File Syst-em- M-od:-:-ei - Fa-ul:-1 M-odel 
• J# 5irnpi<S.nk 
• ~ deposit 
• J dtpos~ 
• MelSI.ge P.arameren 
amount 
• ,1 dtposllRuponse 
Mesnge Panmettrs 
_ 1mount 
'f' ,.1 withdriwRUponst 
MtSSlgt P.rlmtttn 
• J bUI.nct 
• J b1Lince 
MtSYQI P.irilmtttn 
• J bi~nc:tResponst 
Y ~ Mtnlgt Plrlmtttrs 
baiAnctA.tNm 
J About lnje<tlon Modtl Foult Model Execution Script Analysis l- - -
dlflnitions 
S.Mct Address: 192.168.0.1 
Figure A-8: Associating a Server with a Web Service 
Since WSDL does not include any parameter bounds information other than general 
bounds associated with the type specification it is possible enter specific bounds 
information from a more detailed specification using the GUI (See Figure A-9). This 
information can then be utilized by the fault model scripts to generate appropriate fault 
campaign code. 
Once the System Model has been constructed individual parameters can be associated 
with specific fault models contained within the EFM (See Figure A-1 0). In the example 
given in Figure A-1 0 the Constant Server Loading fault model is associated to a specific 
parameter in the System Model. This will then generate the appropriate code fragment 
complete with trigger conditions in the final fault injection campaign script. 
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More complex fault injection fault models can be implemented on a message basis by 
adding a manually written generation script to either the Message or Part on which they 
will operate. By adding a script to the Message the complete message body is available 
for manipulation whilst if the script is attached to the parameter only the parameter tags 
and body are available. In this way syntax errors can be introduced into the message to 
test the middleware protocol stack or to introduce fault models that the EFM cannot 
handle. 
~ hUD.//blllk.laul!UJI.samplu.w>fil.OtV 
.. ,1 Simpllll•nk 
• J deposit 
• ~ deposit 
,. Message PArameters 
"""'""' • J depositR.tstKJMt 
Mesw.ge Pifimtters 
Y J withdraw 
Y wtthdriwRtsponst 
Muw.ge P1r1meters 
., ,.1 b•lonu 
Mtss1.ge Pirlmtttrs 
• ,J b1t.oceResponu 
,. J Mtsw.ge Plrlmtttn 
.. 
J About Injection Modtl Fwlt Modol Execution Script Anolysls ~ 
part 
Pa~ete.r Name: balanuRetum 
Paramt:ter TyJM!: xsd:doublt 
Monitor: 0 
Lower Bound: 0 
Uppor Bound: 2000.00 
~ ( AddModll ) 
Figure A-9: Manually adding bounds information to an RPC parameter 
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File System Model Fau:.:..lt M:_:_o::.::d~el----;r=:===:::::=:::::::::::;:;::;::=::=;::=:=:=:=:=--:==.=-~-,---==:=;=:==;­
~ About 
r_ hltp.//banl<.t•ulnol.s•mplts.wsfitorg--
r • SimpleBank 
• deposit 
• deposit 
• Mesnge P~ra.mtttn 
amoun1 
T depositRuponse 
Mesnge Parameters 
• withdraw 
.., Withdraw 
• Mesnge P.i ramelers 
J.mount 
T wfthdrawResponse 
Message Parameters 
• ba~nce 
• bJ.linceRuponse 
• Mess1ge Pu ameters 
• bii~nceRewrn 
-
Corrupllon ol Dati lniD Web S.Mc:e 
• Vaults In R•nge 
Random Vaules 
Upptr Bound 
Lowor Bound 
FaultModel 
Corruption ol Data out of Web SefVIct 
Communki.tlons FaullS 
• Serwr loidlng 
-
enablo 
Figure A-10: Associating a Fault Model from the EFM to an RPC parameter 
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Once a System Model has been constructed a fault injection campatgn script ts 
automatically generated (See Figure A-ll). The fault injection campaign script ts 
generated by executing all the fault model generation scripts in sequence whilst 
generating the appropriate trigger code for each generated fragment. The script can be 
viewed on the Script tab that is included for debugging purposes. 
The script fragment shown in Figure A-ll shows the trigger code to trigger on the 
balanceReturn parameter of the balance response message from the bank Web Service. 
The fault model applied generates a 1 second timed delay in returning the result but 
otherwise leaves the message unaltered. 
Once the correct fault injection campaign script has been generated it can be executed 
using the Execute tab. The execute tab is structured as two panes: 
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• The top panel which displays visualization information 
• The bottom panel that contains context sensitive buttons 
' 11110 
File System Model Fault Model 
21: def crute(selfl: 
24: return UserlnjoctScrlptO 
25 : 
i About 11\Jt<tlon Modtl Fault Modtl Execution Script Analysis )-
26: def injoctStillt(self, no.mo, &ttrs, Address): 
27: if self.checkName(name, attn, 'nsl :tmanceResponse', 'hnp://M.nk.faulttol .sAmples .wsfit.org', '•' , address): 
28: solf.m_msg • 43 
29: return None 
30: 
11: def irl)ectllody(self, n&me, &ttrs, body): 
32: self.m_par.un • 0 
33: if ulf.m..msg •• 43 : 
34: if name -- 'baJanceReturn': 
35: self.m_par&m • 75 
36: if self.m_param •• 75 : 
3 7: I Constant Server Loading 
38: time.51eep(l) 
19: return None 
40: 
4 1: def ii\JectEnd(self, name, attrs): 
42 : return None 
43: 
44:sorver.stvtServer(User1rl)ectScript0, UserResult(monitorCraph,log)) 
Figure A-11: Scripts generated from System Model using applied EFM 
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To start a fault injection campaign running the start button is pressed. This prompts 
the user to select a log file (See Figure A-12) that will be used to log the fault injection 
campaign as described in Section 5.2. Once the fault injection campaign is executing the 
top panel will display simple visualizations of RPC parameters (See Figure A-13 ). 
Simple numeric parameter in RPC can be configured to be monitored by selecting a 
'Monitor' check box for the parameter in the system model (See Figure A-9). 
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Figure A-12: Specifying a log file to record fault injection campaign execution 
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Figure A-13: Fault Injection Campaign execution 
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A.4 Summary 
This appendix has documented how the WS-FIT tool realises the FIT method 
(Chapter 4) and implementation (Chapter 5) and has briefly shown how the EFM and 
System model can be constructed and used to assess a SO A. 
This chapter has also examined under what circumstances WS-FIT can be considered 
non-intrusive as far as introduced latency is concerned. The demonstrations documented 
here indicate parameters for using WS-FIT. 
Firstly, under normal conditions an RPC exchange over an Internet connection can 
take ofthe order of seconds to complete, including Web Service execution time with the 
default timeout for Axis SOAP being 10 seconds. This baseline demonstrated that there 
can be a large variation in the execution time of a Web Service RPC running over an 
Internet connection depending on the load that connection is under. WS-FIT can be 
considered acceptable if its induced latency falls within this variability. 
Secondly, it was demonstrated that the number of triggers utilised by WS-FIT in a 
fault injection campaign gave a linear rise in latency which was within the standard 
deviation of the baseline non-instrumented data over the number of triggers tested and 
was thus and acceptable overhead. 
Thirdly, it was demonstrated that for a Web Service RPC which utilised multiple 
element data structures such as arrays the latency introduced into the SOA rose linearly 
depending on the number of elements in the data structure. The same SOA instrumented 
for use with WS-FIT gives a polynomial rise dependent on message size. This is to be 
. - expected-since-the-SOAP-message-is-parsed-and-each-element -within-the-messagemust. 
be processed. 
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By examining the data from the experiment an upper bound of 450 elements could be 
chosen since this falls below the default timeout of 10 seconds although under these 
circumstances WS-FIT could affect the running system. This upper value could also be 
adjusted if a larger timeout was set in the SOA to allow for long processing times by the 
Web Service etc. 
.. 
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